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Abstract
In 2002, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) created Money Exchange Companies with the
aim to create a well-documented, corporatized foreign exchange market in order to
eliminate the informal, undocumented and illegal hawala. This has not happened. The
purpose of this research was to investigate why the 2002 reforms have failed to eliminate
hawala in Pakistan. It is a descriptive case study analysis, which has relied on both primary
and secondary data sources. The secondary data comprised the available literature and other
published sources while primary research data was gathered by conducting semi-structured
interviews with the various hawala market stakeholders so as to describe the ‘on the
ground’ implementation of the reforms and explain the operational dynamics of the market
in the post reform years. It was found that despite the 2002 reforms two types of hawala
markets are functioning in Pakistan. One comprises exchange companies, their dealers and
agents and the other is ‘pure hawala’ in Pakistan-Afghanistan border cities. It was also
found that the formally regulated exchange companies and the unregulated hawala market
are closely integrated, having domestic and international networks. Moreover, the project
that the SBP initiated to counter hawala’s inherent incentive is mired in scandal and
corruption in which billions have allegedly been doled out from the public exchequer as a
result of alleged collusion between commercial banks and officials of the SBP. The 2002
reforms were fundamentally ill-conceived and introduced without taking steps that were
required to mitigate the impact of those factors that directly challenge hawala regulation in
Pakistan. These include the existence of a Frontier Crimes Regulation that excluded the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the shadow economy and its criminal elements,
rampant tax evasion, ineffective and overriding legislation and corruption and tax evasion
by the Pakistani elite. Failure to address these factors led to the failure of the 2002 reforms.
Funds which are generated through tax evasion and corruption constitute a large part of
Pakistan’s shadow economy and are subsequently siphoned off through the use of hawala.
The Pakistani ruling governments are unwilling to take action to introduce fundamental
taxation reforms as the majority of the elected politicians do not themselves pay income
tax. An active role by the international donors who could have used their substantial
influence to push the Pakistani ruling elite for essential reforms has remained elusive.
xv

The integration of hawala in today’s globalized world is due to disparities and irregularities
in international trade as well as repressive and restrictive government policies. Regulations
that attempt to control hawala with the reporting and compliance standards applicable to
banking and other formal structures could not produce successful results in mitigating the
risks of abuse of the informal transfer systems as long as policy prescriptions do not
consider the salient features of hawala-type informal systems that make them a preferable
choice in the different geographical, economic and cultural realities. In Pakistan’s case, the
‘dual function’ of hawala — channelling development finance to the poor and the
underserved as well as facilitating illicit financial flows — is the critical policy factor that
needs to be considered for effective regulation of these informal transfer systems. Whilst
Pakistan’s peculiar geo-political situation and administrative and institutional issues require
a multi-track hawala regulatory strategy, the weak and failing Pakistani state lacks the
capacity to undertake multifarious regulatory responsibilities. The SBP therefore, needs to
review its hawala regulatory strategy from that of one which views hawala as completely
outlawed to a more inclusive one by bringing the hawaladars into the legal network by
offering them suitable incentives.
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Chapter 1:
1.1

Introduction

Current Interest in Hawala

‘Hawala’ is one type of a number of Informal Value Transfer Systems 1 (‘IVTS’) that came
under public scrutiny after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States
(‘9/11’) and in the context of the US led ‘War on Terror’.2 It could be argued that the
increased international interest in hawala is largely driven by the global efforts toward
countering terrorism financing.3 However, 9/11 is not the starting point of international
interest in hawala. The starting point for the interest of international organizations and
financial regulatory agencies in hawala-type informal transfers was in the mid 1980s when
efforts were being made to tighten the control and regulation of financial crimes such as
money laundering.4 This in turn was part of the global response, driven by the United
Nations, to combat the illicit sale of narcotic and psychotropic drugs. 5 Around the same
time, the international development agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF noticed
that large volumes of remittances were being transferred by migrant workers working in the
high-income economies of the West and the North through the use of informal transfer
channels to their countries of residence, mostly in the low and middle-income economies of
the South and the East.6 They also suspected that the volume of these transfers might
surpass, if recorded, other (formal) inflows such as development aid and foreign direct
investment to these countries.7 Hence, initial interest in IVTS can be attributed to both these
1

Hawala and IVTS are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. Hawala is one of the many IVTSs that
have developed over time. These ‘arrange for transfer and receipt of funds or equivalent value and settle
through trade, cash, and net settlement over a long period of time’ and are distinguished by ‘their use of non
bank settlement methods’: FATF, The Role of Hawala and Other Similar Service Providers in Money
Laundering
and
Terrorist
Financing
(3
December
2013)
<http://www.fatfgafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/documents/role-hawalas-in-ml-tf.html>.The equivalence of these IVTS is
noted in FATF’s reference to them as ‘Hawala and Other Similar Service Providers’ (HOSSPs). See Chapter
2 for detailed explanation.
2
Following 9/11, President Bush addressed a joint session of the US Congress and the nation on 20
September 2001, and rallied support for ‘War on Terror’. For transcript of complete speech see Media Mill
Works, ‘Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation’, Washington Post, 20 September 2001
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html>.
3
See Thomas J Biersteker and Sue E Eckert (eds), Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Routledge, 2008).
4
See Mark Pieth (ed), Financing Terrorism (Kluwer Academic, 2002).
5
Ibid.
6
Paul Allan Schott, Reference Guide to Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism
(World Bank 2nd ed, 2006).
7
Dilip Ratha, ‘Workers’ Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance’ in
World Bank, Global Development Finance (The World Bank, 2003).

1

factors. Subsequently, in the early 1990s, globalization of international trade and finance
and technological advancements that radically increased the speed with which capital,
goods and labour can be moved around the globe along with equally radical reductions in
the cost of so doing has created a ‘borderless world’,8 particularly when it comes to the
instantaneous electronic movement of funds across the globe.9 All of these factors have
raised interest in the use of IVTS and highlighted the need for research into the mechanisms
used and the effects of such transactions. On the other hand, the informality of value
transfers allegedly ‘outside’ the conventionally regulated banking and financial systems
raises regulatory alarms particularly when the use of IVTS are viewed in conjunction with
international efforts towards financial regulation and transparency. The informal ways
through which value or funds may be transferred has become a regulatory concern as the
IVTS are believed ‘to exploit ... vulnerabilities in financial systems that allow for an
inappropriate level of anonymity and non-transparency in the execution of financial
transactions’.10
1.2 Regulatory Efforts to Counter IVTS
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances 198811 was the first international legal instrument which contains provisions
combating financial crimes such as money laundering, although it does not use the specific
term. The United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
1999 had recognized the need to deal with terrorism financing but had not received
widespread support until 9/11.12 Following 9/11, in the context of the war on terror, far
reaching new regulation of financial institutions and transactions has been put in place in
order to detect and prevent the financing of terrorism and money laundering more
8

Janet Ceglowski, ‘Has Globalization Created a Borderless World?’ Business Review (March/April 1998)17–
22.
9
Jonathan M. Winer, ‘Globalization, Terrorist Finance, and Global Conflict: Time for a White List?’ in Mark
Pieth (ed), Financing Terrorism (Kluwer Academic, 2002)5–40.
10
International Monetary Fund, Fact Sheet: The IMF and the Fight against Money Laundering and the
Financing of Terrorism (30 September 2013) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/aml.htm>.
11
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature
20December 1988, 1582 UNTS 95 (entered into force 11 November 1990).Subsequently referred to as the
‘Vienna Convention’.
12
While only 41 nations had signed prior to 9/11, many signed in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks
and rapidly ratified the Convention.

2

generally. These efforts towards establishing global standards, also referred to as Anti
Money Laundering/Countering Financing of Terrorism AML/CFT regulations, are
considered essential to protect the integrity of markets and the global financial framework
as they mitigate the factors that facilitate financial abuse. The World Bank defines ‘money
laundering’ as, ‘a process by which the illicit source of assets obtained or generated by
criminal activity is concealed to obscure the link between the funds and the original
criminal activity’.13 ‘Terrorism financing’ refers to ‘raising and processing of funds to
supply terrorists to carry out their attacks’.14 The two phenomena are completely different;
yet they are believed to exploit similar vulnerabilities in the financial systems and use
similar techniques.15 For this reason, the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism 1999, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1267
impose obligations on Member States to take measures to protect their financial systems
from being misused. Moreover, the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime 2003 and the United Nations Convention against Corruption 2005 are
legal instruments that broaden the scope of the money laundering offence beyond the
proceeds of drug trafficking to include all serious crimes. These Conventions urge ‘Member
States to create comprehensive domestic supervisory and regulatory regime for banks and
non-bank financial institutions, including natural and legal persons, as well as any entities
particularly susceptible to being involved in a money laundering scheme’.16 Under the
obligations of these Conventions, Member States are called to ensure effective regulation
through establishment of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs).
The primary policy-making body responsible for developing worldwide standards for AML
and CFT is the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), currently a 36
member intergovernmental body established by the 1989 G-7 Summit in Paris. In 1990,
FATF published Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and in the aftermath of the
13

Schott, above n 6, 1.
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),UN Instruments and Other Relevant International
Standards on Money-Laundering and Terrorist Financing, UNODC<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/moneylaundering/Instruments-Standards.html?ref=menuside>. See, eg, Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, opened for signature 15 November 2000, 2225 UNTS 213 (entered into force 29 September 2003) art
7; Convention against Corruption, opened for signature 31 October 2003, 2349 UNTS 41 (entered into force
14 December 2005) art 14.
14

3

2001 attacks, a further Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorism Financing were added
with a Ninth Special Recommendation (on cash couriers) subsequently added in 2004.
Collectively, these are called the FATF 40+9 Recommendations, and set out a framework
of measures to bring about legislative and regulatory reforms in areas such as the criminal
justice system, the financial sector, certain non-financial businesses and professions, and
other mechanisms of international cooperation.17 The FATF works in cooperation with
other international organizations such as the United Nations, IMF, World Bank, Asian
Development Bank and regional FATF-style bodies such as the Asia Pacific Group on
Money Laundering (APGML). These organizations work to develop international
AML/CFT policies, conduct financial sector assessments, provide technical assistance in
the financial sector and exercise surveillance over member countries’ economic systems in
order to evaluate countries’ compliance with the international AML/CFT standards.
An important component of the work of these organizations is the study of methods,
techniques and trends within financial systems that may be used for financial crimes such as
money laundering and terrorism financing. Since IVTS is an important area, FATF’s
Special Recommendation (SR) VI18 on Alternative Remittance Systems reads:
Every country should take measures to ensure that persons or legal entities, including
agents that provide a service for the transmission of money or value, including
transmission of money or value through an informal money or value transfer system or
network, should be licensed or registered and subject to all the FATF
Recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial institutions. Each
country should ensure that persons or legal entities that carry out this service illegally
are subject to administrative, civil, or criminal sanctions.

1.3 Results of Hawala Regulation
In pursuance of FATF’s AML/CFT standards, during the past decade various countries and
jurisdictions in the world have attempted compliance by introducing reforms in their
17

FATF Recommendations 1996; 2003; 2001; 2012.
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), Combating the Abuse of Alternative
Remittance System: International Best Practices(SR-VI),(2003)
<http://www.fatfgafi.org/documents/documents/internationalbestpracticescombatingtheabuseofalternativeremi
ttancesystemssrvi.html>.
18

4

financial systems to ensure increased transparency and more thorough reporting of financial
transactions. At the same time, countries have attempted different approaches19 to regulate
the informal value transfer systems. Many countries have involved formal banks in the
remittance market and these have introduced better financial products with the aim to
disincentivize the informal hawala-type transfer channels. It is interesting that despite such
concerted efforts at the international as well as national levels, hawala still prevails as the
most popular choice for its customers. To say that the efforts to regulate hawala in various
countries during the past decade have largely been unsuccessful would not be an understatement. So far there has been no significant attempt to assess the post 9/11 regulatory
efforts that countries have introduced to curb hawala-type transfers.
1.4

Aims of the Study

The research takes Pakistan’s hawala regulation as a case study with the aim to:
i) identify and describe the challenges that financial regulators and policy-makers face in
regulating hawala.,
ii) clarify our understanding of whether, and if so, how effective these regulatory activities
have been, and
iii) to the extent that the attempts to regulate hawala in Pakistan have proved problematic,
the thesis aims to explore why is this so? What works and what does not, and why does it
matter? From the answers to these questions, better solutions for regulating hawala in
Pakistan can be developed, which in turn has implications for FATF’s legal and regulatory
framework that guides international regulation of the hawala-type transfer systems.
1.5

Thesis Structure

In order to achieve the aims of the study, it is imperative to develop an understanding of
hawala-type systems. Terms and definitions that are used for such systems as well as the
various names these systems have in different cultures and locations are explained in
Chapter 2 by reviewing the available literature on hawala. It then explains the origin of
these systems, how and why they have spread far and wide as well as their revival. Next, it
19

See Chapter 2.

5

introduces the issues financial regulators face in dealing with hawala-type financial
transfers and presents the arguments for the need for regulating these systems. Various
approaches that have been introduced to regulate these informal systems are discussed and
the problems these approaches face are identified. Finally, the chapter sums up the hawala
regulation debate by identifying the problem and points to the direction in which the present
study will make a contribution to the knowledge gap.
After identifying the purpose of the study, Chapter 3 introduces the methodology used to
achieve the stated purpose. In Chapter 3, the choice of a case study methodology for the
thesis as well as the conceptual framework of the present research is justified by first
explaining the choice of a case study as the methodology and then the selection of Pakistan
as the country to be studied. Various stages of the case study design are explained, and
research questions and propositions have been justified and data collection sources — both
primary and secondary — elaborated. This chapter details the different stages of fieldwork
interviews conducted by this researcher in Pakistan in order to verify on the ground results
of hawala regulation introduced in 2002 by the State Bank of Pakistan. A summary of the
findings of the fieldwork interviews detailed in chapter 3 is reflected in Table 1.1 below.
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Table 1.1

i)

ii)
iii)

Summary of Fieldwork Interviews in Pakistan

Total Number of Interviewees

37

Interviewees included in the sample

17

Interviewee Groups

4

i)
Governance
(government
officials, 09 interviewees
investigators, prosecutors, government and
market regulators)
ii) Hawaladars (operating in major cities such
02 ---do-----as Karachi, Peshawar and Islamabad)

iv)

02 ---do------

v)

iii) Other Businesses (ECs, banks)

vi)

iv) Clients (users of hawala market such as 04 ---do----businessmen, traders, parents of students in
foreign countries, migrant workers and their
families)
Interviewee Responses (in categories)

Variables

i)

i) Hawala Market

10

ii)

ii) Regulatory Issues

Total No of responses

06
126

Percentage Response
Indicator 1. Hawala Market

76.98%

Indicator 2. Regulatory Issues

23.02%

From Chapter 4 to Chapter 7, the findings and propositions of the thesis are discussed in
detail. In Chapter 4 the scene is set through a description of the case study environment.
This chapter acquaints the reader with Pakistan’s geography, political administration and
the role of remittances in the economy. It also provides requisite information about the legal
7

and institutional frameworks that are relevant to hawala regulation. The background
information provided in this chapter will help the reader understand the need for the
reforms that the State Bank of Pakistan introduced in 2002.
Next, the 2002 hawala reforms are explained in Chapter 5. After introducing the reforms,
the reader is taken into the current market to see whether the 2002 reforms have worked and
if there are any ‘on the ground’ changes in the structure and mechanisms of the hawala
market. Two hawala markets (Karachi and Peshawar) are discussed to fully understand the
hawala dynamics. In order for the reader to better appreciate the ‘inner workings’ of the
hawala market, the chapter explains the State Bank’s incentive-based initiative as well as
law enforcement efforts to curb hawala-type transfers.
Chapter 6 discusses the reasons due to which regulation in Pakistan cannot work. Set within
the framework of institutional economics, this chapter presents an examination, in game
theory terms, of the challenges to hawala regulation from the perspective of weak and
failed states. It explains that these problems are ingrained in the political economy of
Pakistan and include corruption at various levels. This can be seen as both a cause and an
effect of the failure of regulation. There is a small minority elite that has used the state
resources to its own advantage and continues to ensure protection of vested interests at the
cost of state institutions. The chapter also sheds light on Pakistan’s segmented society
where laws are difficult to implement and institutions remain weak and non-functional
because of a lack of unity and agreement on basic public goods and institutions; and the
role of the international donors such as the IMF and the US who despite their influence on
successive Pakistani governments have remained weak in requiring actual change. Finally
transit trade with Afghanistan and the smuggling economy it has created is discussed.
Pakistan Afghanistan transit trade is primarily financed through hawala and is relevant to
the thesis due to a realization that regulating the hawala type informal transfer systems is
challenging because settlements are mainly trade-based and hawala-type systems prevail
due to their competitive efficiency and the equation of supply and demand in the
international financial system.
Chapter 7 analyses the policy line adopted by the State Bank of Pakistan in compliance
with FATF’s international standards and provides an account of how the regulation has
8

proven counter-productive. In analysing Pakistan’s case, the chapter comes to the position
that FATF’s policy on hawala regulation is essentially misdirected. It addresses policy
issues with a view to clarifying thinking about hawala regulation and to explore future
strategy. Indeed, discussion on the identified propositions throughout the thesis has led the
research into offering recommendations for hawala regulation based on Pakistan’s ‘on the
ground’ realities.
Chapter 8 thus offers concluding remarks and final recommendations for future hawala
regulation.
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Chapter 2:
2.1

Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter reviews the available literature on hawala with the purpose of analysing issues
faced in the regulation of these systems as well as identifying gaps in current approaches. It
gives an overview of the principal arguments and approaches in the available debates on
hawala regulation. The aims of the literature review are thus to:
1) clarify the conceptual understanding of hawala, describe various terms and set out and
explain the definitions;
2) give a historical account of the origin, development and revival of hawala;
3) examine the operational procedures and characteristics of these systems;
4) outline current regulatory approaches, and highlight problems with these strategies;
5) set out key issues and challenges; and
6) identify the problem statement.
2.2

Definitions and Terms

Hawala is defined as ‘an informal channel for transferring funds from one location to
another through service providers known as hawaladars, regardless of the nature of the
transaction and the countries involved’.20
In many instances, the informal remittance systems have been referred to as ‘alternative
remittance systems’ and ‘underground’ or ‘ethnic banking’. According to Passas,21 banking
(deposit-taking, lending and so on) is hardly ever involved in these transactions, which have
been taking place quite openly in several countries for a long time. Many experts also find
the term ‘alternative’ ill-chosen or problematic when used to refer to informal remittance
systems because in many countries hawala and similar informal networks are the
20

Mohammed El-Qorchi, ‘Hawala’(2002) 39 (4) [IMF] Finance and Development 31, 31.
Nikos Passas, ‘Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations: A Study into So-Called
Underground Banking Networks’ (Working Paper, Netherlands Ministry of Justice, 14 December 1999)
<http:ssrn.com/abstract=1327756> (‘IVTS and Criminal Organizations’).
21
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conventional or sole option available for all legitimate transfers. 22 Examples of such
countries are Afghanistan and Somalia where these systems are not only used by residents
but also by many aid organizations and other international agencies actively working in
these regions. Moreover, use of the terms ‘alternative remittance systems’ and
‘underground banking’ is also found inappropriate for hawala-type informal systems
because, in many cases, it is value rather than money that is transferred from place to
place.23
In order to introduce conceptual clarifications regarding the informal transfer systems,
Passas has introduced the term Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS) to define hawala
and other informal transfer systems as, ‘any network or mechanism that can be used to
transfer funds or value from place to place either without leaving a formal paper-trail of the
entire transaction or without going through regulated financial institutions at all’.24 In
defining IVTS, Passas and others have drawn a distinction between its two types: ‘Informal
Fund Transfer Systems’ (IFTS) where a fund transfer is originated transferred and delivered
as a financial asset,25 and ‘Informal Value Transfer Systems’ (IVTS) where value is
transferred. There are also transfers that may include a combination of both funds and
value, through the use of (mostly) illegal methods which are referred as ‘Informal Value
Transfer Methods’ (IVTM). Passas has drawn analytical distinctions between IVTS/IFTS
and IVTM based on their characteristics.26 This is reflected in Table 2.1 below:

22

Samuel Munzele Maimbo, The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Informal Funds Transfer
Market in Afghanistan (Working Paper No.13 , World Bank, August 2003).
23
Ibid 2.
24
Nikos Passas, ‘Financial Controls of Terrorism and Informal Value Transfer Methods’ in Henk van de
Bunt, Dina Siegel and Damian Zaitch (eds),Transnational Organized Crime: Current Developments (Kluwer,
2003)149 –158, 149.
25
Nikos, Passas, ‘Informal Value Transfer Systems, Terrorism and Money Laundering’ (A Report to the
National Institute of Justice, November 2003)15,16 < https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208301.pdf>.
26
Ibid.
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IVTS/IFTS

IVTM



These constitute traditional ethnic fund and
value transfer operations and businesses.



They have originated on the Indian
subcontinent and in China, but have spread

following waves of immigration and
economic globalization.



These networks are currently subject to
regulations designed for the so-called
‘money services businesses’.

They involve small groups or networks,
which employ methods of transferring both
money and value informally but mostly
illegally.
They do not require the existence of
widespread networks of people. Most of
them can be accomplished by a couple of
individuals on either an ad hoc or regular
basis.







They involve the use of the formal financial
system, but they leave no trail for anyone
The clients and services using IVTS/IFTS
are for the most part well established, known wishing to monitor or reconstruct the route
of a transaction intended to remain secret.
to their respective local community.
The underlying feature of these networks is 
that the transfer is originated, transferred
and delivered as a financial asset.

They are very often part of legitimate or
legitimate-looking trade transactions, which
effectively obfuscate substantial value
transfers.



They are always criminal and usually
combine with other offences (e.g. tax
evasion, subsidy fraud, embargo busting,
capital flight, funding of militant groups,
smuggling).



They have the capacity to transfer very
substantial amounts of money (much higher
amounts than IFTS). So, terrorists and other
criminals can conveniently use these
methods.

Table 2.1: Distinction between IVTS/IFTS and IVTM. Source: Passas, ‘Informal
Value Transfer Systems, Terrorism and Money Laundering’, 2003.
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The Financial Action Task Force has defined Alternative Remittance Systems (an
overarching term comprising IVTS/IFTS and IVTM) as:
any system used for transferring money from one location to another and generally
operating outside the banking channels. The services encompassed by this broad
definition of ARS range from those managed by large multinational companies to
small local networks. They can be of legal or illegal nature and make use of a variety
of methods and tools to transfer the money.27

2.2.1 Meanings of Terms
Etymologically, hawala is an Arabic term. In Arabic, the root h-w-l signifies ‘change’ or
‘transformation’.28 The word ‘hawala’ is derived from this root and is defined as a bill of
exchange or promissory note.29 Hawala denotes a ‘transfer’, and in commercial terms the
practice of transferring money and value from one place to another through service
providers, who are known as hawaladars.30 In Arabic legal commentaries, hawal is
mentioned as the ‘exchange of debt’, particularly in its historical context of long distance
trade.31 This was adopted into Hindi and Urdu — the national languages of India and
Pakistan — in more or less the same sense, but gained the additional meanings of ‘trust’
and ‘reference’ which reflects the code of functions of the system. Afghans involved in the
trade tend to call themselves ‘sarafi’, or in the singular, ‘saraf ’, which means money
changer.32 Similarly, the term ‘hundi’ is etymologically rooted in Sanskrit language and
means ‘to collect’, which is synonymous with promissory note, bill of exchange, or hawala.
Hundi is a kind of bill of exchange or written order for payment that its drawers used in

27

Financial Action Task Force, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Typologies 2004–
2005(FATF/OECD,
10
June
2005)3
<http://www.imolin.org/pdf/imolin/FATF_Yearly_typol_0405_incl_typologies.pdf>.
28
Patrick MJost, and Harjit Singh Sandhu, ‘The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and Its Role in
Money Laundering’ (Paper prepared by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) in cooperation
with INTERPOL/FOPAC, January 2000) http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicitfinance/documents/fincen-hawala-rpt.pdf.
29
Ibid 15.
30
Edwina Thompson, ‘An Introduction to the Concept and Origin of Hawala’ (2008)10(1)Journal of the
History of International Law83, 94.
31
Ibid.
32
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13

much the same way as Americans use cheques to draw on their cheque accounts.33 In order
to draw a hundi, a client had to open up an account and maintain a correspondence
relationship with the hundi operator.34 It follows that the terms hundi and hawala are
essentially the same and used interchangeably. Though it is more popular in contemporary
times, hawala is an Arabic term while hundi is its Indian and Pakistani variant.35 In addition
to hundi (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh) and hawala (Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Middle East
and parts of Africa), the various forms of IVTS are geographically known under different
names for example fei ch’ien (China), hui kwan (Hong Kong), phei kwan (Thailand) and
padala (Philippines).36
2.3

Origins and Revival

Hawala is believed to have originated in the Indian sub-continent and China and these
networks were the established means of transferring valuables and money long before any
of the formal banking methods were conceived.37 The links of these networks with
international trade and commerce can be traced thousands of years to about 1120 BCE in
the biographical sketches of ‘huozhiliezhuan’ (literally ‘moneymakers’) that are contained
in historical biographies written by the Great Sima Qian (circa 145–86 BCE) in his Records
of the Grand Historian, which traces more than two thousand years of Chinese history.38
Reference to hawala as ‘transfer of debt’ is also found in Islamic texts as Prophet
Muhammad’s sayings (Hadith) which show that the Prophet of Islam as a trader by
profession was aware of these informal financial transfer systems.39 It emerges that after the
Prophet’s demise, Islamic jurists prescribed the practice of delegation of debt as alhawala.40

33

Divya Sharma, Historical Traces of Hundi, Sociocultural Understanding, and Criminal Abuses of Hawala
(2006) 16 (2) International Criminal Justice Review99, 104.
34
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35
Ibid 105.
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37
Jost and Sandhu, ‘The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and Its Role in Money Laundering’, above n
28, 5.
38
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39
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40
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Among the more strong theories regarding the origins of hawala networks is that during the
T’ang Dynasty (617–907 CE) in China, the growing Chinese tea trade required a means of
transferring money to the South of China from the Imperial Capital without the burden and
risk of carrying large sums of money between the two locations. To solve this problem,
provincial governors maintained special courts in the capital that issued certificates to
merchants who could present the certificates to the provincial governors and redeem their
money in the southern province. Since, this system was based on ‘chits’ or ‘tokens’, the
Chinese would refer to these as fei’chen, meaning ‘the flying money’.41 A similar system
was adopted by the Arab traders to avoid robbery while travelling along the Silk Road.42
It appears that nothing can be said with certainty about the true origin of hawala-type
systems. These networks nonetheless, can be traced to ancient times where they were
adopted to facilitate trade and commerce across geographical, political and cultural borders
in either the absence of or weak or conflicting formal institutions. Some view that hawala
and other IVTS were born out of political turmoil.43 Additionally, individuals are found to
choose IVTS as a result of inefficient banking services or to bypass rules, laws, or currency
restrictions.44
In modern times, this ‘rhizome’45 of informal finance re-emerged in the 1960s and 1970s to
facilitate the transfer of wages of migrant labourers, coming mainly from the low-income
economies of the global South but working in the high-income economies of the North and
the West.46 These overseas workers who regularly send money back home to their families
constitute by far the single largest group of customers for the hawala market as they are the

41

Joseph Wheatley, ‘Ancient Banking, Modern Crimes: How Hawala Secretly Transfers the Finances of
Criminals and Thwarts Existing Laws’ (2005)26 (2) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International
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46
Roger Ballard, ‘Coalitions of Reciprocity and the Maintenance of Financial Integrity within Informal Value
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source of supply of liquidity of funds to hawaladars in the developed economies.47 This
pool of funds is offset by another pool of funds in the developing economies that is
commonly used by labour migrants, refugees, humanitarian organizations and transnational
businesses involved in import/export, foreign exchange, travel and/or jewellery48 to
circumvent official currency restrictions and bans on gold imports in South and Southeast
Asia49 and increasingly by those involved in money laundering and terrorism50 though
many refute the view that hawala has much to do with either terrorism or money
laundering.51
Hawala’s revival, in modern times can also be attributed to the role that these informal
networks have played in regions affected by war and conflict, during civil unrest and
economic crises and in the presence of weak or non-existent political systems. An
International Monetary Fund study52 found that IVTS is highly adaptable to such events and
provides an efficient mechanism for funds transfer during war and in conflict zones. In
Afghanistan hawaladars were instrumental in a positive manner where they facilitated the
movement of millions of dollars of humanitarian funds that ensured the smooth running of
the first national democratic elections in early 2000s, after almost three decades of war and
conflict.53 Being the sole fund transfer system available to the international aid
organizations, hawala helped in the construction of hundreds of kilometres of road, the
implementation of agricultural assistance programs, and the building of educational
facilities.54 In other refugee or internally displaced person (IDP) settlements in Iraq and
across Africa and South Asia, hawala-type IVTS have been widely due to the collapse or
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weakening of formal institutions.55 Thompson has illustrated this with the example of the
aftermath 2005 Tsunami, when money dealers reportedly established an emergency
communications system using local mobile phone network to help migrants locate their
families and arrange for the delivery of funds either to functioning bank accounts or directly
to the IDP camps themselves.56
2.4 A Simple Hawala Model

Figure 2.1:

A Simple Hawala Model

Source: El-Qorchi, 2002

In theoretical terms, a basic hawala operation can be explained through a simple
relationship requiring two customers and two hawaladars, in order to complete the
transaction. In practice however it is a ‘multi-nodal value transmission network’57 whereby
each participant stands in a ‘constantly shifting position of debit and credit with each of the
other members of the network’.58 It also means that once the components of the contract are
varied, it can lead to exponentially confusing networks of transfers and accounts. El-Qorchi

55

Ibid.
Ibid.
57
Ballard, ‘Coalitions of Reciprocity’, above n 46, 327.
58
Ibid.
56

17

outlines a simple hawala transaction and builds a model (Figure 2.1) to represent both the
initial transaction and the reverse hawala transaction that may ensue as a result.59
2.4.1 Hawala Payments
In El-Qorchi’s hawala model (Figure 2.1), worker CA in country A remits payment to his
family CB in country B through hawaladar HA paying the HA in the local currency of A.
The hawaladar contacts his counterpart HB in country B who makes payment to the
designated family CB in the local currency of that country. For authentication the remitter
may receive a code to pass on to his family to receive the payment. The hawaladar HA may
charge a small fee or gain profit through the exchange rate spread. Consequent upon
completion of this transaction, HA has a liability on HB which will be settled over time by
various means, either financial or in terms of goods and services, involving ‘reverse
hawala’. A reverse hawala transaction is often used for investment purposes or to cover
travel, medical, or education expenses from a developing country. In these countries there
are often foreign exchange and capital controls, so a customer (XB) desiring to transfer
funds to a developed country (for instance for the payment for university tuition for his son)
provides local currency to HB and requests that the equivalent amount be made available to
his (the customer’s) son (XA) in that country (A). HB may use HA directly if funds are
needed by XB in country A or indirectly by asking him to use another correspondent in
another country, where funds are expected to be delivered. A reverse hawala transaction
does not necessarily involve the same hawaladars; it could involve other hawaladars and
be tied to a different transaction: simple or complex. In another scenario, settlement can
also take place through import transactions. For instance, HA would settle his debt by
financing exports to country B, where HB could be the importer or an intermediary. It can
be understood that an increase in even one variable, such as the number of hawaladars in
the market, would greatly increase the complexity of the transaction. For example, since
each hawaladar would have an account with all of the other hawaladars, clearing of debts
becomes much more complex.
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Table 2.2 Complexities in Settlement of Hawala Debt
Hawala’s common and unique features










Trust among clients and operators
Use of codes
Lack of records
Too many records to sort through
Honest money goes through it
Distrust of authorities
Messaging (payment instructions) does
not follow the same path as the funds
Linguistic Difficulties
Cultural Specificities

Law enforcement challenges







Lack of record keeping and difficulties in
deciphering records
Mixing of legitimate and criminal
businesses
Asymmetric legal treatment around the
globe for instance, some jurisdictions
outlaw hawala while many western
countries allow free capital flows
Use of illegal networks for settlement
Very large number of innocent customers

Source: Passas, ‘Law Enforcement Challenges in Hawala-related Investigations’,
2004.
2.4.2 Hawala Settlements
In order to deal with the issue of complexity in settlement of debts, hawaladars keep a
record of every transaction.60 This is contrary to the common perception that hawala
transactions have no records.61 The reason for the maintenance of records by the hawaladar
is that the network can get complicated quickly and all details of the transactions become
difficult to retain in the memory. These records are, however often written in a code to deter
potential theft, and are promptly discarded after use hence the authorities have problems
following hawala transactions through to their end62 (See Table 2.2). Experts have argued
that, although reverse hawala transaction appears to be a simple way of balancing accounts,
the probability of its actual occurrence is very low. This is explained in the asymmetry in
international remittance flows which tend to be greater from industrialized countries to
developing countries than in the opposite direction.63 It implicitly means that hawaladars
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are forced to find alternative means of debt consolidation. Wilson specifies five methods
that are commonly used to clear and settle accounts between hawaladars.64
1) Bilateral Financial Settlement through Banks: This involves one hawaladar paying into
another hawaladar’s formal bank account (usually from an industrialized country to a
developing country). Wilson argues that this method is less likely to be used because the
preferred payment into a developing country is usually in US dollars and many such
countries have currency restrictions that disallow this inflow. When a large sum of foreign
currency (US dollars) is deposited, local authorities typically replace this with local
currency, which is not favourable for the hawaladar in that country.
2) Bilateral Settlement or Financing of Exports. This involves a hawaladar from country A
financing the importation of goods into country B for a hawaladar there. These goods may
be from country A or from any other country. This alternative poses a problem for the
international community by encouraging smuggling of goods across borders. Continual
gold smuggling between Dubai and India/Pakistan is a case in point.65
3) Clearing by Means of International Services (CMIS) is another alternative to reverse
hawala remittance, and is similar to a reverse remittance transfer except that the funds are
not remitted but are used for the purchase of consumer goods and services. These goods and
services mostly come in the form of medical, education, and travel expenses.66
4) Clearing by Means of Asset Purchase is the fourth option and is closely related to CMIS.
The difference is that goods and services are not purchased but the hawaladar in country
(B) purchases assets for the hawaladar in country A and hands them to him. These assets
can take the form of property or simple financial assets such as investment in stock market,
other portfolio investment.
5) Finally, some countries have adopted a ‘no questions asked’ policy in regard to foreign
exchange. This permits hawaladars to transfer funds in any currency into another
hawaladar’s bank account, without fear that authorities will convert the currency.67
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All of the above options allow hawaladars to settle accounts with one another. In this
manner, there is apparently no need for hawaladars to purchase any foreign exchange in
order to consolidate debt68 and hence the transfer of funds (usually US dollars) remains
undetected by authorities in either country. However, once settled, the funds typically reenter the formal banking system one way or another
Hawala’s Comparison with the Formal Banking Procedures

2.5

Banks (Formal institutions)

Hawala

Value is moved

Value is moved

Agents work on behalf of individuals

Hawaladars work on behalf of individuals

Records are kept to monitor activity

Records are kept simply as reminders but
not for monitoring purposes.

Impartial third parties monitor & enforce

The system is self-regulatory & trust-

laws

based.

Settlement of accounts is done through

Settlement of accounts is done through

netting between corresponding branches

netting between hawaladars.

Table 2.3: Comparison between Hawala and Formal Banking Procedures
Although IVTS is considered an alternative to fund transfers through the formal banking
channels, the processes involved in both are quite similar. Formal value transfers can take
several forms: these may use cash couriers, banks, exchange houses, and money remitters.69
Apart from cash carriers, formal value transfer systems do not physically move cash or
valuables, but an agent forwards a sum to an individual on behalf of another agent
representing a different individual.
In contrast to the banks, even though hawaladars do keep records of transactions these
records are kept not to monitor their activity but simply as reminders concerning the details
68

69
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of individual accounts, transactions, and balances. This record keeping is a matter of
individual practice in contrast with the standardized procedures followed by the formal
sector. The settlement process for hawala can also use the same basis as the formal system:
open accounts are kept and there is occasional netting off between hawaladars to settle
accounts, although they may not necessarily use banking channels.70
The largest discrepancy between the two systems involves the monitoring process. The
formal system relies on an impartial third party to monitor all transactions and ensure
adherence to the rules. Any party departing from fair transactions would become liable to
penalties imposed by the legislation governing the system.71 An illustration of this can be
seen in the transfer of funds through Western Union. In this and similar instances, detailed
records are kept which are then netted and settled through formal banking sectors, while
impartial third parties monitor and enforce rules and regulations for the formal sector. By
contrast, the informal system does not rely on third party monitoring. 72 Since the
hawaladars form an extended community, the system becomes self-regulating and it is
extremely rare for them to defraud one another or a client. The self-regulatory mechanism
is such that even if no disciplinary action is taken against a hawaladar who commits fraud,
‘word gets around’ that he cannot be trusted and without the trust of other hawaladars he
cannot function for long. Being ostracized is a very painful experience, and such sentences
are not only imposed on the hawaladar but also on his extended family.73 Hence, the
detailed documentation required to monitor the formal system is missing from the informal
mechanism. Although hawaladars keep a record of each transaction, their records are not
maintained in any standardized manner that can be readily accessible to monitoring agents
as can occur in the formal system.
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From the above discussion, it emerges that hawala and other forms of IVTS are
operationally efficient. IVTS are culturally convenient,74 lower in transaction costs than
conventional banking due to the ‘relational contracts’,75 trust-worthy,76 and efficient.77
Despite the relative efficiency for which these systems are preferred, there are risks
associated with the use of hawala and similar IVTS, such as erosion of profits of formal
banking and money remittance systems,78 loss in tax revenues,79 inefficient monetary and
fiscal policies,80 limited paper trails,81 and the potential increase in financial crime.82
2.6

Impact on the Global Economy

Financial markets and transactions play an important role in maintaining the stability of the
overall global economic system. The ability of financial markets and governments to ensure
this stability is dependent upon accurate and complete information concerning the flow of
funds. The IVTS, being non-documented transactions, do not register on the radars of the
financial markets, leading to anomalies, information gaps and distortions, which creates an
imperfect picture of global economic health.83 A study has highlighted the impact of
informal remittance transfers on the global economy through a simulation model of 15
developing countries which estimated that over USD300 billion have been transferred
informally into these countries during the last 20 years.84 Ballard estimates that unrecorded
migrant worker’s remittance flows through IVTS such as hawala are 100 per cent higher
than recorded flows through the formal channels.85 Remittances are often considered a byproduct of migration, which has been growing steadily over the past 30 years. Migration is
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likely to continue to grow, given international migration patterns and steady emergence of
diasporic communities. The United Nations estimates that nearly 230 million people
worldwide lived outside of their country of birth in 2013.86 The remittances sent home by
these migrant workers are estimated USD542 billion in 2013.87 Further increases in the
number of migrants will increase the monetary value of remittances worldwide and ensure
more fund inflows to developing countries.88 However given that huge volumes of these
inflows remain undetected on the international economic radar, they have macroeconomic
impact on individual economies, state sovereignty, international financial markets, financial
regulation and monetary policy.89 Hawala-type transfers indirectly drain a country of much
needed foreign exchange by working in conjunction with oppressive government
regulations to keep the needed foreign currencies from coming into the country. According
to a KPMG report published in 2008,90 over USD1 trillion is being laundered every year by
drug dealers, arms traffickers and other criminals in India. Under-invoicing exports and
over-invoicing imports are chronic problems in countries where hawala is prevalent.91 As
more businesses seek the hawala alternative to traditional trade financing, local hawala
brokers raise the exchange rate and weaken the currency.92 Hence, the anonymity
associated with hawala-type IVTS has long raised concerns in the law-enforcement
community in general and in developing countries in particular. In countries such as India
and Pakistan governments have been so concerned about the evasion of currency controls
due to these informal systems as to ban them completely. It was only after the events of
9/11 and worries about terrorist finance that it has become a focus of international
regulatory attention.
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2.7

Need for Regulation

On the occasion of the First International Conference on Hawala in 2002 by the UAE
government under the leadership of the UAE Central Bank, Harish Pawani observed that
the economic efficiency and trustworthiness that give the hawala system its advantage over
the corrupt official financial sector have a downside to them. The same advantages that
make hawala customers’ first choice make them vulnerable to illegal activities, such as
money laundering, terrorist financing, organized crime or drug trafficking. 93 There is
unanimous opinion among the experts that the main vulnerability of the system is in the
process of settlements of debts between hawaladars. In this connection, Passas has
explained that as hawaladars use local cash pools to pay for overseas remittances, there are
chances that funds of legitimate clients are occasionally co-mingled with illicit funds, such
that someone in Pakistan whose father sent honestly earned funds from the United States or
the UAE could actually receive the cash that a corrupt official or smuggler wishes to
launder or secretly take out of the country.94 These cash pools on which hawaladars draw
for payments are always asymmetrical, as each operator transfers funds to and from
multiple locations every day and so, apart from compensatory payments, other ways of
balancing accounts may include formal transfers (check, wire, bank-to-bank, and so on), the
use of couriers and payments in kind, as well as through commercial transactions, falsified
invoices and third parties. Commercial and financial transactions also form integral
components of the settlement process given there is little to no transparency and
verification of transactions in the import/export business.95 The problem, as Passas states,
‘is not merely theoretical; there is evidence that money derived from drug trafficking,
illegal arms sales, body part trade, corruption, tax evasion, and all kinds of fraud have
indeed moved through hawala and trading networks’.96 In light of this and the attention
hawala-type transfers have received in the wake of 9/11, the collective view is that leaving
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hawala completely unregulated, as was the case in many parts of the world before 9/11, is
no longer realistic. The pressing question for international financial regulators and policy
makers nevertheless is how to regulate hawala and other IVTS?
2.8 Regulatory Approaches and Solutions Adopted To Date
The author Samuel Maimbo97 has categorized the current available approaches and
strategies to regulate informal remittance systems as follows:
1) Legal and Prudential Regulatory Approach
Following the events of 9/11, FATF’s response to the concerns on linkages between
terrorism and informal remittance systems has resulted in the issuance of nine special
recommendations aimed at combating terrorist financing. The Special Recommendation VI
(hereafter SR VI) specifically addresses IVTS and calls for countries to license or register
all the informal remittance businesses, as well as subject them to all of the other FATF
recommendations that apply to banks and non-banks SR-VI reads:
Each country should take measures to ensure that persons or legal entities, including
agents, that provide a service for the transmission of money or value, including
transmission through an informal money or value transfer system or network, should be
licensed or registered and subject to all the FATF Recommendations that apply to
banks and non-bank financial institutions. Each country should ensure that persons or
legal entities that carry out this service illegally are subject to administrative, civil or
criminal sanctions.

Driven by the vulnerability of countries to the potential abuse of IVTS, the objective of SRVI is to increase the transparency of inflows by recommending that countries impose
consistent AML/CFT measures — as applicable to banks and other financial institutions —
on all forms of IVTS. The rationale for introducing the regulatory framework has been that
licensing and registration will help isolate legal from illegal remittance service providers;
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that those who operate legally will report suspicious transactions enabling regulators to
report financial abuses to the law enforcement agencies. Hence, FATF’s reporting
requirements and standards are aimed at mitigating the risks98 and reducing the financial
abuse of the informal systems that, if they are used within the reporting and regulatory
framework can, otherwise provide a valuable remittance transfer service.
A major problem with FATF’s legal and regulatory approach is that among different
countries the reporting and record keeping standards are very asymmetric.99 In many
countries, including India and Pakistan, hawala is illegal. There are laws that prohibit
speculation in these countries’ local currency and foreign exchange transactions at a rate
other than the official exchange rate, which makes hawala systems as they currently operate
illegal. Licensing or registration of informal remittance service providers is problematic in
these jurisdictions because it will amount to legalizing an essentially outlawed practice.
Similarly, some European countries (such as France and Spain) also allow no informal
transfer operations at all, and so the question of international cooperation does not arise.
Another problem is that FATF’s reporting requirements and standards are more suited to
formal financial institutions.100 Consequently, compliance in FATF’s reporting standards
has resulted in the design, development and implementation of a patchwork of laws and
regulations for regulating IVTS businesses, which have been put in place by financial
regulators in various jurisdictions. These rules and regulations do not complement each
other and often cause these businesses to either close or ‘go underground’.101 In the United
States, the USAPATRIOT Act 2001, the Money Laundering Control Act 1986, and Financial
Crimes Enforcement Unit of the US Department of the Treasury (‘FinCEN’ (the FIU)) are
three tools that the United States has in place against money laundering. Apart from various
federal laws, the Money Services Businesses (MSBs) in the United States also have to
comply with a host of state rules and regulations. These vary from state to state and become
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prohibitively expensive for a small MSB operator to comply with.102 In Canada, the original
Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act was enacted in 1991 and required many
financial institutions to identify customers and to maintain records. These measures did not,
however, withstand the scrutiny of FATF’s evaluation of member countries, which in 1997
pointed out Canada’s lack of mandatory reporting requirements and absence of a
centralized FIU. As a result, three years later the Proceeds of Crime Act was amended to
introduce new reporting requirements and create the Financial Transactions and Reports
Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC). In December 2001, Canadian Parliament enacted
the Anti-Terrorism Act, which added combating terrorist financing activity to FINTRAC’s
mandate. The Canadian federal government also amended Bill C-25 as part of its ongoing
fight against money laundering and terrorism financing and required all MSBs to register
with FINTRAC by 23 June 2008. As part of these new changes, real estate agents have also
been required to report on suspicious property transactions.103 In Australia, new104
AML/CTF legislation was developed between 2004 and 2006 on the basis that it would be
introduced in two tranches. The first tranche regulates financial and gambling sectors and
the second tranche, which has largely failed to materialise, will extend regulation to nonfinancial businesses and professionals such as lawyers, accountants, jewellers and real
estate agents. The legal framework comprises the Anti-Money Laundering and CounterTerrorism Financing Act 2006(Cth) (AML/CTF Act 2006), which establishes obligations
that are supervised and regulated by the Australian Transactions Report and Analysis
Centre (AUSTRAC).105
2) Financial Sector Development Strategy.
The central argument of this regulatory approach to hawala and other IVTS hinges on
countries’ particular domestic circumstances — on the stage of national economic
development in general and that of financial sector norms in particular. A case in point is
the United Arab Emirates, which has been resistant to western regulatory efforts. The
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United Arab Emirates has openly defended the legitimacy of hawala networks and has
advocated an approach that takes divergent economic and cultural realities into account, in
contrast to the ‘black and white’ approach of a complete shutdown of hawala networks.106
In their study of informal remittance systems, El-Qorchi, Maimbo and Wilson107 have
argued that prescribing regulations alone would not ensure compliance. According to these
authors, the informal remittance systems cannot be eliminated through restrictive policies,
prohibition orders or criminal proceedings until the practical reasons for the customers’
choice of these systems over the formal financial systems, cease to exist. High transaction
costs, long delays in effecting money remittances, exchange controls and overly
bureaucratic policies and procedures for simple money transfers are major incentives for the
continued existence of the informal financial system. Hence El-Qorchi, Maimbo and
Wilson have argued for a strategy to bridge the gap between the informal and the formal
remittance systems such that both benefit from their mutual deficiencies and each tend to
expand when the condition of the other is impaired. Some of the proposed solutions in this
approach have included lower taxes on remittances, floating currency rates, and the
relaxation of currency regulations and interest rates.108 In other words liberation of the
economy, social and economic stability and reliable financial institutions are important
factors in migrants’ choice to remit through formal institutions rather than through the
informal. Based on this, Buencamino and Gorbunov have made a case, using the example
from a study of six major labour exporting countries in Europe and North America that a
rise in the black market premium by 10 per cent results in a decline in official remittances
by 3 per cent. For these authors, doing away with dual and parallel exchange markets is an
effective strategy to channel remittances through the formal channels.109
In the past years, some countries have introduced incentive based strategies to encourage
migrants to remit through the formal channels. For example, relaxing foreign exchange
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regulations on migrant foreign currency accounts and offering above market interest rates
on these accounts have been introduced in Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Vietnam. In
other countries such as Egypt, Poland and Turkey, premium exchange rates have been
offered for conversion of foreign currency into local currency.110 Buencamino and
Gourbanov argue that this strategy has shown mixed results. The reason cited by the
authors is that such incentives are more attractive for professional and high-skilled migrants
who have higher incomes and funds for investment rather than benefitting the low-income
and low-skilled migrant workers who are in majority and should be the real target group of
any strategy.111
3) Institutional Payments System Strategy
This approach is closely related to financial sector development strategies and attempts to
regulate the informal remittance systems by challenging these systems on economic
grounds through competitive formal remittance systems. Proponents of this approach argue
that as hawala proliferates due to its efficiency, it stands to reason that if the private
banking and other payments systems were more competitive, hawala would gradually
disappear.112 Some governments have adopted this strategy by approving partnerships
between corporate wire transfer corporations and postal services or banking operations. For
instance, Pakistan Post collaborated with the Western Union and the Indian government
approved a partnership between Western Union and its national postal service to operate in
cities around the country. Similarly, in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and in the
Philippines, banks and exchange companies offer door-to-door delivery.113 Other proposals
included the suggestion that a tax may be levied on hawala114 or that hawaladars form
exchange companies and adhere to reporting requirements. The latter strategy was adopted
by the State Bank of Pakistan in 2002 when it converted hundreds of money changers into
exchange companies, in order to introduce a corporate culture in money changing business,
as well as to eliminate the informal ‘kerb-side’ foreign exchange market and hawala
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transfers.115 The idea behind these strategies is for hawala’s incorporation into the current
global financial structure by converting them into formally regulated structures. Nakhasi
argues that this essentially ‘Western Unionizing’116 approach fails to consider or meet the
following six major concerns, which are the reasons that customers choose hawala money
remittance system, namely:
i) The proposal does not address the need for secrecy and anonymity of those customers
who use hawala-type systems to avoid capital, exchange, or administrative controls;
ii) Privatized remittance systems such as the Western Union, are inherently bureaucratic,
and cannot compete with the efficiency of the simplistic ‘no over-heads’ operations of the
hawala system;
iii) Privatized and formalized money remitters are not as reliable as hawaladars, who are
often tied with kinship, ethnic and personal relations with their customers;
iv) Hawala systems have an advantage over the privatized regulated systems in terms of
cost-efficiency;
v) Hawaladars are better equipped to meet the needs of customers who are not located in
large cities; and
vi) Finally, the hawala system uniquely meets the religious concerns of many of its
customers as they are located in cultures where religious and family traditions require
women to maintain minimal contacts with the world outside their homes and families.
Moreover, as El-Qorchi has provided that a trusted hawaladar who is well aware of the
social codes would be an acceptable intermediary, being seen as protecting women from
having direct dealings with banks and other agents.117
It is noteworthy that as far as the recent competitive efforts by the formal financial
institutions to increase their share of the remittance market are concerned, many experts are
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of the view that by lowering fees, widening their networks and using better technology by
the formal institutions alongwith the recent law enforcement and regulatory attention that
hawala has drawn have increased operating costs in the informal sector. Yet, despite the
competitive strategies used by the formal sector in the remittance market, hawala continues
to remain the most financially efficient option for most of the immigrants.

Table 2.4 Competitive Efficiency of Hawala
Comparative cost of sending US$100 from Dubai to South Asia
Institution
Exchange House
Bank
Western Union
Hawala

Charges (US$)
Bank Draft
Telegraphic Transfer
1.36 –2.722
9.52–16.33
2.722–6.80
12.25–27.22
9.52
0

Rate of AED/US$
3.6735–3.68
3.678–3.693
3.7
3.673–3.6736

Comparative Amounts Received in Pakistan for remittance of US$100 from Dubai,
UAE
Method of
Charges
Total Paid
PK Rupees
Remittance
Received
Draft (exchange
1.36–2.722
101.36–102.722
5901–5910
house)
Draft (bank)
2.722–6.80
102.722–106.80
5890
TT (exchange house)
9.52–16.33
109.52–116.33
5901–5910
TT (bank)
12.25–27.22
112.25–127.22
5890
Western Union
9.52
109.52
5858
Hawala
0
100
5920
Source: Passas, ‘Formalizing the Informal’, 2005.
Nikos Passas118 illustrates this cost efficiency competitiveness of hawala. Table 2.3
presents a comparison of the costs of sending US$100 from the UAE to South Asia
(Pakistan). The costs reflected in the table include exchange rates, telegraphic transfer
charges or bank drafts and also fees charged by the Western Union. It can be seen that
hawala offers the best exchange rate with no fees charged. Similarly, in the second part of
Table 2.3, the financial benefits to the remitters’ family in Pakistan are even clearer. The
amount received in cash by the beneficiary is higher than all other options of cash transfer
making hawala the best option for remittance transfer.
118
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4) Anthropological Approach
Maimbo has identified the under-researched anthropological approach to regulating
informal remittance systems based on the levels of social cooperation and trust associated
with the informal payments systems. According to this author, the anthropological approach
helps to investigate the various sources of ‘trust – a key element in hawala transfers’,
associated with equally powerful emotions of rivalry, competition and jealousy within the
same kinship networks. This phenomenon has been explained by Monsutti who provides us
a firsthand account of the dimensions of trust and kinship in hawala networks.119 Monsutti
has characterized four types of actors within the hawala system. The first are close
relatives, with which he identifies feelings of solidarity arising among individuals
connected through the mother’s side of the family. Familial relationships stemming from
the father’s side tend to be characterized by direct competition and conflict. Second are
distant relatives and friends. These groups are the people of choice for engaging in business
partnerships and lending activities. The third type is people from the same locality, ethnic
or social group who ‘may be linked by the hawala system but may not be engaged in a
close economic partnership’.120 Fourth, and most importantly, transfers of funds involve
people from the host society, and those outside of the familiar circles of ethnicity or social
background, According to the author, ‘[w]ithout the intervention of the latter [outsiders],
each social network would be an inefficient, isolated structure’.121
Focusing on the Hazara community of Afghanistan, Monsutti has argued that the hawala
remittance system ‘allows the reproduction of social ties despite insecurity and dispersion.
The exchanges taking place through the circulation of people, documents and money bring
together religious, judicial, political, economic and family ties’. As a result of these
exchanges, not only are material needs satisfied but constant social ties are produced and
reproduced between the members of society. According to this author, the relationship
between material and social ties is reciprocal. Monsutti concludes, ‘The hawala system, a
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complex set of solidarity and completion relationships, explains how Afghan society,
despite war and migration, has not collapsed into a Hobbesian chaos’.122
Similarly, in a study on Mexican migrants, Hernandez-Coss123 has observed that the
decision to choose an informal remittance channel over a formal one was driven by
personal relations, mainly for the following reasons:
i) The remittance channels represent a personal social link to back home as do the Home
Town Associations (HTAs);
ii) IVTS operating between Mexico and the United States are mainly an extension of the
cross-border connections between the migrants and their home communities in Mexico;
iii) Contrary to the traditional hawala systems that have developed to facilitate trade, the
IVTS between Mexico and the United States facilitate the movement of funds as well as
letters, food and other goods. In many cases, channels that facilitate fund transfers are the
same as those that have facilitated the migration of the worker;
iv) HTAs are regional associations that have over time sent workers into a particular US
city where the migrants have now organized themselves as an expatriate community. Thus,
regional corridors within the main US-Mexico corridor have been formed;
v) These HTAs help to organize small scale development projects in the migrants’
hometown community, and the social links and networks offered by the HTA provide an
opportunity for the migrant to stay involved in the hometown community; and
vi) Due to strong links between the migrants and their home communities in Mexico, the
immigrants raise money to utilize for public services (such as laying water pipes, and
building churches and roads in Mexico). The funds required for these building projects are
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normally hand-carried by a member of the community when someone goes to Mexico to
visit family.
Clearly, the idea behind exploring the anthropological approach is to find regulatory
solution by involving the hawala community in the regulatory process. Although rarely
practised, this approach reflects a recent shift of paradigm in understanding issues in
hawala regulation by analysts and experts who have realized that unless financial regulators
work through policies of cooperation and inclusion of hawaladars and the community,
successful regulation of hawala will remain problematic.124
2.9 Issues and Gaps in Regulation
One of the leading problems in hawala regulation is that although regulations have been
enacted in various countries around the world, the adequate enforcement of these
regulations remains a matter of debate.125 Traditional IVTS (such as, hawala, hundi, and fei
ch’ien) are ancient and ingrained in the culture of many ethnic groups and communities.
Enforcement of the regulations within migrant communities becomes practically difficult
because these networks are advertised in the ethnic press or in the local vernaculars or in
native languages. Enforcement is also an issue in countries where governance is generally
weak and institutional capacity is lacking. But more importantly, it is noteworthy that
despite regulatory regimes over the years, the use of IVTS continues due to the economic
efficiency and cost effectiveness of these systems. Passas has noted that hawala continues
to be used primarily for legitimate purposes all over the world. 126 This author has argued
that the scale and frequency of serious criminal activity (aside from tax evasion and
currency controls) under hawala is minimal, and that no drastic measures should be taken
against these systems without substantive evidence. In Passas’ view, a more indirect
regulatory approach should be to first ‘test the waters’ because any substantial change in the
system where hawala prevails may force completely legitimate users of hawala to rely on
criminal means to transfer funds. The author has therefore argued for a right balance
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between economic objectives and anti-money laundering/countering the finance of
terrorism efforts.127 In this author’s view, the current regulatory regimes and enforcement
activities have proved to be ineffective and counter-productive and so he has proposed a
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the regulatory frameworks and the results of
financial controls put in place.
One of the major concerns in the regulation debate is the idea that hawala is an ‘economic
phenomenon’ and will exist regardless of controls and regulations.128 It would therefore be
imprudent to declare hawala illegal out-right. Instead, regulatory mechanisms and policies
need to be developed that should incorporate hawala’s self-monitoring features; and the
‘personal relationship’ that hawaladars maintain with their customers and most especially
those with whom they engage in large-scale transactions.129 These hawaladars maintain
their own ‘know-your-customer’ scheme to ensure the system’s safe and judicious use.130
Due to these characteristics, experts have taken the view that strangling hawala out of
existence may cause hawaladars to submerge underground and make monitoring even
more difficult. Moreover, as Passas131 has suggested that since hawala is not harmful in
itself, regulators should exclude potential abusers from the network so that benefits of the
system can accrue fully to the legitimate players. This objective can be accomplished
through effective monitoring by understanding these networks and by the identification of
criminal networks that potentially abuse the system. The task is difficult because hawala
can become a conduit for any criminal activity, but as the author Farooqi has reiterated:
[H]awala, in its essence, is a naturally efficient medium of transferring funds that has
withstood the test of time. It has resolved information and asymmetry problems
without the need of an impartial third party. It is this that has shaped hawala into a
fascinating economic and sociological institution. The hawala system should be
studied and eulogized for what it has accomplished and not penalized because
criminals have abused it. Illegal activity will exist in both formal and informal channels
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of the international financial system as long as there are incentives and lacunae in
procedures and mechanisms.132

A critical gap in the available literature on hawala — and like IVTS, is the lack of research
towards understanding the inner workings133 of hawala-type systems that would enable a
cost-benefit analysis of the regulations imposed and thereafter a critical evaluation of
regulatory frameworks that have been introduced. Samuel Maimbo134 indicates that the
regulatory community does not have an understanding of the issues surrounding the
regulating of hawala-type IVTS. According to this author, there needs to be a concerted and
systematic evaluation of the regulatory objectives and supervisory strategies, tools and
mechanisms applicable to informal remittance systems. The problem is that the literature on
regulating and supervising informal remittance systems is still in its infancy and is
generally lacking in practical examples of the regulatory frameworks introduced since 9/11
to curtail hawala and other IVTS.135 In other words, had there been more country studies or
‘best practices’ showing how different countries have made systematic efforts towards
regulating hawala and other IVTS, and the results they have achieved, it would have helped
to assess the regulations that were introduced after 9/11. However, such specific country
studies are virtually missing from the available literature on hawala regulation. The present
research seeks to contribute in this direction, by focusing on Pakistan’s regulation of
hawala since 2002.
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Chapter 3:
3.1

Methodology

Research Method

Methodically, this is a qualitative, descriptive, single, within-case study of hawala
regulation, with specific focus on the Pakistani hawala market since 2002. In its design and
method, the research has largely conformed to the Yin136 and Stark137 methodology of
qualitative case study.
3.1.1 Choice of Case Study
According to Yin,138 a case study design should be considered when:
(i) The focus of the study is to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions;
(ii) You cannot manipulate the behaviour of those involved in the study;
(iii) You want to cover contextual conditions because you believe they are relevant to the
phenomenon under study; or
(iv) The boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context.
The present research seeks to determine the impact of hawala regulation and factors that
influence the regulation of hawala in Pakistan. A case study is chosen because the case is
the regulation of hawala, but the case could not be considered without the context:
Pakistan, and more specifically the setting: the hawala market. It was to regulate this
market that reforms were implemented by the State Bank of Pakistan. It would not have
been impossible for this researcher to have a true picture of the impact of post 2002 hawala
regulation without considering the context in which the reforms to regulate the hawala
market occurred. Hence, the unit of analysis or the case (hawala regulation) is being studied
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in a context139 (Pakistan) and setting (hawala market). In order to ensure that the study
remains reasonable in scope, the case study has been bound by time140 (since 2002).
3.1.2. Justification for the Choice of Pakistan
Geographically, Pakistan lies in the region where hawala originated and so it has
historically remained a hawala prevalent country. Indeed, due to the popularity of hawala
as well as its impact on the country’s macro-economic policies, Pakistan has traditionally
remained under strict currency controls that prohibit speculation in exchange rates other
than the government prescribed rates. Hawala-type informal transfers are illegal in Pakistan
and there are stringent policies for moving foreign exchange into and out of the country.
Despite these strict controls, Pakistani financial regulators have remained concerned about
the informal hawala-type transfer systems and made many attempts to channelize inward
remittances into the country through the formal banking channels. The 2002 reforms
introduced by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) were also aimed to curb hawala and
channel funds through the formally regulated institutions. However, as the author Passas
has pointed out, so far there has not been any systematic attempt to study the regulations
that countries have introduced to regulate hawala-type transfers in the post 9/11 scenario.
By adopting a systematic empirical approach, this research contributes towards redressing
this imbalance. Two specific contributions are made through this research: first, it examines
the impact of the post 9/11 regulations in Pakistan and second, it analyzes the challenges to
hawala regulation in this key country.
In terms of country selection, Pakistan has been under-researched, and so it still demands a
great deal more attention. Pakistan has a significant diaspora, many of whom are located in
major western economies such as the United Kingdom and the United States, and, to a
lesser extent in countries like Canada and Australia. Many ex patriot Pakistanis have
developed businesses which generate significant cash flows within the expatriate
community (for example travel agencies) as well as in the wider economy in which they
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operate. This means that there is a large pool of funds which may be intended to be remitted
to family within Pakistan. In addition, there are large numbers of migrant Pakistani workers
in developing economies who wish to remit their much more meagre funds to families in
Pakistan. The result is a large pool of funds off shore which can be matched to the desire of
those in Pakistan seeking to ‘export’ corrupt income and/or avoid taxation liabilities.
Pakistan is therefore a country where the demand for hawala services is high. Moreover, by
choosing to study the case of regulation of Pakistani hawala market, it will be possible to
assess whether or not purported challenges to hawala regulation correlate with the
international regulation that guides various countries’ policy to curb hawala-type informal
transfer systems.
3.2.
3.2.1

Research Design
Type of Case Study

There are different terms to describe a variety of case studies, for instance Yin 141 has
categorized case studies as explanatory, exploratory, or descriptive. Yin has also
distinguished between single, holistic and multiple case studies. On the other hand, Stake142
has identified cases as intrinsic, instrumental or collective. In order to determine which
category of case study the present research falls into, the sources of available background
information about hawala regulation in Pakistan since 2002 have been reviewed, as
follows:
1) Academic Literature: The available literature on hawala regulation provides analytical
evidence of the failure of reforms and regulations that have been introduced since 9/11 to
regulate hawala-type transfers in the sense that it informs that hawala is still prevalent and
popular. As mentioned in the literature review section, there is dearth of ‘practical examples
or case studies’ of regulations since 9/11 in the literature.
2) Professional Reports and Evaluations: Two recent reports on Pakistan are available that
confirm the information that hawala is still used in the country. Among these, the first
report is the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APGML) Mutual Evaluation
141
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Report 2009 and the second is the World Bank’s 2009 Report, Bringing Finance to
Pakistan’s Poor: A Study on Access to Finance for the Undeserved and Small Enterprises.
In terms of evidence, both these reports can be counted as confirmation of the use of
hawala after 2002 reforms. Both are general commentaries without any critical analysis of
hawala regulation post 9/11.
3) State Bank of Pakistan: Since it introduced reforms in 2002, the SBP has projected a
continuous increase in the volumes of home remittances coming through the formally
regulated banking channels. As such, the statements of the SBP on public record suggest
that as a result of the reforms, hawala-type transfers have been curbed and greater funds are
now channelled through the banks. Such impressions by SBP are obviously in contradiction
of other available evidence.
4) Press Reports and Articles: Frequently, news and reports about hawala are circulated in
the Pakistani press, particularly in the contexts of rising inflation, depreciation in the value
of Pakistani currency and depletion of official foreign exchange reserves or non-availability
of foreign exchange in the market. Again, these sources can be considered confirmation of
hawala presence which may be taken as counter-factual to SBP’s claims that hawala has
been side-lined but not mistaken for a systematic analysis of reforms.
5) Personal experience: The researcher is a Pakistani national and has knowledge regarding
hawala use in Pakistan. Moreover, the researcher has professional work experience at
Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior and can confirm the availability of hawala channels and
transfers for easy access by any user of foreign exchange market. However, personal
knowledge cannot be cited as evidence for analysis of reforms, unless treated in a
methodical manner.
From the above-mentioned available sources, it is recognized that despite regulation hawala
still prevails and is widely used in Pakistan. What is not known is why and how the 2002
reforms or hawala regulation failed. Such information requires market investigation in
order to determine if the reforms have worked and what specific changes have occurred in
the market due to these regulations. This will help in getting a holistic view of the reasons
for SBP’s 2002 reforms failure and the implications of that failure. In addition, a number of
related propositions have emerged from a review of the above-mentioned available sources
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of information on hawala regulation. To be able to analyze the research questions and
propositions, the most suitable case study design for the study is ‘descriptive’, because it
‘completely’ describes an intervention and the real life context in which it occurred’.143
Besides, the present research is ‘single case’144 because hawala regulation is looked at in
one environment (Pakistani hawala market); however there are embedded units (Karachi
and Peshawar markets) within the larger case which have been analyzed, making the
research also an ‘embedded or within’145 case study.
3.3

Research Questions and Propositions

The over-arching research question for this project is:
Why have, the regulatory reforms introduced by the State Bank of Pakistan in 2002, to
control hawala in Pakistan, not been successful, and what are the regulatory challenges to
curbing hawala-type informal value transfer systems?
In other words, how have the regulatory challenges to hawala manifested themselves in
Pakistan? This involves a number of related propositions, which have been identified as a
result of reviewing the existing literature and other available information:
Proposition 1:

The regulators and law enforcement do not have information

about ‘the inner workings of hawala market’: Analysis of this proposition requires field
investigation in order to deal with the following:


Geographical distribution: Are there ‘hotspots’ of Hawala in Pakistan? Geographical
distribution is important from the regulatory policy perspective since the identification of
hotspots facilitate appropriate effective law-enforcement. The more that is understood about
the hawala market structure and operations, the more informed regulatory strategies will be.
Geographical distribution over time has implications for the anthropological approach to
hawala regulation as well.



Demographic profile of hawaladars and users: Who are the hawaladars, who are their
customers? What are their ethnicities? Where do they reside? Are they educated/literate?
143
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What are the customers’ occupations? This information helps to build a common profile of
a hawaladar and their customers in a market. This kind of profiling provides explanations
of hawala networks in terms of cultural traditions, tribal ties, personal choice and
preference, social and economic deprivation and globalization.


Group Characteristics: What are the group dynamics in hawala market? Are there
identifiable leaders? Group characteristics are important for understanding the type of
social interaction that takes place, which is vital for assessing the relevance of explanations
of hawala as a trust-based value transfer system.



International dimensions and associations: Are the hawaladars internationally
networked? Does trans-border communication occur? If so, where to? Have there been
contacts with foreign networks; and, if so, what has been the significance of this
(efficiency? trust? support?). Additionally, has there been contact/networking between
domestic hawaladars? Such international associations help understand the extent to which
the hawala-networks are truly inter-linked in the globalized world.



Role of the Internet: Has the internet been used for:
a) Fund transfers
b) Communication with others abroad or at home.
c) The role of the internet is again relevant to understanding the globalized nature of
hawala-systems.



Operational activity:
a) Cultural behaviour
i) Is hawala the sole transfer option (due to distance, non-access to formal facilities)?
ii) Is hawala the preferable transfer option (due to tribal, family or religious traditions,
convenience)?
b) Economic behaviour
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Is hawala the most economically efficient transfer option available (better rates than formal
systems, swift transfer, hawaladars offering loans on credit, no documentation, government
policy, economic sanctions)?
Proposition 2: State is weak and failing: Analysis of this proposition will take into
account internal and external influences that impede regulation of informal transfers. This
will include Pakistan’s shadow economy, tax evasion and corruption, vested interests,
governance and institutional issues, role of transit trade with Afghanistan, the IMF and US
War on Terror in order to understand whether or not regulation of hawala-type IVTS is
problematic due to the State being ‘weak’ or ‘failing’.
Proposition 3: Hawala prevails due to demand and supply: One of the leading issues in
regulation is hawala’s economic efficiency. It has been extensively argued in the literature
that regulation fails because hawala is more efficient than formal remittance systems, hence
it prevails. While this is true, hawala’s prevalence and popularity is also a classic example
of supply and demand in today’s globalized world. Whether or not regulatory solutions
consider this aspect or not, will be questioned and analyzed.
Proposition 4: The international hawala regulation is misdirected: This proposition
essentially questions FATF’s international regulatory framework that attempts to counter
hawala-type IVTS and critically analyzes FATF’s approach to regulate hawala in order to
determine whether the right medicine for the disease is being prescribed or if there is a
problem with the policy itself?
3.4

Data Sources

3.4.1 Secondary Sources
This research relies upon secondary as well as primary data and information in order to
achieve triangulation of sources vital for case study. Secondary information used in the
research has been obtained from open-source materials. The main secondary sources
utilized are as follows:
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1) Various forms of press release or online information by the financial regulator (SBP) and
law enforcement agencies (such as the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)) and market
sources, such as the exchange companies’ association;
2) Press reports (the single largest source of information on the market); and
3) Other published accounts, such as academic studies and reports.
All sources of secondary data were primarily sought and acquired online, utilizing specific
websites (for example www.sbp.gov.pk for State Bank of Pakistan, newspaper websites for
press reports.) The search engine ‘Google’ (and ‘Google Scholar’) were also used as a
means for searching the internet for information. This was useful for unearthing
information which might not have been found by referring to sites or sources already
known. The University of Wollongong (UOW) library and online publications and research
material were also utilized. Each source was assessed in terms of reliability and validity.
Press reports vary in reliability and validity. In instances, an uncorroborated report and
information is shared or passed on by many members of the press and there are multiple
accounts of the same information, but the information is not necessarily true. In order to
assess the worth of the press report it is necessary to
1) Consider the source (for example the reputation of the newspaper, news agency or even
the news reporter);
2) Strive for sources with local access to the case (for example, Pakistani news and media);
and
3) Assess the extent to which the reported news is factual observation or subjective
judgement (the former is more reliable).
Finally, other publications such as academic reports were also assessed on the basis of
references cited and according to the validity of analyses or conclusions drawn.
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Primary
Data Source
Semistructured
interviews

Interviewees
4 target groups – 36
participants
i) Governance
(government regulators,
investigators, prosecutors,
law enforcement, market
regulators)
ii) Hawaladars
(operators in the informal
market)
iii) Other Businesses
(foreign exchange
companies, bankers, dealers
in the formal market)
iv) Clients
(traders, importers,
exporters, migrant workers,
their families, students,
tourists)

Selection Criteria for Inclusion/
Exclusion
i) Pakistani adult in one of the four
target groups.
ii) Questions were asked to see if the
market has changed due to 2002
reforms
iii) Participation based on relevance
and experience in the hawala market.
iv) Willingness to participate in the
research
v) Principles of informed consent,
privacy of the participants and
confidentiality of information.
vi) No questions regarding criminal
use of hawala
Reasons for Exclusion:
i) incomplete responses
ii) non-availability for interview
iii) lack of sufficient information and
evidence pertaining to hawala market
structure and regulation

Final
sample
17
participants

Table 3.1 Fieldwork Interviews
3.4.2 Primary Source: Field Interviews
Primary qualitative data for the research has been gathered through semi-structured
interviews planned with four target groups relevant to Pakistan’s hawala market (see Table
3.1). These are:
Group 1- GOVERNANCE: Interviewees included Pakistan government’s financial policy
makers, prosecutors, regulators, investigators and law enforcement officials as well as
foreign exchange market regulators.
Group 2- HAWALADARS: Interviewees included hawaladars in the informal remittance
market.
Group 3- OTHER BUSINESSES: Interviewees included bankers, foreign exchange
company owners and dealers in the formally regulated market.
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Group 4- CLIENTS: Interviewees included users of foreign exchange market such as
businessmen, traders, importers, exporters, students studying abroad, parents of student/s,
migrant workers, family members of migrant worker, tourists and other travellers.
Interviewees were selected according to pre-defined criteria. The criteria for selection and
inclusion/exclusion were determined as follows:
i) The participant is an adult member and healthy stakeholder of the Pakistani hawala
market in one of the identified four target groups.
ii) The focus is on the hawala market from 2002 (when reforms to regulate hawala were
introduced) therefore there must be evidence of hawala activity after the reforms were
introduced (in comparison with how the market operated prior to the reforms). Questions
regarding market structure and operations post the 2002 reforms were asked in order to
compare and contrast the responses with hawala activity prior to 2002, in order to
determine whether —and if so how — the market has changed since the 2002 reforms were
introduced. Sample questionnaires are appended at ‘D’.
iii) Participation in the research is based on relevance and experience in the area as well as a
willingness to participate in the research. Those participants who did not show a willingness
to participate in the research have not been included.
iv) The research was conducted in accordance with the approval of the UOW Human
Research Ethics Committee. Such approval was obtained prior to conducting interviews in
the field concerning the ethical issues associated with hawala transfers. The principles of
informed consent, privacy of the participants and confidentiality of information shared by
them were observed in accordance with the principles of human research ethics. These
processes are explained in the data collection section of this chapter.
v) Participants were not asked specific questions regarding the criminal use of the informal
remittance/value transfer systems.
These criteria were meant to be followed strictly; however a reasonable margin was kept in
mind regarding interviewees who will have to be excluded because of incomplete responses
or last minute lack of availability for one reason (or pretext) or another. For example, some
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government officials were unavailable due to urgent official engagements or important
participants in the Peshawar money market were not available when the researcher reached
there. Such eventualities were kept in mind by the researcher who was aware of the culture
and environment of the case country and had an alternative plan in place in order to meet
any uncalled-for occurrence. By maintaining a standard of inclusion of relevance and direct
stake holding in Pakistan’s hawala market, the current research is focusing on interviewees
who have the most relevant evidence available with them. This can be interpreted in
different ways. On the one hand, it represents authentic information, where involvement in
the market is so deep that the evidence is irrefutable, or where the market has attracted
sufficient attention from law enforcement agencies to uncover inside information. A
potential counter-argument to this is that information pertaining only to those instances
where hawala had been a subject to a ‘crack-down’ has been shared by law enforcement
agencies as evidence of the networks’ operations. Although this argument seems to have
relevance to the court cases involving money-exchange companies which were allegedly
conducting unreported hawala-type transfers (with information regarding these cases
shared by the law enforcement agencies), it is also true that such cases have resulted in
exhaustive investigations by law enforcement agencies into hawala market structure and
operations and these agencies have shared large quantities of useful information.
Essentially, there is great disparity between illegal hawala activity that results in a
prosecution and hawala activity that is known about by the regulators and law enforcement
officials. However, knowledge of this is restricted to intelligence level. The only counteractions that are taken are suspension of exchange companies licences or imposition of
penalties under the foreign exchange regulations. But frequently officials ‘turn a blind eye’
to the known cases of hawala activity. Some plausible explanations can be offered for this
approach: i) Connivance of officials with the hawaladars ii) life security threats to officials
(especially in Peshawar hawala market)
Although the current research has specifically focused on regulatory issues pertaining to
hawala rather than the criminal use of these networks, yet a high level of confidence can be
entrusted in its outcomes, conclusions and minimized false positives. I emphasize this
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because sufficient research and information is available on the ethical aspect of hawala
transfers.
The end result of the fieldwork process is a sample of 17 interviews. These have been
examined and findings are summarized later in the chapter, while detailed analysis is
provided in Chapters 4–7.
3.4.3

Human Research Ethics
PARTICIPANTS
4 Target Groups
Adult >18
Total 36
CONSENT

PARTICIPANTS'

Informed, voluntary
participation, mutual
understanding

ACTIVITY
Interviews

INFORMATION

RECRUITMENT

privacy protected

in Pakistan, random
sample

participants' deidentification

email, telephone

data secured

Figure 3.1: The Human Research Cycle
As mentioned earlier, hawala is illegal in Pakistan. The scope of the study excluded the
ethical issues associated with the criminal use of hawala but given that hawala has become
synonymous with terrorism and terrorist financing in post 9/11 years, it was likely that any
research on hawala would raise similar alarm from the human research ethics perspective
as any terrorism field research would do.146 Hence, fieldwork interviews in Pakistan
required prior approval by the UOW Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) through
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an application that explained how the fieldwork involving human participants will be
conducted in accordance with the principles of human research ethics, as follows:
1) Participant Recruitment
Participants in the research are a random opportunity sample, based on experience in the
area and willingness to participate in the research. All the participants were initially
contacted in Pakistan when the researcher was preparing a research proposal seeking
admission to the PhD course at UOW. They were re-contacted once fieldwork was
approved. Most of the participants in the research (such as government officers and
authorities, bankers, foreign exchange dealers and users of foreign exchange market in the
urban cities of Pakistan) have been approached directly by the researcher. It is noteworthy
that part of the researcher’s networking in Pakistan’s public sector can be credited to her
work experience in the Ministry of Interior Affairs, which is the administrative ministry for
the FIA, the law enforcement and prosecution agency in hawala cases.
a) Recruitment through Liaison
Some of the participants in the research were initially approached through liaison. These
participants mainly included hawaladars and users of remittances in villages and remote
areas of Pakistan and constitute part of two important target groups, which could not have
been excluded; else it would adversely affect the aims of the research. In all, five
intermediaries were involved from different parts of Pakistan in order to approach the
participants in this target group. These intermediaries were people from the public and
private sector whom the researcher knew well as colleagues and acquaintances. Although
working and living in urban cities, these intermediaries belonged to Peshawar and other farflung areas and could introduce the researcher to participants from their home-towns and/or
villages.
The justification for approaching participants through intermediaries is that it was not
possible for the researcher to have found a sample of participants from the informal sector
and remote areas, without first being introduced to the participants through a trusted
contact. Most of the participants interviewed in Peshawar and Islamabad cities belong to
rural and remote areas in the Punjab province and the tribal areas in northern Pakistan
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where cultural and traditional norms do not appreciate a direct approach from people. Also,
unlike urban city centres, free movement of a stranger (particularly a woman) going door to
door, or — in Peshawar’s money market — asking people for participation in the research
would not be culturally acceptable in these locations. Another reason is that although
commonly used, hawala is essentially outlawed in Pakistan, and no participant would agree
to talk about being in the business to a stranger. A trusted intermediary who is either
resident or familiar with the area and its cultural norms was the most viable option to
approach these participants. In this manner, the liaison had introduced the researcher in
advance to the participants to remove any apprehensions in their minds vis-à-vis the
researcher or the study.
The intermediaries involved in this project were made aware of the need for the
confidentiality and privacy of participants to be maintained due to human research ethics.
The role of the intermediary was to introduce the researcher to a few participants, brief
them about the aims of the project, and determine their willingness to participate as well as
ask their permission to forward their contact number to the researcher, for direct, one-toone contact. After confirming the willingness of the persons to participate, the intermediary
provided lists of such contacts to the researcher. Random participants were selected from
the lists and approached directly by the researcher; the aims and benefits of the research
were explained and their willingness to participate determined and consent obtained
without any third party involvement. The participants were informed that their identities
will not be disclosed in the research or in the published thesis, and their privacy will be
protected. In this way, although the initial introduction and contact with the participants
was through a third party, their consent to participate in the research was obtained by the
researcher directly, and they have been so selected and made part of the research in a
manner that the confidentiality of their participation and their privacy remains protected.
b) Location of Interviews
The majority of the participants in the research were based in major cities in Pakistan, such
as Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, and Peshawar. Some participants, mainly regular users of
migrant workers’ remittances were based in some remote areas and villages in Pakistan.
Interviews took place individually in settings of the participants’ choosing. These were
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mainly government offices in the case of government officials. Although prior approval
from higher government authorities is required under the protocols and procedures
applicable for civil servants, most of the officials who agreed to participate avoided these
formalities as they did not want the meetings publicized within their organizations. In
particular cases, some officials avoided meeting in their offices and preferred meeting in an
outside public environment. Meetings with bankers, foreign exchange dealers and users of
the remittance market in urban cities took place in offices and other public places such as
cafes or restaurants, which did not require any management approval.
It needs be emphasized that gender segregation is observed in some parts of Pakistan and
family and cultural traditions do not allow free interaction between men and women. In
such cases, keeping in view participants’ cultural, family, and religious traditions, some
interviews were conducted in private spaces, such as segregated/partitioned rooms within
public spaces or, in a few cases, the participant’s home.
A total of 36 participants have been interviewed during the project. All the interviews were
conducted in Pakistan, in two phases, each of four months duration during 2012. In the first
phase, the researcher covered the northern part of Pakistan and interviewed participants in
the cities of Peshawar at Chowk Yadgar money market, participants from the FIA, and
Customs officials at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (Torkham). Interviews were also
conducted in Islamabad with government officials and users of the market. The second
phase of interviews was conducted in Karachi city mainly with the officials at State bank,
FIA, foreign exchange dealers, bankers and customers. A summary of examination, results
and findings is presented in Chapter 4.
2) Informed Consent and Willingness to Participate
Participation in the research has remained completely voluntary. Participants were not
engaged in any relationship (of favour or indebtedness) with the researcher that would
impact their participation in the research. All the participants were fully informed of the
nature of the research and how their information will be used. Based on mutual
understanding between the researcher and the participants and having their consent,
appointments for interviews were requested in advance. Advance contact with the
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participants, their willingness to meet the researcher and verbal consent to participate in the
research provides evidence of their informed consent. Besides, the participants appeared
convinced that their participation in the research will contribute to the benefit of the larger
community and hence they agreed to meet the researcher and answer questions. All the
interviewees welcomed the researcher in accordance with the social protocols of courtesy
and cooperation practised in Pakistani society.
3) Ethical Considerations
The following ethical considerations have remained relevant during the course of
interviews in the field.
a) Participants’ Welfare: Participants have not been exposed to any potentially harmful
situations and were interviewed in a setting chosen by them. Participants have not been
identified by names in the research. All information shared by the participants has been
treated as confidential.
It is highly unlikely that the interviews have caused distress or harm to the individuals
involved. There is no risk of retribution from anyone who might take offence to
information/opinions that participants share, because they will not be identified in the
research. During the interviews, the researcher reconciled the interviewees’ responses with
her personal notes and ensured that names, designations or posting in case of government
officials and authorities will not be mentioned. Similarly, names, locations and other
demographic details will either not be mentioned or, if required, altered with near-by or
similar details in case of bankers, foreign exchange dealers, informal operators and users of
the market. The questions asked during the interviews are related to their work and
expertise in the field of policy making, financial regulation and investigation or, as
dealers/service providers or regular users of foreign exchange and remittance market.
b) Participants’ Rights: Participants were informed of their right to refuse or cease
participation at any time, without giving any reason for such action. They were also
informed that they are welcome to copies of any notes from interviews in which they
participated, and that they can request that certain information not be included in the thesis,
even after the interviews.
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c) Beliefs, Perceptions, Customs and Cultural Heritage: None of these were negatively
affected in any way from participating in this research. The researcher was aware of the fact
that some people can show reluctance in sharing views considering the ethical issues
associated with alternative remittance transfers. For this reason, research aims were
explained to the participants in advance. During the interview process, the researcher
showed respect for participants’ opinions and reasonably accommodated individuals, their
family, cultural and religious traditions during the course of their participation.
It needs be noted that ethical issues associated with the use of hawala remittance systems
did not arise during the study as the research is not designed to investigate criminal use of
the informal remittance/value transfer systems. The present research focuses on the
regulatory aspects of informal remittance transfer systems commonly used in Pakistan. It
attempts to improve understanding of the regulatory challenges in order to appreciate
reforms and regulations implemented in this area. The questions to the participants during
the research focused on the structure of the market, their preference for formal or informal
remittance transfer systems based on comparative cost and efficiency of these systems, with
the purpose of evaluating policies implemented by the SBP in the foreign exchange
remittance market to regulate hawala-type transfers. However, in the instances where some
participants expressed views regarding criminal use of the hawala-type informal remittance
systems, the researcher has taken care to confirm if the views shared by these participants
relate to the overall aims of the present study, and have retained relevant records only.
There has been no instance during the course of various interviews that the researcher was
exposed to any classified or otherwise legally protected information that might compromise
the integrity of participants or else raise further ethical issues. The scope of the study did
not require any such information during interviews with the participants. Moreover, most of
the participants simply did not have this kind of information, and those who did (regulators
or investigation officers) were well-versed in what they could and could not disclose or
share. However, before the interviews the researcher reassured these participants that any
‘sensitive’ information will not be published in the thesis, and the researcher will delete any
record of it.
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The aim of the fieldwork interviews was to paint a picture of the market structure and
regulatory issues (establishing the who, what, where, when and why of the hawala market
in Pakistan)
3.4.4

Limitations of Data

The most common limitation in interviewing data is the interviewer’s bias. In order to cope
with bias and to avoid error in data, researchers are often advised to complement the
interviews with other data-collection techniques such as transient observation and document
analysis.147 Through the use of these techniques, the researcher is able to overcome the
weaknesses in data collection as either new information is unearthed or available
information is corroborated through the use of these complementary data collection
techniques. Whilst in the current research, triangulation of data has been applied as a
technique through use of primary and secondary data sources, in order to avoid limitations
such as prior information on the case and personal bias during interviews, the researcher
has used an additional technique of transient observation in at least two clear instances. In
the first event, the researcher attended a formal presentation given by the Chairman of the
Federal Board of Revenue to the Parliamentary Committee on Commerce and Trade on the
subject of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade. Here the researcher was allowed the
opportunity to attend the meeting as a guest observer, on the condition that she would not
ask any questions. Hence, the researcher’s status was that of a confirmed transient observer.
The information gathered as a result of this observation provided valuable information that
was used to corroborate interviewees’ information; particularly in dealing with Afghan
Transit Trade issues (see Chapter 7). On another occasion, the researcher was scheduled to
interview hawaladars in Peshawar’s Chowk Yadgar money market. The researcher and
interviewees (hawaladars) were joined by more hawaladars from the same market who
were guests of the interviewees and contributed their input in the discussion. In this group
too, the researcher utilized the transient observer technique and listened to the discussion
between the hawaladars on market dynamics as well as regulatory efforts to curb hawala.
147
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One limitation that must be mentioned relates to the scope of the study which excludes
investigation into specific criminal activity through hawala and binds the research by not
indulging ethical issues related to these informal networks. This has limited the scope of the
research. Complementary future research would be to conduct a study with wider scope
regarding hawala operations in Pakistan, thereby achieving a representation of the aspects
not covered in this study.
In its complete form, this research should be taken as an investigation into the causes of the
prevalence of hawala-type transfers in Pakistan despite the attempts to regulate the market.
The study should be taken as on-ground verification of the presence, popularity and
efficiency of hawala despite the claims by financial regulators and policy-makers that it has
been side-lined by formal remittance transfers, and hence, the study should be considered a
report on how and why attempts to regulate hawala are not bearing fruitful results.
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3.5

Conceptual Framework

Based on the application of the above explained research methodology and design, the
conceptual framework for the present study can be illustrated as follows:
Figure 3.2: Conceptual Framework

2002 Hawala Regulation
1. Literature review

Why it failed and how challenges
manifest?

2. Interviews

Findings
Market Dynamics

Challenges

FATF’s Policy

Propositions
1. Inner workings of
hawala

2. Weak and failed
state

3. System of supply
and demand

4. Misdirected Policy
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3.6 Summary of Fieldwork Findings
As mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter, out of the 36 participants
interviewed for this research 17 interviewees (in four groups) were included in the final
sample to examine Pakistan’s hawala market since 2002, when reforms to regulate hawala
were introduced. Appendix A lists these interviewees in order of group classification. Since
their names have not been disclosed in the research, the interviewees are identifiable as
officials of government regulatory bodies, ministries/divisions, law enforcement and other
market regulators and, by their respective profession/role in case of non-officiating
individuals.
Based on the responses of participants in each group, key words for different variables have
been selected from the interviews to indicate the nature of responses. These interview key
words have been summarized in order to calculate results and chart the findings. A
summary of the responses and key words for each group of participants is appended at ‘B.’
Table 3.2: Fieldwork Findings
Total
participants in
the final sample

17

Group
classification

Group Categories of
ID
responses

i) Governance
ii) Hawaladars
iii) Other Businesses
iv) Clients

G
H
OB
C

i) Hawala market

Total
number
of
responses

Perce
ntage
(%)

126

76.98

ii) Regulatory issues

23.02

To tabulate results, interviewees have been assigned an ID, an alphabetical code comprising
the first letter of interviewee group name followed by abbreviation of their identity in a
combination of letters and numerical digits. For example, interviewees from the State Bank
of Pakistan (Governance group) have been identified as ‘G.SBP.01’ and ‘G.SBP.02’.
Responses of the participants have been tabulated against two broad categories viz ‘Hawala
Market’ and ‘Regulatory Issues’. Each response in the selected variables of these two
categories is recorded as 1. Hence 1 in any column indicates a response while 0 indicates no
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response by the participant. The total on the chart is 126 responses. The participants’
responses are then turned into percentages by dividing each response by the total number of
responses and multiplying by 100 (1/126= 0.0079x100 =0.79%). As a result of this
calculation, 76.98 per cent of responses relate to the hawala market while 23.02 per cent are
in regard to the regulatory issues. Appendix C provides detailed statistical tabulation of the
results explained above.
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CLIENTS
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OTHER BUSINESS
Structure
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Figure 3.2:

GOVERNANCE

Regulatory Issues

Fieldwork Findings

Figure 3.2 above summarizes the findings of the research. It shows responses in two broad
categories received from the four interviewee groups. As can be seen, the main data
collected as a result of interviews in the field relate to the hawala market structure and
operations and the regulatory issues faced in controlling informal value transfers in
Pakistan. It is clear that most of the information on different market variables and
regulatory issues has been shared by the ‘Governance’ group — mainly comprising the
regulatory, investigatory and prosecuting agencies. For instance, the bulk of the information
on the hawala market structure, operations and other dynamics has been obtained from the
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FIA officials. This information was subsequently counter checked and confirmed through
other sources identified earlier. Other than the FIA, the ‘other businesses’ group — mainly
the money exchange companies — was a source of major information on the different
market and regulatory variables.
It is obvious that information obtained from both these groups was different. Whereas, the
exchange companies’ representatives explained the on-ground, regular market procedures
and operations, the FIA officials brought forth information which explained the overall
market dynamics and ‘game-changer’ role of the various hawala market players.
Conversely, interviews with the hawaladars, clients and also exchange companies and
bankers shed light on the role of regulation and law enforcement thus confirming not only
the prevalence of hawala in a regulated environment but also serious regulatory issues
within the so-called regulated exchange companies’ operations.
As for the regulatory challenges to control hawala in Pakistan, the percentage of responses
shown in Figure 4.1 above is relatively low (23 per cent). This may be because not many
participants such as clients or hawaladars could relate the informal transfers with deeper
problems in the political economy, geography and transit trade issues of the country.
Nevertheless, the responses, mainly from the ‘governance’ and ‘other businesses’ groups,
were valuable because of the relevance of the observations of these participants who are
directly involved with these issues.
Detailed, descriptive findings are available in Chapters 4–7 in the thesis.
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Chapter 4:
4.1

Description of the Case Study Environment

Introduction

This chapter introduces Pakistan’s geography, political administration and the legal,
institutional and regulatory frameworks relevant to hawala regulation. The purpose of
providing the reader with the requisite background information is twofold. Firstly, it helps
to highlight the peculiar geo-strategic role of Pakistan in a region where hawala originated
and has been practiced for many centuries. Secondly, it provides a snapshot of the political,
institutional and economic situation of a country which relies heavily on inward remittances
to sustain its many economic problems. It is essential that the reader understands ‘the
environment’ in which the regulation of informal hawala-type transfers is required, in
pursuance of Pakistan’s international commitment to weed out financial crimes and
terrorism. Whether this objective is necessary or achievable is addressed in Chapter 7.
With this view, the chapter begins by providing an overview of Pakistan’s geography and
location. Next, it explains the political administration in the country focusing mainly on the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and introduces the reader with the exclusive
pre-colonial legal and administrative framework that is practised in these areas. After this,
the economy and the role of inward remittances in the economy is discussed, in order to
understand in the following section, the manner in which the dark side of Pakistan’s
shadow economy facilitates as well as necessitates the regulation of the informal transfers.
Finally, there is a discussion of the legal and institutional frameworks that are directly
relevant to hawala regulation, such as the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and the Federal
Investigation Agency (FIA).
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Figure 4.1 Geographical Map of Pakistan148
4.2 Geography
Spread over an area of 796,095 square kilometres the Islamic Republic of Pakistan149 is
located in South Asia, and has a population estimated to exceed 195 million.150
Geographically Pakistan lies at the crossroads of the strategically important regions of
South Asia, Central Asia and Western Asia. It has a 1,046-kilometre coastline along
the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman in the South.151 Pakistan is bordered by Afghanistan
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Available online at <http://geography.about.com/library/cia/blcpakistan.htm>.Both the map and
information are derived from the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Factbook: Pakistan (last updated 11
March 2014) <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>.
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Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy (Rand Corporation, 1995)235.
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in the West and North, China in far north-east, India to the east and Iran to the southwest.152
The narrow Wakhan153 corridor in north Afghanistan separates Pakistan from Tajikistan.

Figure 5.2 Political Map of Pakistan154
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Ashraf Qureshi, Geography of Pakistan (Book Center, 2003)11.
Area linking North-eastern Afghanistan with China.
154
Maps of World available online at < http://www.mapsofworld.com/pakistan/pakistan-political-map.html>.
153
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4.3 Political Administration
In its political administration, Pakistan is a federation of four provinces. These comprise
Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan, as well as the Islamabad
Capital Territory (ICT) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the
northwest.
4.3.1 The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan is spread across about 27,220
square kilometres155 between Afghanistan to the West, Balochistan province to the South,
and KPK province to the East, and is mostly inhabited by Pashtun 156 tribes. FATA is
comprised of seven Agencies157 (tribal districts) and six Frontier Regions158 (FRs).
According to the fifth population census conducted in 1998, FATA’s population stood at a
little over 3.1 million.159 This figure has been recently contested and the population of
FATA is said to be more than 6.0 million people.160
Due to its strategic location, FATA has a history of war and conflict. For instance, in the
19th century the British tried to occupy Afghanistan in order to secure their Indian dominion
from a Czarist Russia; but, despite various attacks, British attempts to invade Afghanistan
failed such that in 1842 an 18,000-strong British army had to retreat from Kabul. To avoid
further conflict, and as a result of compromise between the British and Afghan rulers, a
chunk of Pashtun territory was separated from Afghanistan and amalgamated into British
India. The border known as the ‘Durand Line’ was then created and is currently the border
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Since the Durand Line cuts through the Pashtun
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Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, ‘Political Reforms in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA):
Will it End the Current Militancy?’(Working Paper No 64, South Asia Institute Department of Political
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heartland dividing tribes, clans, and even households, it is crossed with impunity by
Pashtuns who live on either side of what is currently the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.161
Regardless of compromise and administrative arrangements, and despite being under its
direct control, the Pashtuns remained a continuous threat to the British rule in India due to
their obstinacy and refusal to accept foreign domination. Consequently, British imperialism
faced severe resistance in FATA. In 1842, a part of FATA called Waziristan could not be
subdued by 40,000 British troops.162 Ultimately, the British had to resolve matters with the
Pashtuns and the Baloch163 through a special administrative code. This administrative
arrangement allowed the British to continue using FATA’s tribal region as a buffer zone.
Interestingly, even after independence from its British rulers in 1947, successive Pakistani
governments have continued with the legacy of the British colonial policies in FATA
without bringing any fundamental changes to the governance system and administration in
the tribal areas.
4.3.2.

Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901

Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901 is the colonial era legal and administrative
framework which the British used to govern the tribal areas between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. After independence from British India, Pakistan has retained FCR to govern
the tribal belt located in the north-west of Pakistan. Article 247164 of Pakistan’s Constitution
excludes FATA from constitutional coverage and vests the power of law making in FATA
solely with the President of Pakistan. In this manner, FATA is governed directly by the
federal government. Under FCR and Articles 246 and 247 of the Constitution, conventional
161
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Pakistani laws do not apply to FATA, nor do any other constitutional clauses, including
those protecting fundamental rights of speech, assembly, fair trial and dignity. The FCR
effectively takes FATA out of the mainstream political and administrative system and does
not comply with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).165 Acts
of Parliament are not applicable in FATA unless the President directs otherwise. Basic
citizenship rights, such as the right of adult franchise was extended to FATA in 1997, and
the Political Parties Act 1962, was extended to the FATA region in 2011.166
In FATA, Pakistan government’s conventional tax collection, policing and judicial systems
do not exist. Alternatively, FATA is administered by civil servants known as Political
Agents (PAs), who govern in consultation with the tribal elders called maliks.167 Policing
functions in FATA and Balochistan B-Areas are carried out through a special police force
called ‘the Levies’. The number of levies in FATA and Balochistan is estimated at 6,779
and 12,000 respectively.168 Levies are responsible for policing in tribal areas and carrying
out law and order functions under their respective PAs.
The PAs exercise judicial authority in FATA in consultation with the tribal council of
elders (jirga). The jirga is presided over by the tribal (male) elders (maliks), who receive
financial privileges from the PAs in return for helping maintain social peace and suppress
crime.169 Distribution of allowances and other economic incentives to certain tribal leaders
in return for loyalty and facilitating the spread of local administration’s authority over the
region, a colonial strategy, have been possible due to the specific legal framework provided
by the FCR.170 Jirgas enforce customary law, often considered selective and discriminatory
by various human rights organizations.171
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In recent years, the unbridled executive, judicial and financial authority of the PAs has
invited severe criticism. Most criticized among the PAs’ discretionary powers under the
FCR is their power to impose economic blockades or sieges on ‘hostile’ or ‘unfriendly’
tribes and to inflict fines on whole communities where certain crimes took place. For
example, in 2004, South Waziristan administration shut down and later threatened to
demolish, the Agency's central marketplace when members of a prominent tribe failed to
capture foreign militants there, leaving many residents without an income. 172 In addition to
this, the most notorious provision of the FCR is its Schedule 40, which deals with collective
responsibility issues. Under FCR 40, the PAs can punish any tribe, or sub-tribe whenever
they deem fit.173 This means if somebody damages a government property in, say, Area A,
the PAs can punish people from Area B on the basis of mere suspicion and impose heavy
penalties. If a crime takes place in area C, the tribe living in the area is responsible for
redemption, even though miscreants or rivals might be responsible for the act. Moreover,
FCR 40 empowered the political administration to jail anyone for three years without
assigning a reason. In relation to their judicial powers, the decision of the PAs could not be
challenged in superior Pakistani courts until 2011 when, as a result of amendments in the
FCR,174 a three member bench comprising Peshawar High Court judges has been
constituted to hear appeals against decisions of the PAs.175
Although some amendments have been introduced, the FCR nevertheless has still not been
abolished and serves as the law of the land for FATA. The question remains why an
independent, sovereign state would require an exclusive law in its border areas, and who are
the real beneficiaries of such exclusion?
The most common argument for retaining FCR has been that tribal Pashtuns would resent
the Pakhtun code of traditional conduct being breached by the introduction of regular laws
and government.176 Some analysts decry this position as propaganda carried out by a
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powerful elite group who are the real beneficiaries of a weak government writ in FATA.177
Others contend that such claim is impossible to reconcile with the daily misery and risk that
the FCR has wrought.178 Proponents of these views argue that the government’s writ in
FATA is tenuous by design; benefitting a few thousand state and non-state actors including
the Pakistan military, civil bureaucracy, tribal leaders, politicians and businessmen.179 On
the contrary, the inhabitants of FATA, who should have been the real beneficiaries of the
incentives and facilities enjoyed by their leaders, are economically under-developed. The
FATA is one of the poorest and least developed areas in Pakistan with a literacy rate of
17.42 per cent compared with the national average of 40 per cent. 180 The female literacy
rate in FATA is 3 per cent compared with a national average of 32 per cent. Almost 66 per
cent people live below the poverty line and per capita income is USD250, half of the
national average of USD500.181 A survey conducted under the FATA Poverty Assessment
has revealed a number of ‘common indicators of poverty’ that indicated the extent of
FATA’s extreme poverty, illiteracy, small agricultural holdings and lack of industrial
enterprise across the region. These were:
…landlessness or ownership of just small areas of land; lack of livestock; little or no
food; lack of nutritious food; tattered clothing and no shoes; poor quality or condition
of house; unemployment; high dependency on others for food and income; women
working to supplement household income; ill health and disability; increased risk of
conflict; lack of access to public services; lack of influence and powerlessness; and
belonging to a powerless tribe are indicators of poverty across the FATA.182

Little surprise then if FATA deprived of economic development, has remained a kind of
playground for smugglers and criminals of every stripe. Illegal trade of arms and narcotics,
transit trade to Afghanistan through Pakistan, foreign exchange transactions through
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hawala/hundi, and goods transport are the main major businesses in the tribal areas.183 The
Pakistani military has also used the strategically located region to promote its perceived
interests in Afghanistan through local and Afghan proxies.184 In 1978, the military regime
in Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq decided to gain maximum benefit from the Afghan
conflict, and started providing organizational training to the Afghan mujahidins (holy
warriors). The United States, through its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and some
western European countries supported Zia-ul-Haq through the generous provision of both
funds and ammunition to topple the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan.185 The Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had its immediate repercussions on the tribal areas of
Pakistan whose land and resources both were used to serve the objectives of the Afghan
jihad (holy war).186 Ever since, FATA has become a haven for many local, regional and
international jihadi groups.
Two important factors regarding FATA from the perspective of hawala regulation need be
noted. Firstly, in the years following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the
influence of the Afghan businessmen in FATA has increased manifold due to the massive
funds they had received in the name of anti-Soviet jihad. 187 Once the war was over, these
funds were used to start businesses in FATA.188 A second simultaneous significant
development was that thousands of tribesmen acquired Afghan passports and left for the
United States, European countries and the Middle East. These tribesmen have relied on
hawala transactions to send money home, which has sustained family income levels as well
as strengthened hawala networks in the tribal areas. In addition to this, the illegal trade in
narcotics and arms — as well as smuggling through the Afghan Transit Trade189 — creates
a substantive pool of local funds that can be settled through the pool of funds collected as a
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result of migrant remittances abroad, making hawala a vibrant financial system in the tribal
areas.
4.4

Economy and Home Remittances

Pakistan’s economy can be classified as one of the emerging economies of the world. With
a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) estimated to be between USD240 and USD260 billion, it
is among world’s largest remittance recipient countries.190 Home remittances constitute the
second largest source of foreign exchange in Pakistan after exports.191 These inward
remittances exceed foreign direct investment and compared with foreign loans which have
associated costs in the form of mark up or other conditionalities, home remittances have
been a valuable and inexpensive source of foreign exchange available for the government
for the economic development of the country as these are not received subject to strict and
difficult terms.192 Many economists are of the view that remittances from abroad have
helped sustain Pakistan’s economy despite political instability, high oil prices and costly
imports.193 At around 55 per cent of the total export of goods and services (around USD26
billion in 2011–12) and corresponding imports (USD40 billion) inward remittances have
provided support to the country’s current account balance.194 Some authors argue that these
remittances have served to play a crucial role in the growth profile of Pakistan which
helped in poverty alleviation in rural areas as well as provided support in the wake of
natural disasters, such as the earthquake that hit Northern Pakistan in 2005. 195 In addition to
this, home remittances (which account for the second largest source of inflow of US
dollars) have remained one of the major sources countering the negative pressure on
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exchange parity and in the manner that these inflows have consistently kept a check on free
fall of the Pakistani rupee (PKR) against the US dollar (USD).196
Interestingly, the record rise in remittance inflows into Pakistan during the last few years
has occurred at a time when the world economy is still unsteady and most countries have
witnessed declines in workers’ remittances. At a time when a decline in home remittances
was expected as a result of major lay-offs in the aftermath of worldwide financial crisis,
Pakistan defied the trend as its home remittances increased in 2009–10 and thereafter. It
was surprising that in the midst of the global economic meltdown and a rise in
unemployment, remittances grew by over 21 per cent in 2008–09.197 The surge in inflows
was not only limited to Pakistan but South Asia overall registered an increase of 33 per
cent. Several views can be cited to explain this reported increase in remittances in South
Asia in general and Pakistan in particular. Firstly, some migrants have apparently lost their
jobs in host countries and have returned with their savings; hence, the jump in remittances
flows.198 Secondly, Saudi Arabia, UAE and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries are major destinations for the Pakistani migrants and since these countries have
not sent Pakistani workers back home in large numbers, there is an increased remittance
numbers.199 A third reason, to which authors attribute the increased remittances are falling
property prices, rising interest rate differentials and a sharp depreciation of exchange rate.
These are thought to have played important roles in attracting large remittance inflows for
investment purposes as opposed to consumption purposes.200 Last but not least, the record
rise in remittances is explained by many experts as the inflow of laundered money that was
initially transferred through hawala, coming back into the economy as inward remittances
through the formal banking channels.201
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4.5

Shadow Economy

The assumption regarding funds initially transferring through hawala and then returning as
inward remittances through the formal channels has clear application to Pakistan. These
include the size of Pakistan’s shadow economy, rampant tax evasion (both a cause of and
the effect of the shadow economy) and criminal economy which accounts for a large part of
the shadow economy as well as creating many other problems.
4.5.1

The Size Problem

Whilst the shadow economy is global in its dimensions, calculating precise estimates for its
extent is an ongoing problem for policy makers due to non-availability of precise
information. Consequently, several approaches are used to find the estimates for the shadow
economy. Among these, the most popular is the monetary approach, which is based on the
assumption that the shadow economy is based on cash transactions in order to avoid
detection. Other approaches include the labour market approach, fiscal approach, MIMIC
(multiple indicators multiple causes) approach, and so on. The major problem with all of
these approaches is that they do not give the actual estimates of the shadow economy,
instead they give trend estimates for it. This means that various indicators show whether the
shadow economy is going up or down.
4.5.2

Terms and Definition Problem

There is also no commonly acceptable definition or term that can be used for the ‘dark side’
of the world economy; instead there is a ‘plethora of appellations’202 such as ‘black’, ‘grey’,
‘hidden’, ‘shadow’, ‘informal’, ‘illegal’, ‘unreported’, ‘underground’, ‘unrecorded’,
‘undeclared’, ‘second’, and ‘parallel’.
The ‘informal economy’ refers to that part of the economy which is outside the
government’s control.203 It usually involves money-based transactions, including barter
trade, mutual self-help, odd-jobs, street trading and so on. Income generated by the
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informal economy is generally not recorded for taxation purposes, and information is
unavailable for GDP calculations. Very close to the informal economy is the ‘black
economy’, which includes essentially illegal and even criminal activities such as
distributing drugs, smuggling and trading in contraband goods, prostitution and gambling. It
is important to note that while the informal economy may not be taxed or regulated by the
government, it can still include legal economic activities whereas the black market
essentially comprises illegal activities. The black market is also distinct from the ‘grey
market’, in which commodities are distributed through channels, which while legal, are
unauthorized, unofficial and unintended by the original manufacturer.
The problem of term and definition has been resolved by Katsios 204 who settles this issue of
‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ by using a single term ‘shadow economy’ that includes the use and/or
production of legal as well as illegal goods and services. Tax evasion205 associated with
legal activities is itself illegal and subject to criminal punishment. Similarly, investment of
tax evasion proceeds from legal activities still remains ‘money laundering’, as the proceeds
are related to a criminal activity. A broad definition of a shadow economy then, would
include unreported income from all economic activities that would generally be taxable
were they reported to the authorities206 as reflected in Table 5.1 below.
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Table 4.1:

Type
Activity

A Taxonomy of Types of Underground Economic Activities

of Monetary Transactions

ILLEGAL
Trade in stolen goods; drug dealing and
ACTIVITIES
manufacturing; prostitution; gambling;
smuggling, fraud etc.

Non-Monetary Transactions

Barter: drugs, stolen goods:
smuggling etc:
producing or
growing drugs for own use:
Theft for own use.

Tax Evasion

LEGAL
Unreported
ACTIVITIES income from selfemployment;

Tax Avoidance

Tax Evasion

Tax Avoidance

Employee
discounts,

Barter of
legal services
and goods

All do-it yourself
work and

Fringe benefits

Neighbour help

Wages, salaries
and assets from
un reported work
related to legal
services and
goods

Source: Katsios 2006.

74

4.5.3

Informal Economy — A Global Phenomenon

According to a 2013 ILO report,207 the number of unemployed people across the globe is
over 200 million and is likely to increase in the post global financial crises years. The
findings of this report provide that over the past five years the incidence of long-term
unemployment has increased in 60 per cent of the advanced and developing economies.
This has occurred alongside the increase in the incidence of informal employment to up to
half of the total labour market in countries like Germany and Hungary. In developing and
emerging economies, the share of informal employment stands at 40 per cent,
demonstrating that the shadow economy is a significant part of many developing countries.
Although difficult to determine precisely, the value of shadow economies around the world
may total about USD10 trillion a year.208 A World Bank study209 estimated the size of
shadow economies for 162 countries over the period 1999 –2006/7 and revealed that the
weighted average size of the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP in Sub-Saharan
Africa is 38.4 per cent; in Europe and Central Asia it is 36.5 per cent, and in high income
OECD countries, it is 13.5 per cent. The ILO estimates that the shadow economy comprises
half to three-quarters of all non-agricultural employment in developing countries. If
agricultural workers in developing countries are included, the estimate of the number of
informal workers in developing countries would be 2,000 million people.210 Shadow
economies are generally associated with poor employment conditions and increasing
poverty, and the labour force is exposed to lack of protection in the event of non-payment
of wages, compulsory overtime or extra shifts, lay-offs without notice or compensation,
unsafe working conditions and the absence of social benefits such as pensions, sick pay and
health insurance.211 Illicit work can take many shapes. The ‘underground’ use of labour
207
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may consist of a second job after (or even during) regular working hours. A second form is
informal economy work by individuals who do not participate in the official labour market.
A third component is the employment of people (such as clandestine or illegal immigrants),
who are not allowed to work in the official economy. Given all these approximations, it is
not difficult to understand the volumes of unrecorded funds generated in the shadow
economies both in the formal as well as informal sectors that are available for settlement
purposes in case of hawala transactions.
4.6

Size of Pakistan’s Shadow Economy

The economists Kemal and Qasim212 have taken stock of the shortcomings of the existing
approaches that are commonly used to calculate the size of shadow economy. They have
used a new ‘discrepancy’ approach to calculate precise estimates of Pakistan’s shadow
economy. The discrepancy approach calculates total private consumption from the
household survey for the total population, and adjusts it for trade mis-invoicing. True
estimates of the GDP are then compared with the GDP estimates reported in the National
Accounts. The difference between the two values, according to these authors, is the size of
the shadow economy. According to their estimates, the informal economy of Pakistan was
91 per cent of the formal economy in 2007–08213 which, considering Pakistan’s GDP of
USD231 billion in 2012–13,214 easily comes to USD211 billion. If the estimate of these
authors is indeed true, this also indicates the true size of Pakistan’s GDP as USD440
billion, almost double its present value and bringing it on par with countries such as Austria
(USD398 billion), South Africa (USD384 billion) and close to Taiwan (USD473 billion).215
Different international authors have used other approaches to estimate Pakistan’s shadow
economy; for instance, Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro have used the multiple causes
multiple variables approach to estimate shadow economies for 151 countries between 1996
and 2006/7. For developing countries, these authors have used cause variables: the size of
the government, the unemployment rate, government effectiveness, and GDP per capita. As
212
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indicator variables they have used currency, the growth rate of GDP per capita, and the
labour force participation rate. According to the estimates calculated by these authors, the
average size of Pakistan’s shadow economy is around 35.7 per cent216 of GDP, which is a
middle distribution level among developing countries compared with the smallest shadow
economies, such as China (12.8 per cent), Singapore (13.0 per cent), and Vietnam (15.2 per
cent). The highest shadow economies include Peru (58.7 per cent), Panama (63.5 per cent),
and Bolivia (66.6 per cent).
Pakistan’s Federal Bureau of Revenue (FBR) states that the country’s shadow economy had
already touched over USD100 billion, while considering the total GDP of USD166 billion
in 2008–09.217 An FBR report has estimated that the country’s shadow economy expanded
at the rate of 9 per cent between 1977 and 2000. Similarly, United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) research has estimated the size of Pakistan’s informal economy in
between 20 and 30 per cent of the formal economy. 218 Research by Arby, Malik and Hanif
(2010)219 has estimated the size of shadow economy as 30 per cent of the total economy.
According to Gulzar, Junaid and Haider (2011)220 the size of shadow economy is around 28
per cent of the formal economy.
In view of these various calculations, conservative estimates of the size of Pakistan’s
shadow economy can be anywhere between 30 and 90 per cent of its formal, documented
economy.221
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4.7

Indicators of Pakistan’s Shadow Economy

4.7.1

Low Tax Revenues

According to World Bank Data,222 Pakistan’s tax revenue as a percentage of GDP (also
referred as the ‘tax-to-GDP ratio’) was 9.3 in 2011, one of the world’s lowest. Developing
economies usually have a tax-to-GDP ratio from 13 per cent to 18 per cent. Compared with
other South Asian economies, India stood at 10.4 per cent, Bangladesh 10 per cent and Sri
Lanka 12.4 per cent. A low tax-to-GDP ratio means that a country incurs high budget
deficits which must be financed by either printing money or borrowing. This adds to the
country’s debt burden and creates inflationary pressures. At present, Pakistan has an
inflation rate that is second only in Asia to that of Vietnam.223 Low tax revenues also mean
that fewer resources are available for essential social services.
The composition of Pakistan’s GDP is such that it becomes easy to avoid tax, especially in
sectors that have largely remained untaxed, for example the agricultural sector employs 45
per cent of the country’s total workforce with a 22 per cent share in the GDP, 224 and yet its
contribution to tax revenue is roughly 1per cent.225 The same is the case with the services
sector (53 per cent of GDP) which includes retail, transportation and general government
services. According to the quarterly review of the Federal Board of Revenue for the first
half of the fiscal year 2012–13, the total number of registered employees in the services
sector was 122,000, a figure that has grown significantly over the years. During the last six
years, income tax collection from this sector hovered around PKR 4–5 billion, and the share
of total direct taxes could not increase above 1 per cent rather it has been declining since
2009–10. 226
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To illustrate this mismatch between revenue contribution and share in GDP, the FBR
report227 cites the example of the leading component of the services sector — wholesale and
retail trade (WRT). WRT constitutes 17 per cent in the overall GDP and within services
sector its share is about 34 per cent however, its contribution to the federal taxes is only 0.5
per cent. According to FBR estimates, there are about 1.5 million wholesale and retail trade
units in Pakistan. These include sale, maintenance or repair of motor vehicle, wholesale
trade and commission agents and retail trade. Nearly 85 per cent are in the retail trade,
followed by sale or repair 11 per cent and wholesale 4 per cent. Within the retail trade,
almost 54 per cent of units are engaged in sale of food, drinks or tobacco. The growth in
this sector necessitates greater employment which the report substantiates by providing that
a total of 9.0 million people being employed in this sector, which is around 16 per cent of
the total labour force.228 Around 59 per cent of the people within WRT sector are employed
in retail trade and the sale and purchase of goods, as untapped unregistered workers.
4.7.2

Tax Evasion

Only 1.4 million (0.9 per cent) Pakistanis pay tax — a small proportion of a total population
of over 180 million.229 A 2003 Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) study
has been cited showing that out of every PKR100, the government receives only PKR38,
and PKR62 is pocketed by the tax payer, tax collector and the tax practitioner. According to
the findings, PKR720 billion tax collection was only 38 per cent of around PKR2 trillion
which should have been collected by the FBR.230 If these calculations are applied, then the
PKR1.939 billion revenue collected by FBR in fiscal year 2012–13231 should have been
PKR3.132 trillion.
A comparison of key indicators of financial inclusion in Pakistan with those of other
countries in the region confirms the presence of a growing shadow economy. According to
227
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the World Bank Financial Inclusion data 2011,232 only 10 per cent of Pakistani adults have
an account at a formal financial institution. The comparable figure for India is 35.23 per
cent, China 63.81 per cent, Sri Lanka 68.52 per cent and Bangladesh 39.55 per cent.
Similarly, only 5 per cent of adult Pakistanis use a bank account to receive wages and only
1 per cent use bank accounts to receive remittances.
Some financial analysts argue that the problem in Pakistan is that of fiscal inclusion, rather
than financial inclusion as the international financial institutions suggest in their studies.
According to these experts, there are between 20 and 30 million bank accounts in Pakistan,
suggesting that each household maintains at least one bank account. By contrast, the
number of income-tax paying people is about 2 million only.
The key question remains: why aren’t government revenues higher? Zaidi233 considers tax
evasion as the main culprit for the problem. In his view, tax evasion is caused by three
things: poor legal frameworks and bureaucratic capabilities with regards to revenue
extraction; corruption in the form of a predatory class that privileges certain sectors and
vested interests with unjustified ‘tax exemptions’; and elites who cut deals with the state to
avoid taxation. This is further substantiated by the fact that those attempting to restructure
Pakistan’s tax regime in 2001 have backed down in the face of massive popular revolt to
the proposal to register traders and shop owners.234 Also, after the government imposed the
first-ever sales tax of 16 per cent on tractors in March 2011, above-ground purchases of the
vehicles hit a low of 369 units in January, as compared to 5,673 a year earlier. Tractor
makers Fiat and Massey Ferguson suspended local production, forcing the government to
cut the tax to 5 per cent.235
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4.7.3

Criminal Economy236

At the even ‘darker end’ of the shadow economy spectrum is the thriving illegal economy
orchestrated by complex informal and formal organized criminal networks of supplier rings,
wholesalers, financiers, protectors and patrons. A 2011 study by the Sustainable
Development Policy Institute (SDPI) and the UNODC237 has estimated the scale and
dynamics of illegal economy in Pakistan, and its links with regional and global security.
According to the findings of this study, the most lucrative business for organized criminals
is trafficking in drugs and their precursors, followed by migrant smuggling and human
trafficking, the illegal timber trade and kidnapping for ransom.
i) Trafficking in Drugs and Precursors
Pakistan’s geographical proximity with Afghanistan places it in a vulnerable position with
respect to the illicit trafficking of opiates and their precursors. Afghanistan is now the
source for more than 90 per cent of the world’s opium and a significant cannabis producer
much of which is harvested in provinces bordering Pakistan. According to UNODC,
Pakistan itself has over 1,000 hectares under poppy cultivation in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan.238 Consequently, large
quantities of opium, heroin, and cannabis are trafficked via Pakistan to Iran, the Middle
East, Africa, East Asia and Western countries. Approximately 44 per cent of the heroin
produced in Afghanistan is estimated to be trafficked through Pakistan. Pakistan is also a
major transit country for the precursors entering Afghanistan.239
ii) Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling
Pakistan is also a destination, transit and source country for both human trafficking and
migrant smuggling. Human trafficking to and from Pakistan includes the trafficking of
mostly women and children for the sex trade, child labour, and bonded labour. Migrant
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smuggling is more prevalent than other forms of human trafficking and it primarily
involves emigration to Europe and the Middle East. Illegal emigration of Afghans to
Europe, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent to Australia is also transited through
Pakistan.
iii) Arms Smuggling
In addition to drugs and human trafficking, there is also evidence of arms trafficking. The
proliferation of small arms in Pakistan reportedly originates from two sources. The first is
diversions from the estimated USD2 billion worth of arms which were meant to transit
through Pakistan to Afghanistan in the period from 1979 to 1989. Estimates are that 70 per
cent of these arms never made it to Afghanistan and ended up on the black market in
Pakistan. The second major source is the unorganized and largely unregulated private
ordinance manufacturing enterprises in the towns of Darra Adam Khel and Landi Kotal in
FATA. Darra Adam Khel alone is estimated to have some 2,600 arms manufacturing
outlets, with a capacity to produce 100 AK 47 assault rifles per day.
iv) Illegal Timber Trade
Timber prices in Pakistani cities are generally higher than the world average. This provides
an incentive for timber contractors to harvest the country’s state controlled natural forests
beyond sustainable and legal limits. In addition, high value timber varieties are smuggled
into Pakistan from Afghanistan. Illegally harvested timber is mostly consumed domestically
while the high value cedar wood from Afghan and domestic sources, is smuggled out of the
country, mainly to Dubai. Pakistan’s formal importation of timber is less than one-fifth of
local timber production. There is no formal importation of fuel wood. The 2011
SDPI/UNODC study has estimated that the proceeds from illegal timber trade (consisting of
illegal logging in Pakistan and the smuggling of illegally logged timber from Afghanistan
into Pakistan) stand at around USD23 million.
v) Kidnapping for Ransom
Cases of kidnapping for ransom in all major cities of Pakistan are on a rise since 2007.
Organized gangs involved in kidnapping for ransom often have threefold set-up. One team
82

is responsible for kidnapping and handing over the victim to a middleman; the middleman
then transfers the kidnapped to a third party. This party keeps the hostage until a successful
bargain with the person’s family is complete. In this process, there is also a possibility of
failed deals resulting in the death or re-selling of the kidnapped person. The hostages are
usually kept in areas such as the tribal regions where law enforcement agencies have weak
control. According to conservative estimates, proceeds from kidnapping for ransom may be
just over USD10 million.
4.8

Institutional, Legal and Regulatory Frameworks

4.8.1

Complex Institutional Frameworks

Pakistan has a complex institutional framework and an extensive security apparatus to deal
with organized or isolated crimes. Under the Constitution of 1973, law and order is a
provincial subject whereas immigration and border control are national subjects being dealt
with at the federal government level. The federal government employs an estimated
210,000 law enforcement personnel240 spread across several agencies and involved in a
wide variety of law enforcement, internal security and intelligence roles with country-wide
jurisdiction. The strength of provincial governments’ police personnel is estimated at
354,221.241 According to the UNODC, law enforcement agencies struggle to interdict
trafficking and smuggling of various kinds and on various scales, particularly at the
borders. Resources available to these agencies are insufficient and low personnel numbers
make for sub-optimal investigations and enforcement. Information sharing between
agencies is ad-hoc and their relationships are often competitive rather than cooperative.242
An example of this is that during the past 30 years, the National Accountability Bureau
(NAB), the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) and Federal
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Board of Revenue (FBR) have not been able to establish a joint task force to book and
prosecute the individuals and networks involved in smuggling and money laundering.243
4.8.2

State Bank of Pakistan

The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) is the apex financial regulator regulating the foreign
exchange market. The policies and regulations are administered through the Exchange
Policy Department (EPD) in the SBP. The EPD is structured into three divisions namely the
Policy Division, Investment Division, and Exchange Companies Division. Recently, as a
result of a redistribution of responsibilities, work pertaining to issuance of Authorized
Dealers’ licences has been reallocated from Exchange Companies Division to Policy
Division of EPD. Consequently, while the Exchange Companies Division is responsible for
formulation of policies for establishing exchange companies and developing framework for
their licensing, operations, supervision and monitoring the issuance of these licenses is
taken care of by the Policy Division.
i) Foreign Exchange Regulations Act (FERA) 1947
Foreign exchange business is regulated under the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act
(FERA 1947). FERA 1947 prohibits hawala-type transfers, in that it clearly lays down the
procedure for dealing in foreign exchange,244 thus making the use of any IVTS illegal and
criminal in Pakistan. The Foreign Exchange Manual 2002 outlines the rules and regulations
governing foreign exchange business for the guidance of exchange companies, authorized
dealers, the general public and other stakeholders.
ii)

Contraventions of FERA 1947

Whereas FERA 1947 stipulates the regulation of foreign exchange transactions, in 1992 the
incumbent government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif introduced a new law called the
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Protection of Economic Reforms Act (PERA)1992. Sections 5245 and 9246 of PERA provide
complete freedom to an individual to bring, hold, sell, transfer and take out foreign
exchange within or outside Pakistan. This legislation has a clear overriding effect on FERA
1947, making the legislation controlling foreign exchange regulations contradictory. Under
this situation, the Central Bank is in a difficult position to effectively monitor and supervise
foreign exchange activities. An example of this is that under FERA 1947, an individual
cannot take out of the country an amount more than USD10,000 in cash, whereas PERA
1992 provides complete freedom to this effect. Another legal provision in section 111(4)247
of the Pakistan Income Tax Ordinance 2001 states that, if a person is bringing foreign
exchange from abroad through normal banking channels, the tax authorities cannot pose
any questions about the source of these funds if the foreign exchange is surrendered and
funds are converted into Pakistani rupees. Hence, in such cases, banks also shelter under
these laws to withhold information from the tax and regulatory authorities.
It is obvious that in the presence of such ‘protective laws’, the SBP’s financial regulation
and control of foreign exchange market has remained ineffective. Consequently, despite the
desire to effectively regulate the informal sector in the foreign exchange market, the SBP
has not been able to effectively regulate the informal foreign exchange activities.
4.8.3

Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)

The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) is a federal government organization which reports
to the Pakistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. Among its other responsibilities, the FIA is
the law enforcement agency responsible for apprehension, investigation and prosecution of
245
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hawala related cases in Pakistan. Under the provisions of the Foreign Exchange
Regulations Act 1947, FIA can raid, seize funds, and investigate hawala offences, on a
complaint from the State Bank of Pakistan, along with one other complainant.
Organizationally, the FIA is divided into four zones or directorates: Sindh, Punjab,
Balochistan, and Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa (KPK), with its headquarters in Islamabad. The
agency has the authority to carry out operations all over the country, except in the FATA
region. For hawala investigations and prosecutions, the Agency follows the rules and
procedures of the Pakistan Code of Criminal Procedures 1898 and Pakistan Electronic
Crime Ordinance 2002. The total manpower of FIA is nearly 3,000.248
4.8.4

The Anti Money Laundering Act 2010

Under tremendous international pressure, the Pakistan government has passed the AntiMoney Laundering (AML) Act 2010 but provisions of corresponding laws such as the
Protection of Economic Reforms Act 1992 and Income Tax Ordinance 2001 allow a free
hand to money launderers. In the presence of these laws, the AML Act 2010 has virtually
become a dormant law whose provisions have rarely been invoked.249
Many legal experts view that the AML Act 2010 as inherently flawed.250 For instance, the
Constitution of Pakistan excludes B-areas in Balochistan, and areas in Khyber
Pukhtunkhwa (KPK) provinces from the parliament’s legislative coverage. This means the
Act does not extend into these areas and transactions occurring there are not subject to legal
scrutiny. Moreover, according to the Research Society of International Law (RSIL), the Act
does not apply to fiscal offences such as smuggling of otherwise legal goods for the
purpose of evading customs duties or income tax.251 This is viewed as a practical loophole
for money launderers using IVTS, since smuggling based repatriation of value — once
converted to cash — can be deposited with formal financial institutions.
Consequently, the effectiveness of the Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) — created under
section 6 of the AML Act 2010 — has also become questionable due to contradictory laws
248
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which provide legal cover to the banks. The banks share very few ‘suspicious transactions’
(a subjective term)252 with the FMU. Besides, under the provisions of AML Act, the
Financial Monitoring Unit monitors transactions in formal financial institutions only. This
means that money laundering occurring through hawala/hundi channels has no oversight in
place, leaving a window for money launderers, to conveniently transfer their funds to
international tax havens and off-shore accounts.
4.9

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to provide an overview of the administrative, legal and
institutional frameworks relevant to hawala regulation in Pakistan. The background
information clearly shows that a number of factors in Pakistan’s domestic environment —
mainly the existence of FCR and exclusion of FATA, the shadow economy and the criminal
elements of it, rampant tax evasion and ineffective and overriding legislations (the causes as
well as the consequences of non-regulation) — necessitate effective regulation of hawala
type IVTS. Hence, the 2002 hawala regulation introduced by the SBP discussed in the next
chapter is required to be viewed in this perspective. The information provided in this
chapter clearly shows that whilst Pakistan was under international pressure to implement
FATF’s hawala regulation following 9/11 terrorist attacks, SBP’s 2002 hawala reforms
could well be seen as a reaction to the domestic policy concerns. Following chapters will
shed more light on this perspective.
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Chapter 5:
5.1

Pakistan’s Hawala Market

Introduction

Pakistan is a labour exporting country. About seven million of its emigrants make up the
world’s seventh largest diaspora.253 From the mid seventies onwards, Pakistan's economy
has experienced a dramatic increase in emigration of both skilled and unskilled labour to
countries in the Middle East and Europe, and the United States. Remittances received from
foreign countries have traditionally been handled by Pakistani banks as well as the informal
hawala system. Hawala has operated in Pakistan in a predominantly unregulated
environment for years, although the SBP took initiatives from time to time to encourage
capital to stay in the country or eventually flow into the regulated financial system. Two
such initiatives were the Foreign Exchange Bearer Certificates (FEBCs) Scheme in 1985
and the Foreign Currency Bearer Certificates (FCBCs) introduced in 1992.254 These
initiatives were clearly aimed at attracting funds from Pakistanis in overseas countries and
to reduce the attraction of hawala networks but none could succeed in eliminating hawala.
Money changers were initially authorized by the State Bank in 1991. These authorized
money changers were required to obtain a licence from the SBP but were not allowed to
undertake money transfers, which were legally permitted only through the banks. The
money changers however freely used the hawala system. In March 2002, the SBP took
major steps towards hawala regulation and took the initiative of converting the business of
money changers into Money Exchange Companies (MECs or ECs). Under the introduced
reforms, the newly created Exchange Companies provide both money transfer and currency
exchange business. The purpose of these purported reforms was to corporatize the foreign
exchange business in Pakistan as well as get rid of the informal foreign exchange dealings
and transfers. But, have these objectives been achieved? This chapter attempts to explore
this question. It explains the 2002 creation of exchange companies by the SBP and the
reporting requirements that these formally regulated entities have to abide by. Next, it
describes the regulated market structure and operations in the years post 2002. The various
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market dynamics are explained in detail with the aim of understanding the ‘inner’ market
workings and mechanisms and see the extent to which the 2002 hawala regulation has
taken effect. It concludes the reforms failed to meet their stated objectives and explains why
this occurred.
5.2

Why Were the 2002 Reforms Introduced?

Three popular theories have frequently been invoked to explain the 2002 foreign exchange
market reforms by the SBP. The foremost relates to the role of the IMF; and its infamous,
‘conditionalities’.255 Pakistan has remained under IMF assistance since the late eighties and
as part of its structural adjustment program for Pakistan, the IMF has been pressing the
different Pakistani governments to bring about economic and governance reforms in
various areas.256 One of the key areas where the IMF continuously desired reforms included
foreign exchange liberalization and the merger of the two — interbank and the kerbed —
markets. In the late 1990s, often dubbed as the lost decade for the country’s economy due to
poor growth indicators,257 Pakistan had yet again sought IMF assistance and had embarked
on a structural reform program under the military government that had taken control in
October 1999. While the government was still initiating reforms in different sectors 9/11
occurred, and so, very close to the IMF’s role, another theory views the 2002 forex reforms
in connection with the events following 9/11. This view holds that regulations against
hawala were enforced because the United States thought that such regulations would starve
global terror of funds.258
Notwithstanding the international pressure for cooperation, a more localized view suggests
that the idea of creating foreign exchange companies had remained with the SBP officials

255

These are loan conditions that a borrowing country government agrees to adjust its economic policies that
led it to seek financial assistance from the international community. See Meekal Aziz Ahmed, ‘The IMF and
Pakistan: A Road to Nowhere’(PIDE Lecture Series, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2012).
256
For greater details, see resources available at International Monetary Fund, ‘Pakistan and the IMF’ (11
April 2014) <http://www.imf.org/external/country/pak/index.htm?pn=15>.
257
In the 1990s, economic growth plummeted to 4 per cent, poverty rose to 34 per cent, inflation was in
double digits and the external debt mounted from USD20 billion in 1990 to USD43 billion (47.6 per cent of
GDP) in 1998: Ishrat Hussain, ‘The Role of Politics in Pakistan’s Economy’ (2009) 63(1) Journal of
International Affairs1,6–7.
258
See, eg, 2001 address by President George Bush: For a partial transcript see CNN, ‘Bush: We Will Starve
the Terrorists’, 24 September 2001, <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/24/ret.bush.transcript/index.html>

89

as part of their proposals to control foreign exchange crises in the country.259 According to
this view, the 2002 reforms were a long time priority of both the Pakistani government and
the SBP, which has been trying to stop hawala transfers, and increase inflows of home
remittances from overseas Pakistanis through the formal channels.260
It could be argued that all of the above explained theories to the 2002 reforms may be taken
as sound and true to some extent. Indeed, both the IMF and the US did play a role and
influenced Pakistan to impose strict regulations to eliminate hawala and consequently the
government which had long wanted to restructure the market introduced reforms. The
important question however, is not who or what prompted the reforms or, whether these
were a result of home-grown policies or foreign pressure; what should be critical to any
discussion is to understand whether Pakistan’s domestic policy concerns (explained earlier)
necessitate regulation and whether reforms are indeed beneficial to its own interests.
5.3

Money Exchange Companies (MECs)

Money exchange companies are governed under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act
(FERA) 1947. The SBP issues licenses to them. These companies have to be incorporated
under the Companies Ordinance Act and therefore register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) separately. Hence, under the 2002 regulatory
reform, MECs require both licensing and registration.
There are two types of Exchange Companies: ‘A’ category and ‘B’ category. ‘A’ category
Exchange Companies were established in 2002. These can carry out both money exchange
as well as remittance business. The subsequent ‘B’ category was introduced in 2004. ‘B’
category exchange companies are allowed only to undertake sale/purchase in foreign
currency (money changers). It is noteworthy that since the formation of ECs entailed a
minimum capital requirement of PKR100 million, it became an impediment for many small
scale operators, hence a subsequent B category was introduced by the SBP two years later
with a lower capital requirement (PKR25 million) and limited operational scope. The
minimum capital requirement licensing condition was relaxed by the SBP such that a
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minimum of five previous operators could pool resources to form an EC. As a result, the
SBP’s website shows a list of 28 ECs of category A and 29 ECs of B category. In other
words, the SBP tried to maximize the number of operators that could be licensed and be
part of the regulated sector. It could be argued, however, that the licensing and registration
regulation entails a capital requirement and other regulatory costs, and is not completely
free or involve bare minimum over-heads as is the case of hawala.
5.3.1

Reporting Requirements

Under the SBP’s revised ‘know your customer’/‘customer due diligence’( KYC/CDD)
reporting requirements, banks are required to obtain and maintain full originator
information for both domestic and cross-border wire transfers regardless of the amount,
throughout the payment chain. The money exchange companies are not permitted to
undertake domestic wire transfers.261 ECs are required to collect basic customer
identification, undertake record keeping and suspicious transaction reporting. For
remittance transfers, the procedure stipulates that names, addresses and other particulars of
both the remitter as well as the beneficiary should be mentioned on the receipt regardless of
the amount. Information on outward remittances above USD5,000 must be submitted to the
SBP with the following information: the name of the remitter, computerized national
identity card (CNIC) or passport number of the remitter, address of the remitter, name and
address of beneficiary, account number of beneficiary abroad, amount and currency of the
outward remittance, and the account number of the exchange company used for remittance.
It is important to mention here that the reporting requirement for outward remittance above
USD5,000 was again a result of the SPB’s review of its initial policy. According to the
original policy, identification documents and details were required for every outward
transaction irrespective of the amount being transferred. This means that the exchange
companies were required to obtain complete sender details for an outward remittance even
if it was USD1. During our interviews with the officials of Exchange Companies
Association of Pakistan, it was confirmed that the decision to create exchange companies
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did not involve consultations with the currency dealers. Consequently, the SBP was facing
pressure from exchange companies on reporting conditions such as producing ID card on
even a single dollar purchase/sale or remittance transfer. Acceding to their pressure, the
SPB relaxed its earlier policy and decided upon a threshold of USD5,000 above which
exchange companies are required to observe regulations. Moreover, as far as the regulations
stipulate, MECs are required to secure the prior approval of the SBP before undertaking
outward remittances involving USD50,000 or above (or equivalent in other foreign
currencies), and use banks if cross-border transfer exceeds USD3,000.
It is noticeably evident from the above explanation of the SBP’s reforms that firstly, the
cost of regulation for the money transfer operation has escalated by many fold, and
secondly the reporting requirements have made the system much more complex and
difficult from what the money changers/hawaladars practised prior to 2002. The obvious
question is how these operators have adjusted to the regulation that has apparently
increased their costs as well as complexities in business by new and many reporting
requirements. The following sections delve into these details.
5.4

Market Structure

5.4.1

Formal Sector

Structurally, Pakistan’s foreign exchange market can be divided between the formal and the
informal sectors. Table 5.1 below shows this division in the market. In the formal sector,
the market is comprised of banks, money exchange companies and their authorized dealers,
agents and vendors, and other money transfer organizations (predominantly Western Union
and Money Gram which work through mediation). Following the 2002 reforms,
commercial banks such as the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) has also ventured into the
market and established exchange companies through which it carries out sale and purchase
of foreign exchange as well as remittance transfers.
5.4.2

Informal Sector

In the informal sector, money is carried out by hand, through cash-couriers and IVTS.
Foreign exchange is conveniently available in the black US dollar market. The actual size
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of this black market remains undetermined but it is estimated to have competitive — or
even higher volumes — as compared with the formal market. The black market offers

Table 5.1:

Market Structure and Operations

Karachi foreign exchange market (formal, regulated)
Structure
Formal
Informal

Operation

Players

Clients

Banks

Exchange
companies
dominate retail
sale and
purchase of
foreign
exchange

Exchange
companies

Pilgrims/
Tourists

Dealers/
Agents/sub
agents

Patients

Black
market
operators

Migrant workers

Exchange
companies
Dealers/
Agents

Western
Union/
Money
Gram

Cashcouriers
Hawala
Black US
dollar
market

Customer ID
required but
black market
runs parallel
and serves
clients with no
documentation

Students

Expatriate families

hawaladars Pakistanis settling
abroad
Credit card users

Non-US dollar
currency
exported to
Dubai (both
cash and bank
transfers)

Traders
Other illegal transfers

Peshawar hawala market (informal, unregulated)
Structure

Informal

Operation

Players

Hawaladars
facilitate
payments to
foreign
destinations

Pashtun
Migrant
Afghan
workers &
hawaladars families
exchange
companies
dealers/
agents

Clients

Traders
Other
Illegal transfers
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better exchange rates for US currency than can be obtained in the open market.

262

For

example, if the open market rates hover around PKR99.25 to PKR99.35 per US dollar, then
in the black market, depending on the demand for US currency, the rate may be as high as
PKR102 and not less than PKR101. Also, the purchase of foreign currency from the black
market requires no documentation or information unlike the formal open market where
reporting conditions require the buyer to submit a form and disclose the reason for buying
even USD500. On the other hand, the black market neither provides any receipt for the
purchase, nor there is any other information of its operation.263 An interesting observation
drawn from the fieldwork during the research was that the black US dollar market is
indiscriminately used by all the customers of foreign exchange. As a matter of fact, an
ordinary customer may not be able to distinguish between the formal and the black currency
market due to the strong links and connections between them. Subsequent sections will
further explain and clarify the dynamics of this deep integration between the formal and the
informal currency businesses.
5.5

Karachi’s Foreign Exchange Market

5.5.1 Purchase/Sale of Foreign Exchange
Karachi’s market is mainly dominated by Money Exchange Companies. Foreign exchange
is officially traded in the interbank market and available for purchase/sale in the open
market at exchange companies’ counters and kiosks, through authorized dealers and agents.
Banks in Pakistan do not serve ‘walk-in’ or retail foreign exchange customers. The SBP has
authorized exchange companies to deal with the retail clients (Also see Table 5.1). A simple
illustration of the sale/purchase procedure of foreign exchange can be understood as
follows: An Australian citizen visiting Pakistan wishes to exchange Australian dollars
(AUD) (or any other currency) for Pakistani rupees (PKR). He goes to a bank branch in
Karachi. Since the bank cannot give the Australian citizen Pakistani rupees in exchange for
Australian dollars, the bank manager directs him to an exchange company in the open
money market where the man can sell his Australian dollars and purchase Pakistani rupees.
The exchange company, as part of its KYC requirements, will take a copy of his passport
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for their records. Alternatively, a Pakistani national wanting Pakistani rupees for his/her
foreign exchange walks into an exchange company, gets Pakistani rupees at the agreed rate
but may choose not to produce any identification. An exchange company owner shared with
us that, ‘local people do not want to produce their ID cards; they just don’t want to disclose
their identities’.264
It is noteworthy that despite non-availability of the identification documents or the simple
refusal of customers to produce any documentation, exchange companies are ready to serve
these customers. This also explains how the so called regulated sector is complying with the
reporting requirements. The operations of the ‘black’ market (mentioned above) are also
clearly understandable.
5.5.2 Export of Foreign Exchange to Dubai
Representatives of the Association of Exchange Companies of Pakistan interviewed during
the research explained the formally authorized (by SBP) procedure involved in processing
the foreign exchange as follows: ‘All foreign currency except US$ is (physically) exported
to Dubai as we have no clearing house in Pakistan, and also because UAE is the nearest
destination for us’.265 In Dubai, MECs buy US dollars against the exported currency and
import the dollars back into Pakistan. Under the SBP’s new regulations, MECs will deposit
20 per cent of the imported US dollars in the interbank. In principle, all the transactions
involved in the process of export of currency are to be recorded on the counters of the
National Bank of Pakistan at the airport(s). In reality, the National Bank of Pakistan
decided to set up a subsidiary to act as a money exchange company for reasons that involve
its experience of running one such company with local partnership in Dubai, and also
because it has been handling (on behalf of the State Bank) the export of non-dollar
currencies to Dubai. In other words, consequent upon reforms, the National Bank of
Pakistan has now become a market competitor as well as (official) facilitator of foreign
exchange that is exported to Dubai, converted to US dollars and brought back into Pakistan.
As one interviewee commented: ‘There are two ways to import US$ in Pakistan. One is
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importing cash dollars, and second is through bank accounts’.266 According to an
Exchange Companies’ Association official,
[W]e cannot afford to import US dollars directly from the UAE as it is quite expensive.
Furthermore, since 2002 SBP has imposed restrictions on the import of cash dollar.
ECs are also not importing US dollars through the State Bank. We transfer dollar
through bank (TT) in our Pakistani accounts. After consuming our requirement, extra
foreign exchange is sold to the banks.267

It has been reported that prior to the 2002 reforms, the SBP was periodically purchasing
foreign exchange from offshore money changers. It purchased USD1.4 billion in 2001–
2002 alone.268 Since it has introduced policy reforms, the SBP does not directly contact the
informal/offshore dealers but makes purchases through the interbank market.
If we have extra dollars in ECs’ accounts, we would sell to the banks. But it
depends on the rates. When the gap between the interbank and kerb rises ie
when interbank rate is higher than the kerb market, we hold the dollars but
when it shrinks, these are sold.269
5.5.3

Supply of USD in the Market

One would like to know the sources that supply liquidity in the market. According to
exchange companies, foreign exchange is supplied in the formally regulated market through
sale/purchase of foreign currencies at different authorized outlets/counters in various cities
throughout the country. Prior to 2002, many independent dealers operated in different
villages, towns and small cities. These small-scale agents collected lots of foreign exchange
from visiting overseas workers, expatriates, travellers and so on. The interviewees related
that some of these vendors were so abundant in supply, that when rates rise in the interbank
market they would hold foreign exchange, thus affecting supply and causing shortage of US
dollars in the market. Normally, under such circumstances, speculation in foreign currency
would increase depreciating the value of local currency. This means that the process of
266
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depreciation of local Pakistani rupee versus US dollar would be faster. Such situation was
witnessed in Iran and Afghanistan where speculation in US dollar fatally affected local
currencies. The exchange companies explained that due to the presence of such
unauthorized dealers and agents, remittances through legal banking channels suffered and
the hundi/hawala business flourished.
The representatives of the Association of Exchange Companies of Pakistan who were
interviewed during the research related that following the 2002 reforms, Exchange
Companies have made efforts to curb the scattered selling of foreign currencies in the
market by ‘allowing “franchises” in smaller cities and remote rural areas of Pakistan
where many migrant workers or other expatriate Pakistanis and their families visit on a
daily basis and are carrying foreign currencies’.270 It means that one leading exchange
company in Karachi or Peshawar can run more than 35 to 40 franchises around the country,
comprising hundreds of dealers and agents. ECs’ representatives are of the view that by
allowing franchises they keep the market stable and provide better rates to customers:
It keeps the equilibrium of exchange rate in the market and also helps the exchange
companies to keep official record of foreign money holders in villages and small
cities. In this manner, ECs cover the market from panic and speculative buying by
271

maintaining equilibrium and required liquidity through networking.

According to these representatives, this has led to the culmination of illegal money transfer
practices as customers are dealing with the ‘registered money exchange companies or their
representatives’ to exchange foreign currency or transfer money. We were told in the
interviews that, ‘in this manner, the beneficiaries get better exchange rates and it helps in
documenting remittances. It also helps curb the speculation of small vendors in the market
who would hold the foreign currency in order to raise exchange rates’.272
From the explanation of procedures provided by the exchange companies, it can be seen
with certainty that in the post reform years, Pakistan’s currency market has become more
centralized in the sense that instead of many ‘anonymous’ independent, small-scale dealers
270
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and agents, there are licensed and registered exchange companies, their authorized dealers,
agents and sub-agents working in the formally created, ‘documented’ sector. Whether or
not these formal entities have shed their old habits of hawala at the operational level needs
to be investigated further.
5.5.4

The Market Players — MECs, their Agents and Sub-Agents

One of the most important considerations during the fieldwork of this research was to
understand the SBP’s assumption that through the creation of exchange companies, hawala
in Pakistan will be eliminated despite the market being comprised of the same players, who,
at the operational level, include dealers who have for generations maintained their presence
in the market. Interestingly, these market players have adjusted their ‘labels’ over time,
according to the need of the hour and they have moved from informal currency dealers to
authorized money changers in 1991, to exchange companies in 2002. Hence in the post
2002 ‘reformed and regulated’ market, money exchange companies, their authorized
dealers, agents, sub-agents and sub-sub agents are the main market players alongwith ‘pure’
hawaladars and other informal operators in the black market (See Table 5.1).
Officials at the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) (which is the law enforcement agency
investigating and prosecuting hawala and money laundering cases) were interviewed during
the research. These officials confirmed the involvement of foreign exchange companies and
their agents in hawala-type transfers. According to the FIA Karachi officials, ‘hawala
business (in Karachi) is primarily facilitated by the exchange companies that are
monopolized 273 by a few Karachi-based businessmen’.274
In Karachi, owners of the leading exchange companies mostly belong to the powerful
Memon, and other Gujarati-speaking communities. These communities have been in trade
and currency businesses for centuries and as a result of migration and resettlement, are
spread far and wide in the world (particularly in the Middle East, Africa, UK and the United
States).275 Members of the Memon community were well entrenched in business and
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industry at the time of Pakistan’s birth and continued to increase their power and wealth so
as to be among what was dubbed as the ‘22 families’ in the 1970s.276 To say that this
community has global financial and trading links and networks would not be wrong. Many
members of these communities are powerful and influential owners of exchange companies
in the foreign exchange market where hawala deals and settlements are finalized. Another
powerful group in the market comprise Pashtun owners of exchange companies (their
relative role in the market is discussed in the subsequent section).
5.5.5

MEC Operations

In the post 2002 market, all the major urban centres in Pakistan have franchises of the
MECs from where they can network with their dealers and agents into villages and other
remote areas. Under the foreign exchange law and regulations, A-category foreign
exchange companies cannot transfer money directly but only by using banks. So, in order to
overcome this regulatory hitch, the MECs have bought licences for international money
transfer companies such as Western Union and Money Gram. Being an international
franchise, an MEC can transfer money abroad albeit only through banks. Similarly, Bcategory foreign exchange companies can only buy and sell foreign exchange and are not
allowed fund transfers yet, according to one interviewee, they ‘are all involved in hawala.
They have inner back offices where transactions are processed’.277
Karachi FIA officials also disclosed that few owners of exchange companies control supply
and demand in the foreign exchange market. They deplete US dollars in the market by
holding the dollar and create artificial demand for foreign exchange to manipulate rates.
Foreign exchange is available on cash as well as ‘credit’ for outward remittance transfers
however rates for both differ; ‘if cash deal is +1 Rs/$ then credit rate is +2 Rs/$’.278
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5.5.6

MEC Customers

Owners of MECs interviewed during this research related that the size of the market which
ECs cater to amounts to around one million travellers in a year, mainly in the following
categories:
i) Pilgrims: Around 0.5 million Pakistanis travel to Mecca (Saudi Arabia) each year. In
addition to this, there are pilgrims travelling to Iran and Iraq.
ii) Tourists
iii) Patients travelling abroad for medical treatment,
iv) Students studying in foreign countries,
v) Migrant workers and expatriate Pakistanis,
vi) Pakistanis settling in a foreign country,
v) Credit card users.
For obvious reasons, the information shared by the ECs about their customers did not
include businessmen, importers and exporters who, according to the investigations of this
research, settle up to 70 per cent of trade payments using the hawala channels.279 The ECs
also excluded those customers from their list who transfer their wealth overseas, ‘off-therecord’. This shows that the market turn-over figures of ‘PKR 5-6 million daily’ provided
by the MECs280 are possibly the numbers they show ‘on paper’ while actual market
volumes are much more.
Two important observations were drawn after interviewing the customers using the market
operated by foreign exchange companies, their franchises or authorized dealers and agents.
Firstly, for an ordinary customer such as a student travelling abroad, it is impossible to
distinguish between the formal and the black currency markets as the two are so wellintegrated. One customer informed us, ‘The same dealer who informs you of the shortage of
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US dollars in the market tells you where you can buy it from in the black and at what
rate’.281
Secondly, despite the reforms and formation of exchange companies, the perception of an
ordinary customer regarding a money changer is still that of a ‘hundiwala’.282 Given the
operation of the black US dollar market discussed in the preceding section (see 5.4.2
above), it could be argued that the perception of the customers is not completely wrong.
5.6

Peshawar’s Chowk Yadgar Currency Exchange/ Money Transfer Market

5.6.1

Size and Volumes

Around 190 kms away from Pakistan’s capital city Islamabad is Peshawar the provincial
capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, bordering Afghanistan. The Chowk
Yadgar money market is in Peshawar’s central business district and ‘provides the largest
hawala facility in Asia’.283 An identical facility is available in the border city of Quetta, the
capital of Balochistan province. The FIA estimates the presence of 400 shops in Chowk
Yadgar although definitive counts are refuted due to the complexities involved in layering
of business activities. Out of these shops, only four are registered currency exchange
businesses. All the rest operate informally. The total daily transaction volume of the Chowk
Yadgar currency market is estimated by FIA Peshawar, at about PKR1 billion or USD12
million. The hawaladars did not provide any sure estimates about the size of the market.
5.6.2

Market Players

In Chowk Yadgar, Pashtun operators predominate or ‘run the show’. These include both
Pashtuns from Pakistan’s tribal areas as well as Afghanistan. The money market at Chowk
Yadgar in Peshawar is heavily populated by Afghan hawaladars. As the majority of
Afghans working in the markets are of Pashtun origin, to an outsider they are barely
distinguishable amongst their fellow non-Afghan traders from KPK or FATA. Moreover
during the past 30 years, most Afghans have obtained Pakistani CNICs, many were even
born here. To discriminate between a Pashtun from FATA or from Kabul is a challenging
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task even for the border and intelligence law enforcement agencies in Pakistan.
Consequently, foreign exchange stocks, including dollars and euros, for currency
conversion are conveniently transported by carriers across borders based on demand.
Besides this, Chowk Yadgar houses franchises and kiosks of all major exchange companies
showing that alongside hawala, formally regulated exchange companies also operate in this
market.
5.6.3

Chowk Yadgar Customers

Over time, the Chowk Yadgar market in Peshawar (and the identical market in Quetta) have
integrated with the Afghanistan money market. To say that these markets essentially
operate as one would not be an underestimation. The integration between Afghan and
Pakistani markets has been attributed to the steady flows of refugees, migrants and goods
from Afghanistan to Pakistan, as well as large exports from Pakistan to Afghanistan.
According to Thompson,284 ‘hawaladars in Afghanistan consider their links to Pakistan
crucial to their survival as a large part of the Afghan market relies heavily on Peshawar, and
also Quetta, as a conduit for the delivery of money from places further afield’.285 Also, in
the past years, many NGOs and other international agencies have frequently sent their funds
to Pakistan from where the money has been paid in Afghanistan through hawala. Peshawar
is also a recipient of substantial inward remittances from family members living overseas,
in countries such as Germany, the UAE and the UK. These funds are routinely forwarded to
other family members who stayed behind in Afghanistan, and constitute an important part
of their subsistence in Afghanistan’s coping economy.286
In this manner, the main customers of Peshawar’s Chowk Yadgar market comprise migrant
workers and transit trade businessmen.
5.6.4

Operational Efficiency

Interviews conducted with hawaladars in the Chowk Yadgar market, confirmed that
business is done through hawala, and that hawala has been used for centuries: ‘We use
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hawala because it is easy and convenient’.287 These hawaladars find banking procedures
arduous and complain about rules and requirements that keep changing every day: ‘Most of
us here do not know any other language than Pushto’.288 Some of these hawaladars did not
speak Urdu or English, neither were they formally educated. They did not think this should
prevent them from participating in the market. Indeed one asked rhetorically: ‘Should we
not do business then?’289
The apparent aversion of hawaladars towards banking procedures however does not mean
that hawaladars in Peshawar do not use banks. Money dealers in Chowk Yadgar operate
multiple bank accounts in various banks operating in Pakistan. 290 But, when they compare
their own trade with banks that require documents and have lengthy and time-consuming
procedures, the hawaladars find hawala cost-effective and efficient: ‘Tell us which bank in
the world will loan a trader 100 million on a verbal promise of return in 10 days time?’291
For the Chowk Yadgar hawaladars, issues pertaining to financial transparency, regulation
and monitoring are relative concepts. In their eyes, hawala is the most efficient and selfenforcing system based on personal contacts and trust: ‘We know who we are dealing with
and there is no chance of fraud’.292 Business is done on the principles of ‘honour’,
‘promise’, and ‘trust’ making the system more personalized and transparent as compared
with the western banking system which relies on written contracts and third party
evaluation. Dispute resolution is done in accordance with the tribal norms, through the
council of tribal elders (jirga).
5.7

Banks and Hawala

An important point that comes forth as a result of fieldwork in Karachi and Peshawar is that
the hawala system cannot be viewed in isolation from the formal banking sector. We have
explained earlier the procedures of export and import of foreign exchange to Dubai, the
transfer of funds into the Pakistani bank accounts of exchange companies and remittance
transfers through banks. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Pakistani banks have a ‘no
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questions asked’ policy regarding incoming foreign remittances. All this confirms that
banks are fully integrated into the hawala market in Pakistan as one of the exchange dealers
we interviewed retorted: ‘…and do you think hawala is possible without involving the
banks? How else is money transferred?’ 293
Interviews from Chowk Yadgar hawaladars also confirm that these operators are wellconnected and linked with the rest of the country’s money exchange companies, dealers and
agents and have international connections as well. The linkages between the Karachi and
Peshawar markets could be validated as the Chowk Yadgar money market houses nearly all
leading exchange companies’ counters and banks. The hawaladars, the exchange
companies and the banks were found to operate within the same area — in some cases
within the same building. In this manner, hawaladars at Chowk Yadgar are deeply
integrated with other national and international money exchange networks and cannot be
viewed in isolation from the so called ‘formal’ sector.
5.8

Payments and Settlements

During the fieldwork, it was found that Chamak (meaning ‘glitter’ in English) is used to
trade foreign currency to complete transactions. In local parlance, Chamak refers to a pool
of excess funds that a hawaladar accumulates abroad. For example, a hawaladar collects a
pool of UAE dirhams as a result of migrant remittances. He will then search for customers
interested in clearing their debts, perhaps to a foreign exporter. These customers, usually
Pakistani or Afghan importers or businessmen can utilize the services of a local hawaladar
to make payment to the exporter through the foreign hawaladar. Chamak here refers to a
bright prospect for a customer who wants to pay his debt, or for hawaladars to settle
accounts among themselves.
5.8.1

Role of Dubai

Dubbed as the ‘Singapore of the Middle East’,294 Dubai provides an off-shore financial
space to South Asian, and more specifically Indian, Pakistani and increasingly Afghan
businessmen to strike hawala deals. It has been mentioned earlier that Pakistan (and also
293
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India) have a history of currency controls and these countries impose strict licensing
requirements on money-remitters and foreign exchange dealers. Strict regulations also
contribute to the existence and use of hawala.295 Under these circumstances, Dubai
provides a ready facility to those who want to move their money out of the country.
The total number of Pakistani expatriates in the United Arab Emirates is 1.723 million.296
Of these, 400,000 live in Dubai. According to the Pakistan-UAE Business Council, 6,000
Pakistani companies are operating in Dubai. Pakistanis were the third leading expatriate
property investors in Dubai real estate in 2013 and invested AED3billion.297 Interviews
with FIA officials in Karachi have reported that most of the wealth invested in Dubai has
been transferred through hawala. Findings of FIA investigations into hawala cases have
established that family, ethnic, and cultural ties play a definitive role in hawala
transactions. According to a FIA interviewee: ‘Exchange companies in Pakistan have
subsidiary (limited) companies in Dubai, run by close kin or partners, from where deals are
communicated’.298 To explain this further, FIA officials showed us the trail of emails in one
of the hawala cases investigated and prosecuted by FIA where an exchange company
family member (a nephew) was running a limited company in Dubai. He would strike deals
and send email instructions for payments to the Karachi office. Similarly, hawaladars at
Chowk Yadgar market also confirmed their international links and franchises in major
financial centres, including Dubai.
It is clear that geographical proximity with Dubai makes hawala regulation much more
challenging for the Pakistani regulators and law enforcement. From the regulatory
perspective, Dubai is a contentious off-shore albeit legal financial hub of all hawala activity
from where hawaladars can settle their accounts and move money freely. Two main factors
that complement Dubai’s status as such include the large population of expatriate workers
using the hawala facility to send money home as well as its large gold market which is the
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source of much of the gold sent (legally and illegally) to Pakistan and India.299 In contrast
with Pakistan and India who have strict financial and currency controls, Dubai is widely
recognized as the central clearing house for hawala transactions, or in Ballard’s words, the
‘lynch-pin’ of the contemporary global hawala system.300 Here customers operate within a
free financial space where there are no foreign exchange controls, quotas or trade barriers
and import duties are extremely low, providing them with an essentially unregulated
financial space from where money can easily be wired to anywhere in the world. Once a
transaction is processed within Dubai’s offshore spaces, it can be wired in less than a few
seconds to any international bank where there is a correspondent relationship. In an
electronic banking world, it is no surprise that payments to any destination on the globe can
be made ‘in the blink of an eye’. As one hawaladar recounted, ‘No matter how much the
amount is, it will be paid within half-an-hour to the recipient at the required destination’.301
5.8.2

UAE Free Trade Zones

The globalization of trade and foreign investment over the past decade has led to the
development of Free Trade Zones (FTZs) all over the world. The first FTZ in the UAE
came into existence in 1985 to increase UAE’s share of non-oil exports in anticipation of
the inevitable decline in oil reserves. Today there are more than two dozen industry specific
FTZs all over UAE.302
Each FTZ is governed by an independent Free Zone Authority (FZA), the agency
responsible for issuing FTZ operating licences and assisting companies establish their
businesses. Companies operating within the FTZs are treated as ‘offshore’ entities in that
they fall outside the UAE’s judicial and regulatory boundaries. This special legal status
provides these companies following benefits:
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100% foreign ownership

Full repatriation of capital and profits

100% tax exemption

Extended leases

Quick approval procedures

Abundant and inexpensive energy

In her ground-breaking work on Afghan hawaladars, Edwina Thompson303 reports that
Dubai Free Zones are the most attractive transit points for Afghan imports. These imports
include cars arriving from Japan and Germany, electronics sent from China, or edible oil
that is exported from the Gulf. According to her investigations, in Dubai’s Jebel Ali Free
Zone Authority (JAFZA) many registered Afghan export/import businesses are taking
advantage of the Free Zone incentives. Thompson has also reported that within the export
processing and Free zones governed by JAFZA, the most noticeable commodity chain was
the trade in cars. The Dubai Cars and Automotive Zone (DUCAMZ) covers a one million
square metre bonded area that was established with the objective of re-exporting cars to the
Asian and African regions where the demand exists and continue to grow. The Afghan car
dealers that operate there are able to make use of Dubai’s global transport and distribution
system, which includes ports served by a large and growing number of international lines.
The gateway to this global centre of trade is neighbouring Iran, which has consistently
remained the primary destination of Dubai re-exports and its free trade zones over the past
ten years. According to Thompson’s investigations, majority of the Afghan importers
benefit from this improved transportation infrastructure as the goods enter Dubai through its
various ports, and in turn pass by sea to Iran’s port at Bandar Abbas. They then travel by
road to Islam Qala in Western Afghanistan, and on to Herat Customs for being smuggled
into Pakistan.304
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5.9

International/Global Dimension

During interviews, Chowk Yadgar money changers confirmed that they ‘operate franchises
in multiple (4-5) locations, typically in FATA, Dubai, Oman and Saudi Arabia’.305 They
also said: ‘We have our agents in China, Hong Kong, Dubai, Malaysia and elsewhere. It is
just a matter of a phone call. There is no chance of a miss, and payment can even be made
in advance if needed and settled later’.306 We have also highlighted the modus operandi
that MECs adopt to transfer funds. The global nature of hawala has also been validated by
many experts and authors who argue that without the regulatory regimes of cities such as
Dubai, the hawala system would not have a platform from which to integrate fully into the
global political economy. For instance, Thompson has criticized the approach that alleges
that hawala provides criminals with the cover of anonymity and an opportunity to launder
money in the presence of financial centres such as Dubai that provide hawala dealers with
the strongest link to the global economy.307
5.10

State Bank of Pakistan’s Hawala Regulatory Approach

The 2002 SBP strategy to regulate hawala transactions goes beyond mere licensing and
registration of hawaladars. Along with the creation of exchange companies, SBP took
initiatives to improve banking practices and regulations. It phased-out the reforms by
initially allowing the informal market to co-exist with formal banks for a period of time, as
well as to provide alternative remittance products. Like its previous efforts, SBP’s aim in
2002 was to reduce the incentive for hawala-type transfers and channelize inflows through
the formally regulated sector. But in this instance the SBP went beyond introducing
competitive products for this purpose. As part of 2002 reforms, the Central Bank has
encouraged the banking sector to tap the unexplored remittance market308 traditionally
dominated by hawaladars.
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5.10.1 Pakistan Remittance Initiative
The Pakistan Remittance Initiative (PRI) is a collaborative venture of the State Bank of
Pakistan along with the Ministries of Finance and Overseas Pakistanis. Under this five year
program initially launched in 2004, and continuing, commercial banks have been
‘sponsored’ to venture into the remittance market by the offer of incentives to them. PRI
initially provided Pakistani banks and international exchange companies the incentive of
getting PKR1 for each dollar remitted through their network. Later this policy was replaced
with a ‘commission’ as a form of fee reimbursement for every transaction. Banks and
companies are not supposed to charge their international customers for remitting money
through their network, and the SPB pays them an amount per transaction to reimburse them
for the costs incurred in each wire transaction because these costs cannot be recouped from
the customer. Official reports and statements record that since PRI has been launched, five
big banks in Pakistan — namely the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP), Habib Bank Ltd
(HBL), Allied Bank Ltd (ABL), Muslim Commercial Bank (MCB), and United Bank Ltd
(UBL) — have set up specialized home remittance cells in their respective head offices and
sped up remittance transfers among their branches. These banks work in partnership with
other international money transfer operators (MTOs) and banks in various countries to
facilitate remittance transfers, for instance HBL works in partnership with the Al-Rajhi
Bank in Saudi Arabia, through which free of cost remittances can be transferred to Pakistan.
HBL also has an agreement with Travelex, an MTO based in the United Kingdom.309
During interviews, SBP officials explained that the basic aim in launching the PRI was to
speed up the remittance delivery process. Prior to the PRI it could take up to two weeks for
the money to arrive through banking channels whereas hundi/hawala could facilitate the
transaction within a day. According to the SBP, some USD14–16 billion in remittances is
sent yearly; however, many workers prefer hundi and hawala systems due to the speed and
ease of transaction despite a poorer rate of exchange. 310 On average, only 50 per cent of the
workers inflows travel through banking channels. As highlighted earlier, the main reason
for a workers’ preference for hawala is its economic efficiency. For a migrant worker,
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exchange rate may not be the most significant consideration as he has to send money to his
family to meet their monthly expenditures.311 Unlike investors and speculators, migrant
workers do not hold back their savings if they find that the rupee is weakening in the near
term, giving hawala an even greater competitive advantage as hawaladars accumulate
funds from migrant workers’ earnings.
The PRI is housed in the SBP and is a holding company. Its budget is allocated by the
Finance Division in the Federal Government, by taking less than one percent of the total
home remittances received. The banks are offered 25 Saudi riyals (SAR25) for every
transaction to share with the international counter-part foreign exchange companies. The
SBP does not allow local MECs to participate in PRI because ‘they are not willing to shut
down their back office operations’,312 an SBP official said in the interview. Consequently,
the PRI is a project that the SBP is running in collaboration with Pakistani banks and
international MTOs (such as Western Union) by excluding the local MECs because,
according to the SBP officials, ‘they do hawala’.313
Reports suggest that an inquiry has recently been constituted into PRI affairs by the
National Accountability Bureau (NAB).314 According to these reports, from July 2001 to
January 2012, a total of USD69 billion home remittances were received and 6.67 per cent
was reimbursed to banks with the SBP’s approval.315 MECs interviewed during the research
provided details about PRI’s ‘actual’ working: ‘[A]s soon as a remittance is received, it is
broken into four packages by SBP [$1000 equals $250x4] in order to claim commission
equivalent to four transactions instead of one’.316 It is important to note that this handling
of the remittance does not involve the remitter’s knowledge nor is the remitter receiving
any benefit from it. Reportedly, the amounts that are claimed (as ‘commissions’) on the
transactions are shared among the colluding officers of banks as well as the SBP. In
addition, the minimum amount of remittance USD200 that was earlier set by the SBP to
qualify for the reimbursement of charges has been reduced to USD100 or equivalent in
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other currency. The reimbursement rate of SAR20 has also been increased to SAR25 for
each transaction, further increasing the ‘return’ to personnel involved. 317
It has been estimated that the ‘scam’ (involving officers from a number of banks and the
SBP) has meant a loss to the national exchequer of some USD4.9 billion in the 11 years to
January 2012. It has been also alleged that the Al-Raaji Bank of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (KSA) is involved in the fraud.318 The constitution of this inquiry by the NAB has
been extensively reported in the local Pakistani press and electronic media; however, the
inquiry has not been concluded at the time of writing of the thesis.
5.11

Enforcement of 2002 Regulation: The FIA and Hawala

Since the creation of Foreign Exchange Companies in 2002, the role of FIA in countering
hawala in Pakistan has become significant. The FIA has in the past detected many hawala
operations. Two cases involving foreign exchange companies that the FIA has investigated
and prosecuted on alleged hawala transfers are particularly important:
i)

Khanani and Kalia Foreign Exchange Company Case
In 2008, the State Bank of Pakistan and the Ministry of Finance reported that Pakistan’s
foreign exchange reserves had diminished from USD16 billion in October 2007 to USD7
billion in February 2008. These regulators requested the Ministry of Interior to probe the
matter of smuggling of US dollars into Afghanistan through its Special Investigation Group
(SIG) at the FIA.319 The SIG/FIA submitted an investigation report to the Ministry of
Interior confirming the smuggling of US dollars from the country, stating that a foreign
exchange crisis would occur if smuggling of foreign currency through Afghanistan was not
stopped. Hence, in light of the investigations, the FIA cracked down on the largest foreign
exchange company in Pakistan for running a separate and unregistered hawala counter. The
two directors at the Khanani and Kalia Foreign Exchange Company were arrested on
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allegations that they had transferred USD10 billion out of Pakistan using the hawala
channels.320 During investigations, the arrested directors reportedly confessed to have
transferred millions of dollars of funds for politicians, bureaucrats, army officers and
businessmen, to pay for their children’s education abroad.321 According to the FIA
statements that have been widely publicized in the press and electronic media, Khanani and
Kalia also paid instalments on costly properties in real estate abroad.322 In addition to these
directors, a few bankers and employees at the National Database Registration Authority
(NADRA) were also accused of collusion in providing counterfeit identity cards through
which the alleged transfers would take place.323
Consequently, the SBP suspended the company’s licence and a case was prosecuted against
the company in the banking court. In 2011, all the accused persons in the case were
acquitted. The reason for their acquittal was a lack of substantive evidence from the FIA
directly implicating the Foreign Exchange Company or its directors or associates in the
case. Instead, ‘the evidence turned out to be non-specific descriptions of illegal money
transfer systems’.324
ii)

ZARCO Exchange Company Case
Later in 2008, the FIA clamped down on another leading foreign exchange company,
ZARCO. The FIA investigation report stated that the Chief Executive Officer of ZARCO
had illegally transferred PKR1,870 million to his bank accounts abroad, while his company
performed Foreign Telegraphic Transfers (FTTs) amounting to USD346.71 million under
the hawala business between January and November 2008.325 According to the FIA report,
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the alleged hawala transfers resulted in the loss of capital and foreign exchange depletion in
the country. As a result, the SBP suspended ZARCO’s licence. The company’s
headquarters, its branches, franchises, payment booths as well as currency exchange booths
were barred from undertaking any kind of foreign exchange business activity and its
complete operations both in Pakistan and internationally were shut-down.
Subsequent to this, the Chief Executive Officer of ZARCO lodged an FIR (first information
report) alleging that his company employees had embezzled PKR1.25 billion through fake
accounts. The FIA arrested the nominated employees and the latest reports in the case are
that FIA has charged former employees of the ZARCO company for siphoning off PKR250
million from the company’s accounts. The FIA has stated that SBP officials will also be
investigated for their possible role in the case.326 On the other hand, the CEO of ZARCO
has been acquitted by the banking court; again (as in the Khanani and Kalia Foreign
Exchange Company Case) for want of evidence from the FIA.327
Two points merit consideration in view of the cases of foreign exchange companies’
alleged involvement in hawala transfers. Firstly, involvement of the so called ‘corporate
bodies’ created by the SBP in 2002 in hawala practices shows a corporate governance
failure.328 Clearly, the SBP has failed to govern the corporate bodies that it created in 2002
and instruct in and ensure the application of the principles of due diligence against the non
due diligent hawala practices. This corporate foreign exchange market that was created to
curb and side-line hawala is not working as the purported regulated entities are involved in
non-compliance with regulations.
A second important point relates to the failure in prosecuting hawala cases in Pakistan. As
mentioned earlier, hawala is illegal in Pakistan. As such the law does not acknowledge
hawala type transfers and there are prescribed procedures to declare a transaction ‘legal’. In
the cases of these accused exchange companies, the investigation and prosecution by the
FIA involved accusations that the companies are carrying out hawala transactions (meaning
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no actual ‘legal’ transaction took place at all). Consequently, prosecution was carried out
against these companies on charges of hawala transfers framed under the FERA 1947. This
means that the findings of the FIA investigations did not prove fruitful as prosecution under
FERA took these cases as irregularities in contravention of laid-down procedures for
foreign exchange transactions and not money laundering through hawala. The confessions
of the accused company directors before the FIA where they admitted to having transferred
funds of various powerful people abroad became irrelevant to the legal proceedings against
these forex dealers as these charges were not covered under the law. As has already been
pointed out earlier, the overriding legislations (PERA 1992 overrides FERA 1947)
essentially protect rather than assist in the prosecution of the offenders. Consequently, the
FIA could neither produce enough witnesses to prove hawala transactions nor prove the
fraudulent transfer of funds abroad. Instead, these cases (of hawala transfers) were
technically viewed by the banking courts under the provisions of FERA 1947, as a
contravention of the law.
Lastly, it needs be noted that the penalty and procedure of contravention in FERA 1947,
although it makes the offence cognizable, punishment for such offence is a maximum of
two years imprisonment, or a fine, or a both and is bailable.329 It is clear that the FIA
officials find these laws the biggest impediment to enforcement of the regulation: ‘[E]ven if
I arrest a hawaladar, he gets a bail, returns to the market within two days and becomes a
threat to my life’.330 This also explains why the number of hawala cases registered and
prosecuted by the FIA during 2009–12 (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2(below)) by no means
capture the hawala activity in Pakistan where over 10,000 hawaladars are reported to be
operating in the city of Karachi alone.
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Table 5.2:

Table 5.3:

Number of Hawala-related cases 2009–2012
Zone

2009 2010 2011 2012

Punjab

0

0

0

0

Sindh

0

0

0

0

Islamabad

0

26

2

0

KPK

23

29

15

10

Balochistan

1

1

0

0

Total

24

46

17

10

Number of Hawala-related convictions 2009–2012
Zone

2009 2010 2011 2012

Punjab

0

0

0

0

Sindh

0

0

0

0

Islamabad

0

14

0

0

KPK

14

18

8

4

Balochistan 0

0

0

0

Total

32

8

4

14

Original Source: SDPI and UNODC Report on Pakistan’s Illegal Economy 331, updated
during Interviews with FIA Officials.
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5.12

Conclusion

In this chapter the critical question we examined was whether the 2002 reforms introduced
by the SBP to curb hawala have been successful. To achieve this aim, fieldwork interviews
were conducted to see whether the 2002 creation of exchange companies has reformed the
market into a regulated corporate sector that complied with due diligence standards. It was
found that despite the reforms, two types of hawala markets are openly functioning. One
comprises exchange companies, their dealers and agents who have not shed their old habits
of hawala transfers. The other type is ‘pure hawala’ in Pakistan-Afghanistan border cities
such as Peshawar and Quetta. Moreover, the procedures and operations followed by the
regulated exchange companies show their integration with the unregulated hawala market
as well as the commercial banks. The linkages between the formal and the informal players
are so deep that a customer cannot discriminate between the formal and the informal
elements as both these operate in the same space and have networks and connections —
both domestic and international.
Prevalence of hawala despite reforms shows that once again the SBP could not achieve the
objective of eliminating hawala in Pakistan. Moreover, involvement of corporate bodies in
hawala shows corporate governance failure as a result of non-compliance with regulations.
The project that the SBP has launched to counter hawala’s inherent incentive has also
proven to have outcomes quite contrary to its claims and is reportedly producing financial
incentives for corruption in commercial banks, their personnel and among the officials of
SBP.
It needs to be emphasized that although on ground investigations have established the
prevalence of hawala and a failure of enforcement of regulation in Pakistan, this constitutes
just ‘the tip of the iceberg’. The real, deeper political and economic issues that make
regulation of hawala problematic are worth exploring further in order to gain clearer
insights into the causes that make these informal transfer systems invincible in relation to
Pakistani regulators and law enforcement. The next chapter will investigate the issues and
challenges faced in regulating hawala in Pakistan.
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Chapter 6: Challenges to Regulate Hawala in Pakistan
6.1 Introduction
As we have seen, hawala has continued unabated despite the introduction of regulatory
approaches by SBP in 2002 and subsequent changes to that system. What are the factors
which have led to this situation? Is Pakistan unable to regulate effectively or simply
unwilling to do so? Part of the answer can be found in an analysis of why states fail.
Many policy debates assume that disorder and chaos prevail where the basic state
institutions necessary for liberal, democratic, political, economic and social orders are
either absent or dysfunctional.332 In many instances, weak and failed states have also been
linked with terrorism.333 It is generally understood that in weak and failed states, informal
contracts and arrangements prevail because of the lack or absence of the formal institutions.
The popularity of hawala and similar IVTS in countries such as Afghanistan and Somalia
has been cited frequently in support of the view that the absence of formal institutions and
structures has created disorder and chaos and that such instability poses a potential threat to
the health and stability of the international financial edifice.334 Whist this approach clearly
regards hawala as being a financial instrument which is restricted to only being used in
weak and failed states, it also tends to ignore the competitive efficiency and ‘globalized’
character of hawala-type IVTS in the contemporary world. While hawala is found in weak
and failed states it is also found in developed economies. We need to address these issues
surrounding hawala and other IVTS to be able to better appreciate the challenges faced in
regulating these informal systems. In order to achieve this purpose, this chapter is divided
into the following three parts:
i) In the first part, the chapter builds upon the framework of institutional approach to state
regulation. It describes the primary functions that a ‘State’ is required to perform on the
332
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basis of which it can be relatively categorized as ‘strong’, ‘weak’, ‘failing’ or ‘failed’. Next,
the institutional theory of state regulation and the respective roles that formal and informal
institutions play in state-building are explained. Within this framework the current
international effort towards ‘reconstruction of failed and weak states’ is discussed implicitly
in game theory terms
ii) Part II applies the ‘weak’ and ‘failing’ states framework so discussed in Pakistan’s case.
It explains that there are influences and vested interests that obstruct the essentially required
reforms and regulation to make the Pakistani state perform effectively. Among these
challenges, the chapter identifies the different forms of corruption prevalent in Pakistan and
discusses its various dimensions and the role informal channels of money transfer play in
transferring the proceeds of corruption and other ill-earned money. The chapter highlights
the role of the corrupt Pakistani political elite who is resistant to any essentially required
reforms alongwith other key structural and governance issues hampering the reform agenda.
The role of the major international donors engaged with Pakistan over a long period is also
underscored in order to understand the different vested interests that challenge reform and
regulation.
iii) Finally, Part III brings the entire discussion into perspective. It takes the PakistanAfghanistan Transit Trade as an example of failed regulation to show that in the political
and legal environment discussed in chapter 4 which legally excludes the tribal areas from
the operation of laws and regulatory processes operating in other parts of the country, as
well as the challenges to regulation highlighted in part II above, to demonstrate that the
failure to effectively regulate hawala is the result of a number of factors.
It would be a serious misunderstanding to see the continuation of hawala as a substitute
informal institution which is only prevalent because the state is incapacitated in regard to
regulating and protecting formal institutions effectively. Notwithstanding the need for
essentially required reforms, the discussion underscores that hawala is taking advantage of
the disparities in government policies (such as exchange and tariff rates), and has become
an efficient alternative to the often expensive and complicated formal financial sector. The
discussion on Pakistan Afghanistan Transit Trade establishes the comparative ‘efficiency’
of the hawala-type IVTS which is most prevalent in the international trade settlements
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where ‘gigantic sections of the world economy operate under the radar’335 and is a
continuous challenge for the authorities. While it may seem that the prevalence of hawala
in weak or failing states is evidence that the existence of hawala is a consequence of the
failure of government in such states, its existence (indeed effective operation) in London,
New York, Berlin and Singapore puts the lie to this over simplification.

Part I):

Why States Fail?

6.2 Why Do States Fail?
The prime function of a state is to provide key political goods to its citizens. These include
security; freedom; essential public services such as health and education; sound
infrastructure; a beneficent fiscal and institutional context within which citizens can pursue
personal entrepreneurial goals; the promotion of civil society; and methods of regulating the
sharing of environmental commons.336 This means that the performance of the state to
provide these goods and services to its citizens determines whether the state in question is a
strong state or relatively weak. Strong states will be those that perform well in service
delivery and weak states will perform poorly. It also means that constant weakness may
edge the state toward failure (hence the term ‘failing state’). It is most unlikely that a state
fails completely in providing all the different categories of goods and services unless it
loses the very essence of its existence as it may happen in the case of a civil war or a
foreign invasion. Rutberg states that nation states fail because ‘they are convulsed by
internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants.
Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself
becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens’.337
This explains that failure or collapse of nation states is a complex situation and that most of
the states lie between the strong and weak continuum of ‘service delivery’ assessment
criteria. While strong states perform well in providing their citizens with a full range and
high quality political goods and services, weak states may show mixed results, fulfilling
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expectations in some areas while performing poorly in others. Within this context, state
failure is ‘relative’, driven by the under-performance of the state in service delivery causing
economic degradation and poverty, which in turn is related to governance failures,
corruption and rent-seeking, distortion in markets and the absence of democracy.338
Another possibility is that some states are inherently weak due to their specific
geographical, physical or fundamental economic constraints — these may be weak
temporarily or situationally, due to internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed,
despotism or external attacks.339 In certain states (as in East Asian economies) the state may
be transiting through a phase of social transformation — from pre-capitalist and preindustrial economies to a dynamic industrial capitalist economy.340 In such situations, state
failure could be driven by lack of institutional capacities, and more importantly, the
incompatibility of institutional capacities with pre-existing distribution of powers.
Proponents of the ‘institutional approach’ argue that the more critical area of a state failure
has been the absence of political and institutional capacity in many developing country
states to assist and accelerate a dynamic transformation. Supporters of this opinion contend
that sustained progress in service delivery is unlikely in the absence of strategies to enhance
political and institutional capacity.341
6.3 The Institutional Approach to State Regulation
According to the institutional approach to state regulation the role of a state is based on its
claim to the monopoly of legitimate violence. The ‘State’ is the only body in a society
which can legitimately enforce institutions, collect taxes, redistribute income and wealth,
represent and enforce social cohesion or resolve conflicts, through ‘institutions’ comprising
constitutions, rules and laws. An institution is thus defined as the set of both the formal and
informal rules which constrain and govern the action of agents subject to that institution. In
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other words, institutions are the rules of the game;

342

these are systems that structure

human interaction within a state — they provide incentives and disincentives for people to
behave in certain ways; and if the state institutions are effective, they facilitate in
structuring the economic, social and political activities. In short, effective institutions play a
key role in the state-building of any country.
By this definition, state regulation is part of the ‘formal institutional structure’ which
includes constitutions, laws, property rights, taxes and subsidies. In this manner the state is
responsible for enforcement and protection of all formal property rights. It is interesting to
note that whereas both formal and informal institutions affect economic outcomes because
they condition the opportunities and incentives of the various agents, the institutional
analysis views the state as closely associated with the protection and maintenance of the
‘formal institutions’ and the processes through which these are changed and reformed. In
such a situation, the term ‘state failure’ becomes rather descriptive as it involves only a
judgment about the potential benefits of informal institutions343 without extending any
protection to them.
6.4

The Informal Rules of the Game

It could be argued that due to its focus on the formal rules of the game, the institutional
stream of thought rather overlooks the role of the informally shared set of rules. These
informal rules are the usually unwritten regulations that are created, communicated, and
enforced outside the officially sanctioned channels344 or what Ostrom345 has termed ‘rules
in force’.
When defining ‘informal institutions’, a distinction is required between ‘informal’, ‘weak’
or ‘ineffective’ institutions. For example, if rules that exist on paper are widely
circumvented or ignored in a formal institution (such as abuse of executive authority), the
circumvention or abuse of rules is an institutional weakness and not an informal
342
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institution.346 Similarly, an informal institution needs to be distinguished from informal
behavioural irregularity. For instance, public graft can be categorized as a behaviour
pattern, unless the graft is enforced from above, or it is rooted in widely shared expectations
among citizens and public officials and a refusal to ‘go along’ risks incurring serious costs,
then the corruption is an informal institution.347 Another important difference is between
informal institutions and informal ‘organizations’ such as, mafias or clans348 which can be
classified as informal organizations. Lastly, informal institutions are different from
‘culture’. Culture is a set of shared values whereas informal institutions may be viewed
more narrowly as a set of shared expectations.349
The interaction and relationships between the formal and informal institutions are multidimensional. Following the informal rules may lead to a similar result as following the
formal rules or the outcome may be substantively different. When the results of following
the informal rules are closely similar to those resulting from the use of the formal set of
rules, institutions converge, and where the results are different, the institutions diverge. A
second dimension relates to the effectiveness of the formal institutions meaning the extent
to which written rules are enforced and followed. Based on these two dimensions, the
authors Helmke and Levistsky350 have categorized institutions as:
i)

Complementary Informal Institutions – these address contingencies not dealt with by the
formal rules or by facilitating the pursuit of individual goals within the formal institutional
framework. These serve to ‘fill-in-the-gaps’, creating or strengthening incentives to comply
with formal rules that might otherwise exist merely on paper. An illustration of the
complementary institutions is that in 2013 the effectiveness of the Election Commission of
Pakistan (ECP) in holding free and fair elections was linked to a complementary set of
shared beliefs and expectations among the citizens who demanded transparency in elections
346
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and promptly reported rigging and cases of violence on electronic and social media, leading
the ECP to cancel polling for that day and announce re-elections in the disputed
constituencies.351
ii)

Accommodating Informal Institutions – these are often created by those actors who
dislike outcomes generated by the formal rules but are unable to change or violate these
rules. As such, the accommodating informal institutions help to reconcile these actors’
interests with the existing formal institutions. An example is that under the 2002 reforms
introduced by the SBP, foreign exchange companies were initially required to obtain
identification documentation from their customers even if the amount of transaction was
equivalent to USD1. Later, this policy was amended as a result of ‘negotiations and
compromise’. The SBP relaxed the rule and set the reporting limit to USD5,000. Although
this arrangement violated the basic spirit of AML/CFT regulations, it resolved the conflict
thereby enhancing market stability at the expense of at least one of the basic objectives the
reforms were designed to achieve.

iii)

Competing Informal Institutions – these institutions structure incentives in ways that are
incompatible with the formal rules. To follow one rule, the actors must violate another.
Clientelism and corruption are the most common examples of such institutions. An
illustration of this has been explained in Chapter 5 in the politics of clientelism in the
Pakistan foreign exchange and remittance market which has traditionally remained
dominated by a few families and ethnic groups.

iv)

Substitutive informal institutions – these act as defacto formal institutions because the
formal institutions have failed to achieve what they were designed for. For example, in
Afghanistan in the absence of a functional western banking system, hawala networks
provide financial services which have been used by the international organizations and
western aid agencies.352
A pertinent question that is often raised concerns the contribution of informal institutions to
the development of the formal institutions, particularly when accommodating institutions
violate the formal rules, and substitutive institutions replace the formal institutions. To
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answer these queries, scholars have delved into the motivations for the creation of informal
rules particularly in the presence of formal institutions. There can be three major
motivations for actors to create informal institutions. First, actors create informal
institutions because formal institutions are incomplete. Second, informal institutions can be
a ‘second-best’ strategy for those actors who can either not achieve a formal institution or
do not have the power to change the formal rules. A third and final motivation for creating
informal institutions is the pursuit of goals not considered publicly acceptable. For instance,
politicians may create informal rules (of coalition bargaining) for government formation
and alter formal institutions that do not function to their benefits.353 Similarly, the processes
for the emergence of informal institutions may also vary. In some cases, the informal
institutions may emerge as a result of elite design or imposition, while in other cases these
may be a result of interaction between many actors. Informal institutions may have emerged
as a product of compromise or conflict or their informal rules may have been transmitted
through social networks or political organizations.354
6.5

Reconstruction of Weak and Failed States

Within the above framework, if attempts to regulate the IVTS during the past decade are
viewed from the perspective of the international efforts towards reconstruction of the failed
or weak states to establish formal institutions which can be protected, maintained and
regulated by the state, it could be argued that these reconstruction efforts suffer from a
‘nirvana fallacy’.355 The ‘nirvana fallacy’ is essentially the fallacious reform mindset which
assumes that foreign interventions, via occupation or reconstruction, can generate
preferable outcomes or better solutions to the problems of these countries in comparison to
that which would occur if interventions were not present.356 But, what this ‘reforms’
mindset tends to ignore is that in the absence of formal institutions or contracts, many
informal mechanisms have evolved and are enforced to fill the void that was created as a
result of the ‘no state’ or ‘despite the state’ situation. Coyne has studied the case of Somalia
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where in the absence of a central government, the private sector has developed coping
governance mechanisms which substituted for state institutions.357 The same is true for
Afghanistan, where the informal hawala system provided financial services as a result of
collapse of banking institutions.358 These examples further reinforce the argument that the
reconstruction efforts aimed at bringing ‘order’ by formalizing the informal practices have
seemingly overlooked the indigenous (albeit informal) practices embedded in the societies
and cultures of the weak and failed countries.
In game theory terms, this argument can be explained as the reconstruction efforts focus on
resolving the meta-level game (of creating self-sustaining formal institutions), it ignores the
various nested games embedded within the general meta-game. The ‘nested game’
framework has been developed by Tsebelis.359 His focus is that during a game if, with
adequate information, an actor’s choices appear to be sub-optimal, it is because the
observer’s perspective is incomplete. The observer focuses attention on only one game, but
the actor is involved in a whole network of games. What appears suboptimal from the
perspective of only one game is in fact optimal when the whole network of games is
considered. In short, if actors in a game are not opting for what appears to be the optimizing
strategy, the reason is because they are involved in nested games where various factors and
considerations have an overriding importance for the actors which are not visible to the
observer. As Tsebelis puts it,
Instead of the concept of rationality as a model of human behaviour, I propose the
concept of rationality as a subset of human behaviour. The change in perspective is
important; I do not claim that rational choice can explain every phenomenon and that
there is no room for other explanations, but I do claim that rational choice is a better
approach to situations in which the actors’ identity and goals are established and the
rules of the interaction are precise and known to the interacting agents. As the actors’
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goals become fuzzy, or as the rules of the interaction become more fluid and imprecise,
rational choice explanations will become less applicable.360

Tsebelis has used the game theoretic framework to tackle the problem of institution creation
and restructuring. He argues that in real political situations, the rules of the game are
constantly subject to change. Actors who lose under a particular set of institutions continue
working within them hoping that on another occasion, outside conditions will work to their
advantage. The end result is that institutional rules may sometimes serve as constraints and
at others the object of self-interested redesigns. According to Tsebelis, different types of
institutional solutions may reflect different purposes, from equity to redistributing power to
consolidating power. These solutions are never neutral in their consequences and will
consequently always reflect, ‘conscious choices of the actors involved once they realize that
the previously existing institutions were in constant conflict with their interests’. 361 The
Hawala reforms of 2002 and their failure if viewed in the nested game framework and in
conjunction with the analysis of why states fail has clear application to Pakistan.

Part II
6.1

Regulating Hawala in Pakistan
Corruption

In earlier chapters, factors such as the exclusion of the FATA, the application of the FCR,
the size of Pakistan’s shadow economy and rampant tax evasion in Pakistan have been
discussed. Corruption accounts for a large part of Pakistan’s shadow economy as well as
creating many other problems, although from a theoretical point of view a symbiotic
relationship between corruption and the shadow economy has remained ambiguous.362
Corruption is most commonly defined as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’.363 In
economic literature it is also referred to as ‘rent-seeking’364 which occurs when individuals
and groups from the private sector interface with the state through a variety of mechanisms
360
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to transfer public resources to themselves. Pakistan is plagued with corruption at public,
private and institutional levels and hence the implications for the transfer of (illicit) funds
are far too many through the use of the unregulated financial channels.
6.1.1

Causes of Corruption

Corruption can be rooted in a country’s political development, legal development, social
history, bureaucratic traditions, economic conditions and general policy-making. Buehen
and Schneider365 highlight that the economic causes of corruption are related to the
deficiencies in the political and judicial systems. According to these authors, sound
administrative systems, clear rules and a long tradition of institution building are factors
that deter corruption. Sometimes corruption is also grounded in the social and cultural
traditions of a society366 (for example, presenting gifts to show gratitude for favourable
decisions). In other situations, corruption is related with the increased interference of the
government in the economy in terms of the regulatory environment and the fiscal burden
imposed on individuals.367 Buehen and Schneider argue that greater government
interference increases corruption by causing both bribe takers and bribe seekers to engage
in activities that circumvent rules and regulations.368 In some South Asian countries
(including Pakistan), political turmoil and the continuous expulsion of political regimes has
resulted in the prevalence of official misconduct among politicians and administrators and
the concomitant spread of corruption among business people.369 Alternatively, due to
pervasive corruption in political governments, a politically motivated military would take
over as ultima ratio by bringing down the government. This has happened five times in
Pakistan since its independence.370
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6.1.2 Categories of Corruption in Pakistan
Sayeed371 has categorized corruption in Pakistan in three broad areas as: collusion between
private sector and the state; corruption and extortion by state actors; and institutionalized
corruption.
i)

Collusion between Private Sector and the State
According to Sayeed, collusion between the private sector and the state primarily
involves the allocation and processing of land transactions. The author has traced
the genesis of this form of corruption in the early years after partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and the resettlement of millions of refugees who migrated to
Pakistani territory from post partition India. In the aftermath of the partition, the
Pakistani state adopted a policy of granting land and housing that had been left
behind by the migrating Hindus — and termed ‘Evacuee Property’ — to the
incoming Muslim refugees. The government policy was to compensate ‘property
claims’ of these refugees based on what they had left behind in India. Qadir
provides that the use of influence and money as a form of patronage by the
bureaucrats and politicians in granting such claims had ‘seeped corruption into
Pakistani society surreptitiously spreading its tentacles elsewhere’.372 According to
Sayeed,373 the ‘evacuee property’ policy resulted in the creation of a class of
‘propertied’ migrants. He considers this, the first form of ‘primitive accumulation’
carried out in the newly born Pakistani state.
It could be argued that over the years the acquisition of land has been taken to new levels in
Pakistan. Land-grabbing by the so-called ‘land mafia’374 is prevalent, particularly in and
around the major urban centres such as Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad; and government
housing authorities are allegedly colluding with the private property developers, ‘who
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employ private militias to secure the land.’375 Moreover, to facilitate the practice of ‘land
grabs’ (of both urban and rural land) the Acquisition of Land Act (1894) has been modified
periodically.376 The real estate sector comprising residential colonies and commercial
ventures that have been developed caters largely to the more affluent sections of society and
provides an important conduit for ‘whitening’ of the black money acquired through
corruption and other criminal activities.377
A 1987 report by the Pakistan National Taxation Commission tabled before the Parliament
documented that ‘the bulk of Pakistan’s black money is held in non-productive
investments... real estate and undeclared business assets’.378 According to Sayeed, due to
taxation loopholes, usually more than two-thirds of the money paid in a land or property
transaction remains unrecorded.379 This means that cash or other informal payment methods
are used to complete the transaction. In this manner, the true value of the asset cannot be
estimated because it is neither declared nor documented. Consequently, large amounts of
black money are circulating in the economy that can conveniently be used for settlement of
hawala deals.
Another important form of rent-seeking that has bred corruption in Pakistan over time has
occurred due to the state interventionist policies and discretionary powers exercised in the
award of official permits, licences and quotas. A 1979 White Paper issued by the military
government on the misuse of banks by political governments stated:
the aggregate amount of advances of half million rupees and above which were
classified as doubtful or irregular in the State Bank Inspection Report of 31 December
1975 is over PKR1,340 million. Advances of half million rupees or above given by the
banks after nationalization which have been found to be bad, doubtful or irregular ab
initio amounted to PKR510 million.

The same White Paper also stated that the nationalized commercial banks sanctioned loans
worth PKR562 million under irresistible political and administrative pressure or influence
375
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between 1974 and 1977.380 Many economists support the view that in the early stages of
economic development, preferential treatment of the state in allocating resources to
preferred industries leads to creating artificial monopolies (and hence inefficiency) and the
process of seeking rents creates a deadweight loss to the economy;381 however, in the
industrial development model it is arguably prudent to allocate resources at early stages of
industrialization to sectors which create greater externalities and are geared towards
creating dynamic comparative advantage in the long run.382 In this manner although
corruption would exist, the long term returns to the economy would outweigh the
deadweight loss incurred in seeking rents. The East Asian ‘protective industrial policies
model’ is often associated as evidence of this process of capitalist development in the post
liberalization era. In Pakistan’s case too, such form of corruption have remained prevalent
until the economy was liberalized in the early 1990s. However, state-led industrialization
did not show results in Pakistan (and also in India) that were similar to those generated in
the East Asian countries.383 According to Cheema,384 corruption became an end in itself
rather than a necessary means for accumulating capital for productive purposes. He has
concluded that by the end of the 1980s, ‘economic graft was no longer restricted to funding
individual members of the bureaucracy … but also included financing key political factions
in dominant political parties and the army’.385
The liberalization of the economy in the 1990s was meant to create opportunities for the
emergence of a vigorous, independent entrepreneurial class as organizers of the economic
activity in the country.386 Conversely, privatization policies in the early 1990s resulted in
creating unregulated cartels in Pakistan that took control across a range of industries, such
as banking, automobile, cement, and sugar sectors.387Another significant development
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during this decade was the abuse of the financial sector for generating rents for the political
incumbents. The authors Ali and Malik have documented a chronological history of the
political economy of Pakistan’s industrial development, arguing that the alliance between
the banking officials, government bureaucracy, and the industrialist class has created
serious distortions in the management of the private sector.388 As a result, the decade of the
1990s has remained marked by huge loan defaults by politically connected and influential
industrialists continued public financial assistance of the public and private sector resourcesucking sick industries, and the occurrence of massive corporate failures. Bad loans which
totalled PKR1,340 million in 1979 swelled to PKR80 billion in August 1993, PKR126
billion in November 1996 and PKR130 billion in January 1997.389 It is worth noting that
despite that the SBP announced incentives in exemptions to recover loans from the
defaulters, such as the repayment of only the principal loan amount plus interest of 5 per
cent of the principal (instead of the full amount of accrued interest), the response ratio for
repayment of these loans was only 30 to 40 per cent. Evidently, the banks incurred losses as
they could not detect the majority of the defaulters or recover loans from them. A rich
defaulter class has ended with up this stolen wealth in the black economy, or in many cases
it has simply left Pakistan altogether. 390
ii)

Corruption and Extortion by State Actors
The involvement of the state actors in corruption ranges from petty and straight forward
bribery of a policeman or a building authority clerk to middle level corruption391 of
extortion from individuals and businesses to various forms of domestic and international
‘kickbacks’ on procurements of material and other services.392 In this connection, the civil
bureaucracy has been often criticized for executing the state-led corruption. The
bureaucracy is said to be ‘in the loop’ of all corrupt transactions as the ‘deal executors’. The
reason is that the bureaucrats carry out the requisite documentation and are most familiar
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with all the relevant rules, regulations, loopholes and lacunae.393 However, as Sayeed
argues, apart from the receipt of petty bribes and generally minor extortion, the civil
bureaucrat is not the sole beneficiary of large scale corruption. According to the author,
over the years the civil bureaucracy has lost its clout and political power to the civilian
politicians and the military rulers who have taken turns to control executive power in the
country for periods of time.394
This means that in the ‘new corruption order’ of the state led corruption, where the military
junta and the civil politicians are the chief protagonists. Nevertheless, whilst both the
military and the politicians are at the forefront of the state led corruption, the civil
politicians are more accountable for their conduct than their military counterparts.
Sayeed395 gives three main reasons for this:
i) The logic of electoral democracy holds politicians accountable for their misdeeds and
lack of delivery to the electorate. Poor performance or charges of corruption might risk a
political career or chances of being re-elected; while the other hand, the military men do not
have to contest elections and so are at no risk of retribution from the voters.
ii) Various audit and accountability laws apply to the politicians, leaving them relatively
more susceptible to legal provisions than their uniformed counterparts. The military, on the
other hand, is powerful enough to evade public accountability. The military’s budget in
Pakistan is neither presented in detail to the Parliament nor are the public representatives
allowed to debate the military expenditures publicly. Moreover, the military budget is not
audited by the civilian audit authorities; and, under the law of the land, the serving military
personnel are exempt from any investigation by the civil investigative and anti-corruption
agencies.
iii) Politicians have a greater interaction with the public as well as the media. Also, due to
the very nature of the civil-military imbalance in Pakistan, investigation and reporting of
military ‘scandals’, as opposed to those of politicians, is a much more hazardous
proposition for an otherwise free media.
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iii) Institutionalized Corruption
As explained earlier (in the institutional and legal frameworks’ section), there are enough
tax and legal lacunae through which black money can be laundered. The most salient
scheme in this regard is the ‘no questions asked’ private inward remittance in foreign
exchange policy. According to the foreign exchange law, any individual can receive any
amount of foreign exchange into the country tax-free through the formally regulated
banking channels without being questioned about the source of these funds. This policy has
served as the most common conduit for money laundering of illicit funds generated as a
result of land transactions, tax evasion and other criminal activities. In addition to the
foreign exchange relaxations, state institutions such as, the Federal Board of Revenue
(FBR) periodically provides tax amnesty schemes to ‘whiten’ black money at a nominal
rate of taxation.396
Another form of institutionalized corruption is the grant of land to the military personnel. 397
Since the 1960s, senior army officers have been granted residential, commercial and
agricultural land, as service entitlement at highly subsidized prices. In the case of
residential land, numerous societies have been developed by the armed forces on Pakistan’s
urban landscape where infrastructure is developed largely at the state expense and the land
is allotted to military personnel at subsidized rates. Once the land has been allotted to the
officers, they can sell it at the (much higher) market rates and extract a hefty premium.
Similarly, developed agricultural land is also provided at subsidized rates and, in some
cases, army personnel are officially deputed to tend this land at the state expenses. As a
result, an influential section of the army establishment is now closely integrated with the
landed and business classes in Pakistan.398
Finally, institutionalized corruption is related to the Pakistani state’s covert operations and
security policy during the past three decades. Most pronounced of these operations has been
the country’s nuclear program. In 2004, Dr AQ Khan (founder of the nuclear program)
396
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confessed that he had supplied contraband material to other countries in return for cash. Dr
Khan’s confession provides an important insight into the nature of money laundering
operations involved in such activities. Reports suggest that in the formative phase of the
program, material and equipment was purchased illegally on the international market.
According to Levy and Scott-Clark,399 this process involved a large number of international
state and non-state actors and intermediaries that laundered state money for this purpose.
Other major elements in the same vein of secret operations are those that have been
conducted in Afghanistan and Kashmir by the Pakistani state. The fact that the entire war
effort was conducted through non-state actors, including training, provision of arms and
ammunition as well as logistic support means that large amounts of state funds were
diverted to accomplish these operations. Many versions are available as evidence of the
covert funding provided by the American CIA, and the role of the Saudi General
Intelligence Department (GID) in the Afghan jihad in the 1980s is also well documented.
For example, Gregory states:
Neither, the CIA nor the GID, had clear and tight oversight of what the ISI (and by
extension the Pakistan military government) was doing with the money or the arms. It
has since become clear that the ISI siphoned off hundreds of millions of dollars for its
own purposes as well as millions of small arms.400

Nawaz401 has provided an account of how private Saudi money was channelled during the
Afghan war through various formal and informal – including hawala – that were used to
deliver funds speedily to specified recipients merely through oral instructions and simple
code words. Other investigations suggest that the undisclosed amounts of money that was
transferred were laundered through a variety of bank accounts, both domestic and
international. According to Sayeed, much of this money probably made its way back into
399
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Pakistan and has been invested in real estate and other sectors without being detected. He
states:
The most important implication of institutionalized corruption is that the actors
involved—be they state or non-state—wield so much influence and power that
bringing them under the ‘due process’ of anti-corruption laws appears virtually
impossible.402

6.2

The Conundrum of Political Elite

Corruption by powerful groups of state and non state actors has clear implications for
hawala regulation in Pakistan — non-regulation means hawala can be used as a preferred
conduit for these groups to siphon off their ill-gotten, illegally obtained and criminal
money. It follows that these groups of powerful political elites who have been using the
Pakistani state for their personal gains are the real problem due to which regulatory policies
(and consequently the state) have failed.
Pakistani economist Ishrat Hussain403 has examined the political economy of Pakistan’s
growth in the decades following its independence in 1947 and has propounded that Pakistan
has historically remained dominated by a group of elites; mainly drawn from the landlords,
political parties, the military, civil service, big businesses and the professional class. These
influential elite groups, which in Hussain’s view, are not more than one per cent of the total
population, have been maximizing their rent-collecting activities and thus preventing the
poor from equitable access to public services and the acquisition of physical and human
capital. According to Hussain,
the failure of governance and the consistent domination of political power and the state
apparatus by the narrowly based elite seeking to advance its private and parochial
interests lay at the heart of the problem in Pakistan.404

Hussain’s thesis echoes the views of Dr Mahbub-ul Haq, Pakistan Planning Commission’s
Chief Economist in the 1960s, who in a famous speech had stated that 22 industrial family
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groups had come to dominate the economic and financial life of Pakistan.405 Focusing on
the real growth issues such as income distribution and social justice, Haq was particularly
perturbed by the collusion between the private sector and the state authorities and explained
the dynamics of this collusion as,
the 22 families had become by 1968 both the planning commission and the ministry of
finance for the private sector. They pre-empted most investment permits, import
licenses, foreign credits and government patronage because they controlled or
influenced most of the decision-making forums handing out such permissions.406

Haq had viewed these 22 industrial families as merely a ‘symptom’ whilst the real problem
to him was the system of antiquated laws and primitive institutions that caused such
alliances to work.407 Unfortunately, what Haq had considered mere symptom then has
become the real cause of Pakistan’s problems in the present time. A few thousand
individuals control the economic, social and political scene of the country and all the
economic and political power gravitates towards advancing the personal fortunes of these
elite groups and those of their clients and patrons.408
It would not be wrong to say that because of this minority ruling elite Pakistan has one of
the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios in the world. Under Article 77 of the Constitution, Parliament
is the sole authority able to impose taxes —but how will the elected Parliament legislate on
taxation when nearly half of all its sitting lawmakers paid no income tax and more than 10
per cent did not even have a national tax number which is required to file tax returns. A
2013 study409 has analysed the record of all members of national and provincial assemblies
who won the 2013 general elections in Pakistan. The study has examined the income and
tax declarations these legislators made in their nomination papers filed with the Election
Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). It was found that
of the 1,070 members of all the assemblies (including four provincial and one national
405
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assembly) information was only available for 1,016 of those members. Among those whose
information was missing are 123 law makers and a provincial financial minister who did
not have national tax numbers. There are 461 non-tax paying legislators while records of 51
candidates who won the elections are not available. Table 7.1410 below summarizes these
numbers.

Assembly

Total Members

Non-tax Paying

Percentage

National

342

125

36%

Punjab

371

161

43%

Sindh

168

59

35%

KPK

124

80

64%

65

36

55%

1070

461

43%

Balochistan
Total

Table6.1: Non-Tax Paying Legislators
Table (6.1 above) shows that the National Assembly has 125 non-tax paying legislators,
including two ministers and eight prominent politicians; the Punjab assembly has 161 such
members, including 2 ministers; there are 59 non-tax paying members in the Sindh
assembly; and 80 in the KPK assembly who did not pay tax (with this number including
four ministers, speaker and deputy speaker as well). Also, the 36 non-tax-paying members
of the Balochistan provincial assembly includes 8 ministers.

410

Ibid 10.

137

Cases of Income Declarations

680

No of Discrepancies

169

Cases of Tax Returns

550

No of Discrepancies

171

Table 6.2 Number of Discrepancies
Table (6.2411 above) shows discrepancies exist even where candidates have claimed to
declare their incomes and filed tax returns. For example, details provided by the
Parliamentarians in their nomination papers have been found at variance with FBR’s record
and many declarations have been disputed by the FBR.
This shows how the ruling elite is a major cause of fundamental institutional problems like
corruption and tax evasion that have eroded the domestic resource generating capacity of
the country. Moreover, as a result of collusion between the tax-evaders and the taxcollectors the state has become virtually incapacitated as regards the possibility of
judiciously utilizing finances for priority investment needs as well as to promote equity.
The tax evaded or ‘black money’ is legalized by governments first introducing frequent
schemes to ‘whiten’ such funds as well as there being laws and channels available through
which the laundered funds can be injected back into the system (through foreign exchange
bearer certificates or other similar schemes). In this way, the powerful ruling classes are not
only the primary cause for the failure of essentially required reforms but are also
responsible for many other problems the Pakistani state is facing, including the abuse of the
otherwise benign informal transfer systems that are channelling the much required
development finance to the poor and underserved in many remote areas of Pakistan. A
recent study concludes the conundrum of the Pakistani political elite in the following
words:
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Pakistan’s most serious problems have more to do with a selfish elite wedded to a
status quo that consigns some 40 percent of the population to dire poverty with little or
no education or health care, than with terrorism or religious fundamentalism.412

6.3

Polarization in Society

Besides the political elite hypothesis, another cause that has often been argued to have
inhibited essential reforms and contributed to the state failure is the polarization of the
Pakistani society into linguistic, religious and regional factions.413 It has been argued that
those societies which are divided and segmented find it difficult to agree on essential public
goods and institutions which are required for state-building and to prevent rent-seeking in
the society.414
6.3.1

Troubled Political History

The primary cause of segmentation in Pakistani society has been a troubled political history
marred by conflict and instability. It has been argued that right from its promulgation in
1930, the ‘idea Pakistan’ has remained in a flux.415 Easterly argues that the cultural and
geographical homeland of the Pakistan idea in British India lay outside the boundaries of
what is today Pakistan.416 He has stated,
Ironically, significant areas of what is today Pakistan supported other political parties
including Indian Congress Party, than the Pakistan founding Muslim League in preIndependence elections and only shortly before the partition of the sub-continent did
the north-west Muslim majority provinces embrace the idea of Pakistan.417

Hence, Pakistani nationalism has always remained a contested idea and the debates of
national identity and cohesion have haunted the state ever since its foundation.
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6.3.2

Political Instability

Another indicator of polarization in the society is political instability. In Pakistan, during
the initial ten years after its independence in 1947, seven successive non-military
governments were appointed. Throughout the 1960s, the country was ruled by military
rulers. In 1971, East Pakistan was separated. A democratic government was installed after
the secession of East Pakistan but again, another military government took over in 1978.
Democracy was revived between 1988 and 1998 with an alternation in power between the
country’s two leading political parties. Neither of the parties could, however, complete their
constitutional terms in the government and both were ousted on charges of corruption. In
1999, another military government took power. The democratic system was restored in
2008 when an elected government was installed; and again in 2013, when for the first time
in the history of Pakistan, transition from one elected government to another has been
achieved successfully. Continuous political polarization and instability in Pakistan has
nevertheless led to institutional deterioration and poor quality of governance. 418 An
example of institutional deterioration is often cited in the deterioration of the institution of
civil bureaucracy from the 1970s onwards when a political government encouraged lateral
entries and quota allocations in the meritorious civil service as a result of politicization of
the institution.419
6.3.3

Ethno-linguistic Diversity

Another factor that has caused fragmentation in Pakistan is ethno-linguistic diversity.
Pakistan is home to a variety of ethnic and linguistic groups speaking different languages
and dialects. Its founding fathers chose ‘Urdu’ as Pakistan’s national language which only 8
per cent of the total population speaks.420 Before the secession of East Pakistan, linguistic
polarization was even greater as the Bengalis wanted their language to be declared the
second national language along with Urdu.421 Furthermore, despite Urdu being the national
language in Pakistan, the English language is used in government offices for official
418
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communication because Pakistan has retained most of the colonial English laws and
administrative institutions. At the societal level, the elite — and increasingly the urban
middle classes — prefer English as a medium of communication and education, creating
further schisms in regard to the medium of language in which basic education needs be
delivered.
Another division in Pakistan has remained between the native inhabitants of the region that
became Pakistan and the immigrants (Muhajirs) who came from India at the time of
partition. The communal violence witnessed in Sindh province since the mid 1980s has
been cited as a cause of the perception among the Muhajirs that they have remained
marginalized compared to the ‘sons of the soil’.422 Similarly, the Baloch have tried to
secede in the 1950s as well as in the 1970s, but these attempts were responded to with
brutal force by the Pakistani army. The separatist insurgency is presently continuing in
Balochistan.423 The demand for a combined Pushtunland has also ‘remained on the
cards’.424 A final and significant segmentation is between the variants of Islamic belief and
the non-Muslim minorities, and by the debate as to whether the Pakistani state should be
secular or Islamic. In recent years, the growing trend of the so-called ‘Talibanization’ of the
society has further exacerbated the existing fissures between the Islamists and the
liberals.425
It is worth contemplating the situation of a divided society where corruption is rampant and
the successive governments have shown an unwillingness to take action to increase
revenues and introduce other corrective measures for fundamental reforms to improve
services for the majority of the people — yet Pakistan continues to receive financial
assistance from the international community. The question remains: Why has the
international community not used its influence for fundamental reforms in Pakistan which
has remained a recipient of its financial assistance for many decades? The answer can be
explored in Pakistan’s relations with the major international donors
422
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6.4

International Donors – The IMF and the United States

6.4.1

Relations with the IMF

Since the late 1980s, Pakistan has remained a recipient of continuous assistance from the
IMF, a situation that is often accompanied by a number of demands and obligations
imposed by the ‘Fund’. As a starting point, approaching the ‘Fund’ shows that a country’s
economy is in dire straits as the IMF is often considered ‘the lender of last resort’ and
countries only turn to it in times of grave economic crisis. This means that when a country
wants to be ‘bailed out’ by the IMF, its economic managers have accepted their failure of
control over the economy. As a result, under the financial assistance package, the Fund has
leverage over that country’s economic and financial policies. This view is often refuted in
IMF’s defence and it is argued that the ‘reforms program’ a country has to follow under the
financial assistance package is not what the Fund wants it to do but what the membercountry thinks is doable and politically and socially acceptable in view of its ‘ground
realities’.426
6.4.2

The Decade of the 1990s

Pakistan’s economy has remained highly volatile and instable since the late 1980s. The
decade preceding the 2002 foreign exchange market reforms was a period of heightened
political instability in the history of Pakistan comparable only with the political instability
of the 1950s. Nine different governments — including four interim, four elected and, one
appointed after the 1999 military coup — ruled the country during the 1990s.427 A natural
consequence of this political instability and the frequent changes in the governments
followed by a reversal of decisions taken by the preceding government was an overall
environment of uncertainty that prevailed throughout this period.428 Lack of political will
and ownership of the governments resulted in the failure of various ‘structural adjustment
programs’ initiated under the IMF assistance during this decade. According to Meekal Aziz
Ahmed, ‘the lack of ownership of the program is translated into faltering implementation, a
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sleight of hand to meet the targets and roll-back of reforms’.429 An example of the ‘rollback’ of reforms is the removal of exemptions and concessions as part of IMF
conditionality. Once the program is abandoned or terminated by a government, these
exemptions and concessions are restored, normally through Statutory Regulatory Orders
(SROs), again fragmenting the tax base and leading to a loss of revenues.430
The democratically elected governments of the 1990s — and the 2000s — that have come
to power in Pakistan after prolonged periods of military dictatorship behaved like Mancur
Olson’s431 ‘roving bandit’ (that is, who loots for the day) rather than the ‘stationary bandit’
(that is, one who takes his theft in the form of taxation and at the same time ensures
provision of public goods). The two major political parties who ruled Pakistan during the
1990s were more focused on making ‘friends’ and influencing people and more so,
replenishing their coffers for personal enrichment and re-election.432 According to the
economist Hussain, ‘personal, parochial and party loyalty considerations dominated
decision making while institutions were bypassed’.433 The laxity of these democratically
elected governments increased the loopholes in taxation system because preferential
taxation regimes were facilitated through SROs that overrode legislation. Four consecutive
political governments during this period were ousted on charges of misgovernance and
corruption. Overall, the 1990s has been dubbed as a ‘lost decade’434 due to faltering
economic and governance targets by Pakistan’s domestic as well as the international
economic managers.
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6.4.3

Military Take-over 1999

When the military government took over in late 1999, Pakistan was faced with economic as
well as institutional turmoil. The country was on the verge of a default on its huge foreign
loans.435 This crisis was further exacerbated by the imposition of economic sanctions and
the disruption of external economic assistance as a result of the nuclear testing conducted in
May 1998.436 Thousands of wealthy Pakistanis had pulled their assets out of the country
and the local and foreign investment was at a halt.437 In the midst of this economic crisis,
Pakistan again sought IMF assistance in late the 2000. The Fund made a loan to Pakistan
for ten months to save the country from defaulting, but this assistance was subject to
stringent conditions to ‘set the house in order’ so as to receive further financial aid.438
Consequently, General Parvez Musharraf’s government carried out some economic
reforms, including the devaluation of the Pakistani currency, raising the prices of petrol, gas
and electricity, and attempting to broaden the tax base.439 The military government was
focused on bringing the economy back on track while also ensuring that the program targets
were met.
This explains why the Musharraf government was too weak to open any new fronts without
initially getting some foothold on the economy. It is inconceivable that under the economic
hardships that the government was facing where the country’s foreign exchange reserves
had been alarmingly depleted and official remittances were all time low that the SBP could
plan any attempts to ‘regulate’ hawala, particularly when the unofficial remittances through
hawala were perhaps the only source of inflows in the cash-strapped country. It could be
argued that even though increasing the inward remittances through formal banking channels
had remained SBP’s long-term priority, the timing (late 1990s) was just not right for the
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government/SBP to curb hawala at a juncture when the SBP was itself periodically
purchasing billions of dollars from the off-shore money changers.440
6.4.4

September 9/11 and Pakistan

There are two dimensions to the events following 9/11 and Pakistan’s participation in the
so-called ‘War on Terrorism’. After the tragic events of 9/11, the United States pressurized
the governments internationally for political and moral support for the United States’ War
on Terrorism.441 President Bush had stated to the world, ‘every nation, in every region, now
has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’.442 On the
other hand, General Pervez Musharraf who had come to power as a result of a coup d'état
wanted to legitimize his military rule. Military leaders are generally deplored in the western
democracies and cooperation on an international agenda such as the war on terrorism would
result in the stamp of western approval to Musharraf’s autocratic rule,443 just as it had done
to the rule of General Zia-ul-Haq once he had agreed to fight the United States’ proxy war
against the Soviets. In his autobiographical account, General Pervez Musharraf has related
that his decision to participate in the War on Terrorism was driven by a mighty United
States and India:
[T]he question was: if we do not join them, can we confront them and withstand the
onslaught? The answer was no, we could not, on three counts. First was our military
weakness as compared with the strength of the United States. Second was our
economic weakness. We had no oil and we did not have the capacity to sustain our
economy in the face of an attack by the U.S. Third and worst of all, was our social
weakness. We lacked the homogeneity to galvanize the entire nation into an active
confrontation…India had already tried to step in by offering its bases to the U.S.444

As a result of the alliance with the United States, Pakistan received many economic rewards
in accordance with the US policies of economic statecraft. These economic rewards
included removal of the three economic sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan for
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testing and acquiring nuclear arsenal.445 Along with this, foreign assistance and aid
amounting to USD1.2 billion and USD600 million in cash transfers were given to the
Pakistani government to pay its international debts.446 Moreover, the United States agreed
to reschedule a USD379 million bilateral debt through the ‘Paris Club’ as well as promising
support for the rescheduling of other outstanding bilateral debts.447 The United States also
allowed several trade concessions by agreeing to lower tariffs and quota restrictions on
Pakistan.448 This extensive economic foreign assistance from the United States that
followed 9/11 was only comparable to the amount of security and economic aid given to
Pakistan when it was front-lining the United States’ proxy war in Afghanistan against the
Soviets during the 1980s.
In exchange for the economic benefits, the Musharraf regime joined the United States led
coalition in global efforts to counter terrorism. Among many other steps, the introduction of
international regulation to curb hawala was the United States’ and the international
regulatory agencies’ ‘knee-jerk response’449 to starve the global networks of terrorism
finance. Pakistan cooperated in these efforts by complying with the international AML/CFT
legislation and standards. It introduced reforms in the financial market that would, at least
in principle, eliminate informal and unreported transfers. It could be argued that if it were
not for the United States’ pressure after the events of 9/11, the Pakistani government was
economically, institutionally and morally too weak to enforce these regulations. It needs be
emphasized that the structural changes introduced in the market such as creation of
exchange companies were essentially ‘ill-timed’, as the requisite ‘ground-work’ or prereform measures that were mandated before such reforms are introduced could not be taken.
6.4.5

Roles of the United States and the IMF

Following Pakistan’s collaboration in the ‘War on Terrorism’, the United States claimed it
had lobbied for its ‘ally’ and ‘friend’ at various multilateral agencies, including the IMF
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which had disbursed the final tranche of a USD135 million loan in late September 2001.450
Consequently, the SBP, keeping the United States and the IMF in confidence, created
foreign exchange companies that replaced the licensed money changers with the objective
of eliminating hawala and corporatizing the foreign exchange market in Pakistan.
Ahmed and Mohammed argue that large inflows to Pakistan that have coincided with the
US proxy-war in Afghanistan with the Soviets during the 1980s and again after the 9/11
have a ‘flipside’ to them. These inflows and continuous foreign financial assistance has led
to behavioural changes and higher expectations in successive Pakistani governments.
Constant foreign assistance has not only created distortions in the incentives structure in
society and the desire of the governments for self-reliance451 it has also led to the creation
of a ‘rentier state’ which has remained dependent on external hand-outs and rents rather
than correcting the structural flaws that impede provision of essential public goods and
development of the state institutions.452
6.4.6

Pakistan — Limited Access Order

Absence or lack of effective institutions has consolidated the Pakistani state into a ‘Limited
Access Order’ (LAO) state.453 North et al argue that countries that are characterized LAOs
have social, political and economic systems based on limited entry and rent-creation. Elites
in the LAOs use these rents to maintain order and to hold the social order together. The
political system manipulates the economy to generate rents that bind the interests of the
economic actors to support the current political system. In contrast to the LAO state is the
Open Access Order (OAO) state where access to economic, social and political
organizations, including the freedom to form them, is open to all citizens. According to
North et al, almost all developing countries lie along the fragile, basic and mature LAO
spectrum. Such states can regress and develop — as well as stagnate — along this spectrum
based on the capability of their respective state institutions that can restrain rents. Whilst a
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fragile LAO state can barely sustain itself, in the basic LAO state there is a stable
organizational structure, and the mature LAO state has durable institutional structures.454
Analysis of the Pakistani state within the LAO framework explains that alongside the
existence of a ruling political elite, the attitude of the international donors (the United
States, the IMF and the World Bank) has also been instrumental in encouraging the
maintenance of the status quo that has hindered attempts towards serious reforms.455 The
international community could be criticized for not pushing the various governments
enough to introduce essential reforms despite these donors having leverage on Pakistan’s
economic and financial policies. The IMF generally takes the position that it does not
‘dictate’ terms to the local authorities because it presumes that the local officials are better
acquainted with the ground realities and political constrains. 456 In Pakistan’s case, the
Fund’s proclaimed acquiescence has allowed implementation of highly controversial and
infamous policies such as ‘the no questions asked’ and ‘no tax foreign currency accounts’
64 per cent of which belong to residents (the remaining 36 percent to non-residents and
institutional investors).457 The IMF knowingly agreed with the Pakistani authorities’
proposal for the ‘no questions asked’ foreign exchange policy, paving the way for a brazen
money laundering scheme that was introduced in the garb of capital account
liberalization.458
Moreover, during the past decades both the IMF and the World Bank have allowed
continuous flexibility, waivers and favourable conditionalities to Pakistan despite its failure
to achieve even ‘soft’ reform targets. The IMF has always bailed out Pakistan and not let it
default, even though Pakistan’s reputation within the Fund is that of a ‘stop-go’459 country
due to its continuous track record of either not completing the agreements or abandoning or
rolling-back program conditionalities. In reality, the IMF has always willingly agreed on a
‘new loan program’ without much reflection on the failures of the past. One of the reasons
454
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for the international community’s preference to continuously remain engaged with Pakistan
and not let the country sink could arguably be that the world powers find it increasingly
risky to let a nuclear armed state become vulnerable.460 Hence, even though the United
States was not directly providing financial assistance to Pakistan in the years following the
end of the Cold War until 9/11, it did not oppose bilateral aid to Pakistan through other
bilateral agencies. Another plausible explanation holds that the IMF’s soft approach
towards Pakistan is driven by its own financial interests. The IMF agrees to roll over a
program to get the loan instalments repaid to itself while the economy sinks. In this manner,
every time the IMF shows eagerness to enter a new loan program, it is ensuring payments
of the loan instalments rather than focusing on the economy of the country.461
Many critics have argued that such relaxations allowed by the United States as well as the
international financial institutions have created a predictable pattern of behaviour which has
been used by the Pakistani authorities to their advantage and so different governments have
avoided the fundamental issue of domestic resource mobilization measures underpinning
the various reforms’ agenda. Consequently, during the last three decades, every military
and political government has resisted fundamental reforms such as broadening the tax-base,
modernizing tax administration, closing preferential schemes and other loopholes, among
the essentially required reforms. Critics have argued that by not using their clout for the
introduction of fundamental reforms within the economy and in the governance structures,
the international donor community has ‘played in cahoots’ with the ruling elite of
Pakistan.462
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Part III:
6.1

Pakistan Afghanistan Transit Trade

Trade Relations with Afghanistan:

Community based trade and commerce between tribes on both sides of the Durand Line has
been in place for centuries, based on tribal affiliations.463 Before the partition of the subcontinent, the Afghan goods were allowed to transit by the British under the obligations of
the international laws.464 Problems between Afghanistan and the newly created Pakistan
started when, at the time of partition of the sub-continent, Afghanistan supported the
movement of an independent ‘Pashtunistan’465 (the idea of the unification of borderlands on
both sides of the Durand Line). The idea was rejected by Pakistan but Afghanistan’s
position on a sovereign Pakhtunland was unrelenting.466 After the creation of Pakistan in
1947, the new government continued treating the tribal belt as a buffer zone between
Pakistan and then hostile Afghanistan. The Pakistan government granted some concessions
to the tribal people, by allowing free interaction between families and households across the
border but the Afghan government refused to recognize the Durand Line and the division of
Pakhtuns in the United Nations.467 In order to normalize severed relations with its
landlocked neighbour after the 1962 border closure crises,

468

Pakistan agreed to provide

Afghanistan a commercial transit corridor. According to Syed Waqar Hussain, Pakistan’s
agreement with Afghanistan on 2 March 1965, known as the Afghan Transit Trade
Agreement (ATTA) can be viewed partly as efforts to normalize diplomatic ties with
Afghanistan and partly as efforts to meet the obligation under the international law.469
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With the signing of the ATTA, Pakistan became Afghanistan’s largest trading partner.
Official trade470 between the two countries amounted to USD 1.5 billion in 2011–12 and
around USD1 billion in 2012–13. On average, bilateral trade between Pakistan and
Afghanistan during the past five years has fluctuated around USD1 billion.471 The trade
balance is heavily tilted in Pakistan’s favour with over 90 per cent of the total trade
consisting of Pakistani exports to Afghanistan. Official imports from Afghanistan were
valued at USD140,000 in 2011–12.472
6.2

Economic Drivers of the ATTA

One of the objectives that the Pakistani government was aiming to achieve through the
ATTA was to win support of the FATA tribes, vis-à-vis the independent Pashtunistan
movement, by providing them an economic package in the form of a transit treaty. Naseer
relates:
the Pakistan authorities had a very clear idea that the Afghan imported duty free items
would ultimately be smuggled back into Pakistan. This was a tolerable price to pay by
Pakistan, since the chief beneficiaries would be the tribes of FATA who were
vulnerable to Afghan interference. Therefore the major objective of the 1965 treaty was
to win over support by the pro-Pakistan Maliks, and this approach worked well in
helping impoverished tribesmen.473

Indeed, in the long run, the transit treaty was aimed at providing Pakhtuns on both sides of
the Durand Line employment and livelihood opportunities as trade is complemented by the
development of service industries. As mentioned earlier, the FATA is a difficult terrain
comprising high mountains and narrow rocky valleys. Almost 80 per cent of the land is
barren and difficult to cultivate. Similarly, the Afghan-Pashtun border along the FATA is
also extremely impoverished and conflict ridden. The World Bank has estimated that
poverty in this area is more than 58 per cent474 which is far higher than among the FATA
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residents as some of the FATA residents still have access to urban areas of Pakistan for
education, employment and business. The harsh geographical situation and continued
conflict has kept the Afghan tribal borderlands isolated from the rest of the urban
Afghanistan475 (just as the FATA is isolated from the rest of Pakistan). Consequently,
similar living standards and tribal connections have made the border areas more dependent
on each other for creating common employment opportunities and markets rather than
relying on their respective governments. Formal trade relations between Afghanistan and
Pakistan have resulted in the creation of employment in diverse economic activities for the
tribal workforce. These range from clearing and shipping services to unloading, trucking,
transportation, and other allied services, such as employment at fuel stations, garages,
shops, and tea houses along the transit routes.476 Most of these businesses (particularly
transportation of transit goods from Pakistan through to Afghanistan) are completely
dominated by the tribal traders.477
6.3

Unauthorized Trade under the ATT

In addition to being engaged in the business industries related to the transit trade, the tribal
traders and businessmen are simultaneously engaged in the illegal trade of arms and
narcotics, currency trade through hundi/hawala as well as smuggling of goods across the
borders.478 Indeed, the economic and tribal alliances between the FATA and Afghan tribes
have been instrumental in creating a smuggling economy that primarily developed in the
1970s when Afghan-Pakistani trucking merchants, predominantly the Afridi Pashtun tribes,
became a growing economic force.479
6.3.1

The Smuggling Economy

There are two ways through which the transit trade goods are smuggled into Pakistan:
i) Re-export: Transit trade goods legally enter Afghanistan but are smuggled back into
Pakistan across the porous borders.
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ii) Transit diversion: Transit goods do not enter Afghanistan at all, and transit trucks are
instead diverted for sale in Pakistan.480
Syed Waqar Hussain has observed that ever since the first ATTA was signed, trucks
containing transit trade goods have routinely been crossing into Afghanistan, some goods
sold in Kabul and then turned around to smuggle the remaining consignment into Pakistan
where these goods were sold in the ‘Bara’ markets.481 According to Hussain: ‘It was a
flourishing but limited business, giving Pakistan access to duty free foreign consumer
goods particularly, Japanese electronics’.482
In a January 2012 presentation before the Parliament Standing Committee on Finance,483
the Chairman of Pakistan FBR informed the members of the Committee that a total of
28,802 ATT trucks were found to have been missing between 2009 and 2011.484 According
to the FBR, of these missing containers, only 560 trucks could be traced. The loss sustained
by the government due to the disappearance of these containers has been estimated at
around PKR50 billion. A subsequent investigation conducted by the FBR Directorate of
Intelligence and Investigation has revealed that in 2010 alone, 3000 ATT containers did not
leave Karachi and the goods were shifted to the local warehouses. 485 The FBR has placed
the onus of this negligence in transit trade procedures on Pakistan Customs Services (PCS)
officials.
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Table 6.3

Customs Procedure486 for Afghan Transit Trade487

 Karachi Port (Gate-in); declaration of goods by the importer.
 Examination of 5–25 per cent of the consignment by the Customs officials. The
containers are then sealed.
 Torkham (Gate-out): The consignment is weighed and if the weight is more than
500–1000 kg from that of Gate-in, the importer’s profile is scrutinized by the
Customs officials.
 If the weight difference is around a ton, the consignment is examined to check if the
seals have been tampered with. Penalties of custom duties in between 2 and 10 per
cent of the consignment value may apply if customs procedures have been violated.

6.3.2

Transit Trade Customs Procedures

A review of customs procedures, obtained during the interviews with PCS officials (Table
6.3 above) explains the ease with which goods bound for Afghanistan can be diverted
anywhere in Pakistan. Following two points merit special attention: At the entry point in
Karachi, a maximum of 25 per cent part of the consignment is examined before it is
‘sealed’. Understandably, this examination is manually carried out, cursorily done, and in
many cases could be avoided because goods are not essentially carried in closed containers
but in open trucks.488 Similarly at the exit point (Torkham Pakistan-Afghanistan border)
inspection procedures involve weighing the consignment, checking importers’ profile and
the tampered seals. This only serves to emphasize that collusion between the smugglers and
the officials cannot be overstated. In the words of Hussein:
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In view of these checks and counter checks, it can hardly be believed that these goodsin-transit may either be diverted or re-exported in the goods market of Pakistan. But
such a comprehensive checking itself explains that the trade is prone to abuse.489

6.3.3

Smuggling Volumes

Hilali has reported the existence of country wide ‘Bara’ markets selling transit trade
smuggled goods bound for Afghanistan which has resulted in lost revenues for Pakistan.
These losses were estimated in the late 1990s to be around PKR4.7 billion annually that
would have come to the state exchequer as a result of the duties and taxes paid on legal
import of these goods.490 In the Parliament Standing Committee’s meeting, the FBR
officials informed those present that around USD5 billion worth of smuggled goods enter
Pakistan annually through the ATT channels. The revenue loss to the state represented by
the FBR is about USD2.5 billion per annum. According to the FBR officials, 75 per cent of
the total smuggling in Pakistan can be attributed to the ATT.
Goods that have been identified as particularly prone to smuggling through the ATT
include:
i)

Tea: The Afghans prefer green tea to black tea; however, huge quantities of black

tea have been imported under the ATT that have ended up in Pakistan markets. It is
estimated that 40 million kilograms of tea, which forms almost 40 per cent of the total legal
import of Pakistan’s requirement is smuggled into the country.491
ii)

Power Generators and Electrical Equipment: The increase in demand for

electrical items such dry cell batteries, rechargeable lights, generators and uninterruptable
power supplies has increased the imports of these goods through the ATT, presumably for
Pakistani consumers.492
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iii)

Tyres: It is reported that as much as 75 per cent of the domestic demand in Pakistan

for bus and truck tyres is supplied through the ATT.493
iv)

Air Conditioners: Although these figures are dated now, in

1994 Pakistan

imported air conditioners worth PKR30 million while Afghanistan, with little electricity
and very low domestic demand, recorded import of air conditioners of PKR1 billion. A
large number of these air-conditioners were re-exported to appear in the Pakistani
markets.494
6.3.4

Drivers of the Smuggling Economy

Smuggling and selling of goods in Pakistani markets has prompted governments to review
the commodities imported under the ATT. Pakistani authorities have revised these
commodities lists in 1996, 2000, and 2005, subsequently identifying those commodities that
cannot be imported under the ATT. However, as Naseer points out, the revision of
commodities lists was of no use because — along with the smuggling problems — trade as
a subject matter between Pakistan and Afghanistan had become a much more complicated
issue.495 Asif has accounted for this complicated scenario:
Smuggled goods are big business in all seven tribal districts, and traders in nearly every
FATA agency have defined their niche market; if one agency is known as a trading hub
for smuggled tyres another deals exclusively in smuggled cars, weapons, or chemicals.
Whenever the government of Pakistan introduces any changes in the taxation system
that would push up the prices of any such goods, or cracks down more vigorously on
the illegal weapons trade, smuggling of these commodities into Pakistan begins
through these routes.496

Interviews conducted during the course of this research in Peshawar city’s Chowk Yadgar
money market have confirmed that hawala finance is used in the tribal belt which is
geographically isolated and has scarce infrastructure. The tribal areas in both the FATA and
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Afghanistan have a well-established hawala system’,497 and ‘anyone wishing to make a
financial transfer with an individual or institution anywhere in the world can do so in the
tribal areas, irrespective of the amount involved and without any concern over the
transaction’s reliability’.498
6.4

From Smuggling to War Economy

Starting in the 1970s, the smuggling economy has gained increased impetus as a result of
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and subsequent massive migration of Afghan
refugees to Pakistan and Iran. During the war, the Muslim resistance fighters (mujahidins)
set up their supply bases inside Pakistan’s FATA from where the ISI supplied (the United
States’ provided) arms to the resistance commanders fighting inside Afghanistan. 499 The
arms and ammunition were moved into Afghanistan by private teamsters, mostly tribesmen,
who served as logistical conduits between the external and internal resistance
commanders.500 According to Rubin, ‘the pipeline of arms and humanitarian aid supplied
capital to build up regional smuggling networks’.501 Ironically many of the trucks used to
move war supplies to Afghanistan were the same as used for ATT. The transit trade trucks
were also leased for arms transport502 and profits accumulated by commanders and traders
were reinvested in illicit activities including the drug and cross border smuggling
economies. Daniel Pearl and Steve Stecklow have reported on the smuggling of electronics,
tires, crockery and textiles which gave some of the mujahidin commanders a way to enrich
themselves and keep supporters employed.503
According to Jonathan Goodhand, the Taliban take-over of Afghanistan in the early 1990s
should be seen in the perspective of protection of the ‘economic’ state and non-state
interests in Pakistan. Goodhand has argued that through the instalment of a pliant regime in
Kabul, the Pakistan government wanted to further its pursuit of strategic depth in relation to
497
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its confrontation with India as well as establish political influence in the region’s ‘New
Great Game’ through the construction of oil and gas pipelines to Central Asia. A salient
feature of the Taliban take-over and rule was that they were supported by the AfghanPakistan transport sector who wanted stability and security in order to safeguard their
economic interests which were adversely affected by continuous warlordism and conflict.504
Consequently, during the Taliban rule in the late 1990s, cross border smuggling under ATT
flourished. A World Bank study in 1996–97 estimated that cross border trade between
Pakistan and Afghanistan was worth approximately USD2.5 billion.505 The amount of the
revenue that Taliban generated by taxing this trade has been estimated at USD75 million506
which, according to the study, is still much less than the taxes and duties the transit traders
would have to pay in case of a formal trade.
6.5

Afghanistan – The Regional Trading Gateway

The disintegration of the Soviet Union into Central Asian Republics (CARs) has changed
the geo-political status of Afghanistan from a buffer zone into a regional trading gateway.
In the post Cold War years, Afghanistan is facilitating transnational trading networks —
both licit and illicit — through multiple trade routes to Iran, the Persian Gulf and the
Central Asia. Conrad Schetter has argued that as a result of the post Cold War geoeconomics of the region, many disparities have emerged in the trade policies of countries in
this region. Afghanistan is taking advantage of these disparities and consequently it imports
consumer goods such as television sets from Dubai which is the largest free port in the
world; fuel is imported from Iran where oil products are subsidized and fuel costs less than
USD0.04 per litre; and automobile spare parts are imported from Turkmenistan into
Afghanistan.507
It requires no special effort to understand that most of these goods have little or no use in
Afghanistan and are destined to be smuggled into Pakistan, through the same transportation
networks that integrate Afghanistan into the region. Consequently, the ATT has extended
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well beyond Pakistan and Afghanistan into the region through these trading networks.
Rubin has provided an illustration of the transformation of ATT into trans-border trade
through its extension to Dubai where the third largest Pashtun population resides (after the
Pakistani cities of Karachi and Peshawar). According to Rubin, these transnational trading
networks make Afghanistan and Pakistan the second largest trading partners of the UAE
from where Afghan and Pakistani traders purchase duty-free goods in Dubai and ship them
to be smuggled into Pakistan through Afghanistan.508
It could be argued that despite being termed a country ‘without a state’, today’s
Afghanistan is at the cross roads of the global trade, exporting emeralds and drugs to the
developed countries as well as importing war material, fuel and manufactured consumer
goods of a variety of products from the international global markets. 509 In Ahmed Rashid’s
view, what is euphemistically referred to as the Afghan Transit Trade has in reality become
the biggest smuggling racket in the world. The author provides that the border posts
between ‘Chaman’ in Pakistan’s Balochistan province and ‘Spin Boldak’ in Afghanistan
are the prime locations for watching the operations of the smuggling racket. He has
estimated that almost 300 trucks cross over from Afghanistan to Pakistan on a daily basis.
The goods that these trucks carry have no invoice and cross up to six international frontiers
without possessing route permits, driving licences or even passports. The consignments on
these trucks:
range from Japanese camcorders to English underwear and Earl Grey Tea, Chinese silk
to American computer parts, Afghan heroin to Pakistani wheat and sugar, East
European Kalashnikov to Iranian petroleum.510

Ahmed Rashid has further related that the trading networks that facilitate this transnational
trade include smugglers, transporters, drug barons, bureaucrats, politicians, police and army
officers, not only in Pakistan but also in Iran, Turkmenistan, and Dubai.511 Jonathan
Goodhand has elaborated more on these networks. He argues that it would be a difficult
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task to find linkages between the more criminal trade in drugs and arms and a rather ‘licit
transit trade’ as well as to distinguish an arms smuggler from a transit trader. The reason
supplied by the author is that the connecting nodes are multiple and fairly intricate,
particularly ‘in the middle of the commodity chain there is a lot of integration linking the
military, political and economic power’.512
6.6

Trans-border Trade Financing: The Hawala Networks

At the heart of the transit trade networks is the hawaladar or ‘saraf ’,513 — an important
node in the transnational trading chain. The hawaladar facilitates efficient, cheap, and
reliable international and domestic payments in the absence of the enforcement of formal
transactions. ATT provides that because despite being informal in structure and
mechanisms, the hawala system has sustained coordination among intricate linkages and
connections between various licit and illicit state and non-state actors. This serves to
explain why these systems have survived and have transformed into transnational networks
and also clarifies the common perception that such networks flourish in tribal or rural
societies and cultures only.514
Emily Schaeffer has given an overview of the literature on self enforcing exchange
relationships. While the intention here is not to delve into the vast literature on the subject,
it is noteworthy that scholars in this area have focused on small groups of traders who
develop reputation mechanisms. These informal reputation mechanisms keep their costs
low and sustain communication, as long as they remain a small group. Conversely, if the
size of the group becomes larger, costs of communication would become prohibitively
higher causing the exchange mechanisms to break down. A principal scholar in this stream
of thought is Douglas North who states:
[R]ealizing the economic potential of the gains from trade in a high technology world
of enormous specialization and division of labour characterized by impersonal
512
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exchange is extremely rare, because one does not necessarily have repeated dealings,
nor knows the other party, nor deals with a small number of other people.

On the other hand, the contesting stream of argument supports the proposition that self
enforcing exchanges can be equally effective across larger populations and greater
distances.515 As an illustration to this view, Emily Schaeffer has analysed the reputation
mechanisms in hawala networks which cover large populations of traders across the globe.
She has concluded that the hawala systems are, ‘substitute institutions for highly regulated,
unenforceable, or nonexistent formal systems’, and that these informal networks ‘also
persist when the costs of using formal systems are prohibitive’.516
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6.7

Why Do Traders Prefer Hawala?

Table 6.4

Reasons That Traders Prefer Hawala?517

 There is relationship of trust between the trader and the hawaladar.
 Due to a personalized relationship, the trader has access to foreign exchange on
credit to be paid back once the goods arrive.
 Duration of the credit is extendable until the arrival of the consignment.
 Premium rate for 6 month credit is in between PKR4– PKR5 per dollar. For 1 year
credit, the rate can be in between PKR5– PKR10 per dollar.
 Exporters demand that at least half of the payment is made to them through
hawala due to the higher than market minimum export price (MEP) set by the
government.
 The State Bank of Pakistan stipulates that the exporters deposit foreign exchange
within 6 months or their Letter of Credit (bank guarantee) will be cancelled. It is a
practical issue in trade because sometimes it takes even more than a year for the
export order to complete and payment cleared.
 Banks in Pakistan neither provide for nor accept guarantees from the banks in
Afghanistan.
 There are international sanctions on Iran due to which formal exchanges are
difficult.
 For all the trade to Afghanistan and Iran, payments are made in Dubai. The mode
of payment is as follows: A Pakistani exporter sends goods to Afghanistan. The
Afghan importer pays him through a Dubai-based hawaladar. The hawaladar
transfers money in the exporters’ bank account in Peshawar or Karachi.

Schaeffer’s conclusions regarding hawala are further substantiated by the author
Srinivas.518 He has argued that hawala trade financing begins when a law obstructs natural
trade or artificially raises the value of goods and services. He illustrates this point through
an example of the minimum export price (MEP) set by the Indian government for basmati
rice. According to the author, the Indian government’s price for basmati rice is USD900 per
517
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ton whereas its market value is USD700 per ton. This leaves the exporter in a quandary
because he can neither follow the government’s higher price nor sell his product on the
market price. As a way out, the exporter would either ‘over-invoice’ the basmati
consignment by labelling it ‘non-basmati’ (which does not have MEP) or use hawala for
payment. Hawala is always a better option for the exporter as he needs a reverse trade flow
not bound by the regulation.
During the course of this research, traders and businessmen were interviewed and questions
regarding hawala trade financing were raised with them. Their practical reasons for the
choice for informal financial have been summarized in Table 7.4 above. The responses of
the traders (importers and exporters) have served to endorse the argument that in the
absence of efficient formal enforcement networks due to restrictive government policies
and high costs associated with the use of formal financial institutions, hawala networks
have filled a significant gap by providing the exchange mechanisms requisite for the
ongoing economic activity in the region.
Finally, the author Conrad Schetter has argued with reference to the role of trans-border
hawala trading networks in the Afghan war economy, ‘Perhaps, in a world which, in the
political sense, is only conceivable in terms of states, the disappearance of the state
structures and the state order is considered inconceivable’.519 Many supporting scholars
have also viewed that informal systems result in disorder and chaos. In a free market
economy however, the absence or collapse of the state order may not always create disorder
and chaos rather, as Schetter argues it may ‘result in an economic advantage for that
country by offering opportunities for economic practices which are not internationally
available or authorized’.520 He has illustrated hawala financed trans-border trade as a
classic example of a free market economy that regulated all economic activities in the
absence of any state regulation in Afghanistan war economy:
Private trade constitutes the most important economic activity and the influence of a
public sphere almost completely disappear[s]. Furthermore, the Afghan economy is not
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contained by its national borders, but interwoven with the world market through an
informal transnational network.521

The global integration of hawala with the international financial system, then, needs be
appreciated in the context of the discrepancies in the ‘formal’ financial practices. This
aspect is illustrated in the trade settlements between Iran and India which are facilitated by
the Japanese banks.522 Srinivas has reported that due to international sanctions, Iran could
not trade in the US dollars and conversely the Indian exporter had no use for the Iranian
currency. To resolve this problem, the Iranian buyer would deposit an equivalent amount of
the Iranian ‘rial’ with his local bank. The bank would, in turn, use a country that traded
with both Iran and India for the settlement of these payments. According to Srinivas, Japan
— which imports oil from Iran and also trades with India—facilitated these payments. The
Japanese bank would use some of the money it owes Iran to clear its dues with India.
Another explanation of the integration of hawala in the global financial system as well as
the inconsistency in formal financial practices was acquired during our interviewees with
the Pakistani traders who have related their experience of purchase of foreign exchange ‘on
credit’ from the ‘hawala/foreign exchange market’. Purchase of foreign exchange on credit
leaves the impression that the hawaladars are ready to operate ‘on credit’. The perception
however is misleading. In reality, the hawaladars/foreign exchange dealers are exploiting
the gains of the formal currency market which facilitates its customers to avoid currency
controls. In the international foreign exchange market, leading international banks in offshore financial centres, such as Dubai, Singapore, Hong Kong, and London are ready to
offer ‘non-deliverable forward contracts523’ in the Pakistani rupee. Because the Pakistani
rupee is ‘non-convertible’, companies and investors hedge their rupee-dollar currency risk
through the purchase of these ‘forward contracts’ which are exclusively designed to ‘get
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around’ currency controls. Srinivas thus concludes the discussion on the ‘formal’ banking
currency trade:
In this market, no exchange takes place of the two currencies’ principal sums. The only
cash flow is the movement of the difference between the contract rate and the rupee’s
prevailing spot market rate.524 The amount is settled in dollars on the settlement date.
Not a single rupee leaves the country.525

6.8

Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Treaty (APTTA) 2010

In 2010, the United States has facilitated a revised Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade
Agreement (APTTA).526 This agreement came into force in late 2011. According to the
official text, the revised treaty aims to strengthen the economic ties between Pakistan and
Afghanistan, while recognizing the right of Afghanistan to freedom of access to the sea as
an essential principle for the expansion of its international trade and economic
development. Simultaneously, there is also the recognition of the importance of the NorthSouth corridor for Pakistan in relation with trade with the CARs. The revised treaty
highlights the current economic realities such as, trade with India and the new international
transit requirements. It could arguably be stated that since trade is already operational on
these routes, albeit through informal channels, the provisions of the revised agreement are
not of much significance.
A significant concern that has been dealt with in the revised treaty relates to the various
measures that have been taken to curb the smuggling of the transit trade commodities.
Smuggling of transit goods has been prioritized by both the Afghanistan and the Pakistan
governments, as an important issue which has been affecting the socio-economic
environment of these countries. Consequently, in the revised treaty, various steps have been
introduced to prevent smuggling and pilferage of the transit goods. These measures include:
524
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installation of tracking devices on the transportation units, permitting only sealed containers
of cargo, and financial securities/guarantees for duties and taxes to be submitted before the
release of consignments from the port.527 In order to ensure proper inspection of the transit
cargo, a container scanner system has also been set up at the Pakistan International
Container Terminal.528
In addition with the smuggling control measures, the 2010 revised agreement has
introduced a passage tax (rahdari) to be paid to the Afghan Customs when Pakistani transit
goods to Central Asia enter Afghanistan. Ahmed Vaqar and Samad Ghulam argue that
rahdari and other tax duties included, the Pakistani transit goods to Central Asia would be
taxed 110 per cent of the total value of the goods that would be paid as security to the
Afghan government.529 On the other hand, the Afghan traders are required to provide a
bank guarantee equivalent to the duties and the taxes on imported goods as security to
Pakistani authorities. This means that the Afghan importers will deposit huge amounts of
money in the bank against each container as well as arrange to install tracking devices on
each carrier.530 Besides this, the Afghan traders will not be allowed to carry their goods in
open trucks but goods will only be carried in sealed containers (of international
specifications).
In principle, both the Pakistan and Afghanistan governments have adopted the various
provisions of the revised treaty to ensure that the pilferage of goods and their sale in
domestic markets is curbed. It is evident however that these revised mechanisms involve
high costs for the traders for example, securing bank guarantees is a very expensive
arrangement which involves both obvious and hidden costs. As a result, Afghan traders
have reportedly diverted towards the Iranian routes that have developed as a result of Iran
opening its Chahbahar and Bandar Abbas ports.531
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For Pakistan, this diversion of trade routes has resulted in a decline in the number of
imported commercial containers used in the transit trade. These containers have declined
from 60,338 in 2012 to 28,813 in 2013, showing a 54 per cent decline in transit trade in the
fiscal year 2012–13.532 This significant decline in transit trade has been attributed to factors
such as the revised agreement containing stringent conditions of financial guarantees,
insufficient infrastructure, additional taxation/extortion, the poor law and order situation
and high freight charges.533 It is clear that among the reasons that have been cited for the
substantive decline, the revised agreement and its provisions are the only ‘new’ factors as
the rest of the conditions persisted previously as well. On the contrary, a 2011 report by the
Civil Military Fusion Centre has quoted Pakistan’s FBR that the 54 per cent decline in the
number of containers is essentially a decline in the smuggling due to the successful
implementation of the revised trade treaty.534
It would be ironical if with such success in curbing smuggling through the successful
implementation of the revised trade conditions, the Pakistani authorities have
simultaneously allowed a number of ‘concessions’ requested by the Afghan customs
officials and importers’.535 Steven Zyck reports, ‘Containers being imported into
Afghanistan under the APTTA will not need to be stamped with the words ‘‘In Transit to
Afghanistan’’ and open-air (rather than sealed) containers may be used in transporting fruits
and vegetables from Pakistan to Afghanistan’.536 The author further provides that, ‘the
paperwork and number of licences obtained by the Afghan importers will also be
simplified,’ and that ‘the Pakistani customs officials have allowed Afghan importers to pay
customs guarantees directly to the Pakistani government rather than using insurance
companies, which charge a fee’.537 The traders that were interviewed during this research
have also confirmed (see Table 7.2) that all the payments for trade with Afghanistan and
Iran are done in Dubai from where the money is subsequently transferred into the Pakistani
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account in Peshawar or Karachi. Putting it simply, neither has there been any substantive
change in the transit trade procedures as a result of the revised agreement nor has the
smuggling under the transit trade stopped.
6.9

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to understand the causes of failure of 2002 hawala regulatory
reforms in Pakistan. In order to achieve this aim, the framework of the role of state has been
applied to understand the essential functions a state performs and the respective roles
formal and informal institutions play in categorizing a state as ‘strong’, ‘weak’, ‘failed’ or
‘failing’. It has emerged that both the ‘formal’ as well as the ‘informal’ rules of the game
are essential for the state to deliver its essential functions. In the context of the international
‘reconstruction’ efforts of the ‘weak’ and ‘failed’ states, the chapter has argued that these
efforts suffer from a ‘nirvana fallacy’ which is the mindset that finds a cure to the problems
of these states in the western, liberal, democratic systems while necessarily ignoring the
endogenous practices embedded in the local cultures and traditions of these countries. The
specific example of hawala regulation in game theory terms has explained that in order to
solve the meta-game of regulating hawala, the many embedded micro level ‘nested games’
are ignored and consequently the regulatory efforts have failed. The chapter has provided a
practical application of the ‘nested’ games in the case of Pakistan where rampant corruption
and tax evasion in an essentially ‘segmentary society’538 with deep-rooted elite interests are
factors due to which institutional reforms could not work. Mezzera and Aftab have rightly
documented the state of Pakistan’s affairs:
Behind the façade of the state, its laws and procedures, it is socio-economic structures
and networks, cultural norms and expectations, and the exercise of personal power that
shape governance and inhibits transparency.539

It has been argued that Pakistan’s main problem is the unwillingness of its ruling classes to
take action against the problems of tax evasion and corruption and improve service delivery
for the poor. The international community, particularly the United States and the IMF
which have remained engaged with Pakistan for a long time, could have used their
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influence to pressurize the various governments to introduce essential reforms. The chapter
has argued that the role of these international donors has so far been elusive in using their
clout to push for requisite reforms. As a result, lack of fundamental structural and
governance reforms mainly to prevent corruption and tax evasion that should have preceded
the 2002 hawala reforms introduced by the SBP remains the challenge that impede
regulation of hawala in Pakistan.
It is interesting that despite the failure of the 2002 reforms, this chapter has maintained that
these reforms were essentially ‘ill-timed’. As mentioned earlier, structural and governance
corrective measures were required in order to prepare the ground for the hawala regulation
and in the absence of these fundamental reforms, the Pakistani state did not have the
capacity to enforce the much required hawala regulation introduced in 2002. Logically, this
means that FATF Special Recommendation VI (SR-VI) on Alternative Remittance
Systems540 that Pakistan has attempted to implement since 2002 has not been successful
because of Pakistan’s domestic problems. This means that if Pakistan could take the
necessary steps to control the economic and governance problems, then FATF’s SR-VI can
be implemented successfully. However, is that really the case? Is FATF’s SR-VI a good
rule that has been badly implemented and consequently failed in Pakistan?
Evidence suggests that the FATF hawala regulation has not worked anywhere else as well.
This indicates that there may be something wrong in the manner the regulation is being
implemented and if this be true, it also means that even if Pakistan’s domestic problems
were not there, FATF’s hawala regulatory policy may still be impossible to implement in
Pakistan as it does not address the country’s peculiar domestic situation. Moreover, failure
of the regulation to curb hawala has also raised many questions regarding the counterproductivity of the regulatory objectives. The discussion on Afghanistan Pakistan Transit
Trade illustrates that the existence of hawala and other similar IVTS in today’s globalized
540
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world needs to be understood in the context of the basic economic principles of supply and
demand. Hawala is an informal financial instrument which is working efficiently because
there is an abundant supply of funds in the developed world in the form of migrant
remittances and other ‘undocumented’ funds that can be off-set by an equivalent demand
for these funds in many developing countries’ cash-intensive economies while settlements
between hawaladars can very conveniently be trade-based. In regulating hawala, there
needs to be a realization that hawala trade finance is mainly due to the disparities in
government policies (such as exchange and tariff rates) which has made hawala an efficient
alternative to the often expensive and complicated formal financial sector. Keeping in view
these key policy issues, in the next chapter the counter-productivity of hawala regulation in
Pakistan is discussed, in order to analyse FATF’s approach to hawala regulation and
summarize key policy issues.
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Chapter 7:
7.1

Analysis of FATF’s Hawala Regulation

Introduction:

In previous chapters, it has been explained that the 2002 reforms program that the State
Bank of Pakistan’s initiated through the creation of Exchange Companies was part of
Pakistan’s multiple track strategy to rein in the undocumented sector in the financial
markets in compliance with the international AML/CFT standards.541 The 2002 reforms
envisioned that over a period of two years, hawala would be phased out and will eventually
be replaced by a well-documented, self-regulatory, corporate system.542 This has not
happened. One reason is because the 2002 reforms were introduced without taking requisite
corrective measures that would prepare the ground for hawala regulation in Pakistan.
The Pakistani government has in principle, complied with the FATF SR-VI on Alternative
Remittance Systems; however, in practice hawala still prevails. An evaluation of Pakistan’s
AML/CFT efforts by FATF Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering reads:
Use of hawala still exists and remains to pose a challenge to authorities. The
authorities acknowledge that it is still been used to transfer illicit proceeds abroad. It is
important that the authorities continue to crack down on illegal operations through the
use of hawala system. However, the focus has been on regulated entities (exchange
companies) that were providing parallel services. While this effort should not be
understated, authorities should put more emphasis on going after those who are yet to
operate with a licence. It is essential not to drive the formal sector players to
underground or those operating underground to remain underground.543

The eventuality of hawala continuing ‘underground’ in Pakistan if regulations were
enforced was inevitable because, in the first place, hawala is essentially ‘outlawed’ in
Pakistan. In this way, although it has been prevalent and used extensively, it has never been
‘legal’. The reason it has continued unabated (in the full knowledge of its financial
regulators) despite being illegal has more to do with the peculiar role these informal transfer
541
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systems play in the economy. As explained earlier, hawala is channelling the much needed
development finance in the form of migrant remittances to the poor and unbanked
populations in far-flung areas of Pakistan where basic utilities and public goods, let alone
banking institutions, are not available. Along with this, hawala has a peculiar role in
Pakistan’s economy, particularly the banking sector, which uses hawala to cover for the
‘moral hazard’ of the borrowers. Due to this reason — the unique role of hawala — it could
be argued that the SBP duplicitously agreed to comply with the FATF international hawala
regulation and best practices to attempt to ‘control’ hawala while being aware that practical
enforcement of the regulation would remain impossible. The reason is simple. FATF’s
international hawala regulation approach does not address Pakistan’s domestic
circumstances (or that of many developing economies) because it necessarily assumes a
capacity to implement such requirements which is missing in weak and failing states,
ignores legitimate demands for efficient value transfer systems and ignores the levels of
corruption inherent in Pakistan. As a result, not only have the 2002 reforms failed but they
have also resulted in ‘collateral damage.’544 This chapter will discuss the counter
productivity of 2002 SBP reforms with the aim to sum up the policy issues in the
approaches with which FATF has attempted to regulate the hawala-type IVTS.
7.2

The Counter-Productivity of Hawala Regulation

Hawala has a ‘unique’ role in the Pakistan economy although it has never been legally
recognized under the law of the land. It has prevailed in a predominantly unregulated
environment for many years and has remained a major channel of capital inflows that has
supplied liquidity in times of national crisis, such as during the international sanctions that
followed the 1998 nuclear tests.545 At the same time, hawala is channelling the much
required finance in those areas of Pakistan where government outreach is minimal and
formal financial institutions are not available. Most importantly hawala (an informal
system) has an interesting interface with the Pakistani banks (formal systems) as it allows
these banks to control the ‘moral hazard’ of the borrowers.

544
545

Passas, ‘Formalizing the Informal?’, above n 94, 414.
Ballard, ‘A Background Report’, above n 62, 23.

172

Imagine a country with a non-functional regulatory system where if a borrower defaults on
a bank loan, then the bank has practically no way of recovering its money or seizing control
of any collateral that was pledged for the loan. As explained in detail in the previous
chapter, Pakistan has a long history of ‘loan defaulters’ and so it is challenging for the
banks to prevent loan defaults despite guarantees and collateral. Under these circumstances,
the only collateral a banker in Pakistan can rely on is the ‘cash collateral’.546 The
‘undeclared’ wealth of a potential borrower that is first transferred abroad through hawala
is subsequently transferred in the bank’s account and can be used as cash collateral. In this
manner, the ‘undeclared’ funds of the borrower are now ‘legalized’ as they are treated as
foreign remittances that have come into the country through the (formal) banking channels.
Conversely, the banker has enough cash collateral to secure the bank in case of a default. In
this manner, the banks in Pakistan control for ‘moral hazard’ of borrowers.547
It was because of this peculiar role that hawala plays in Pakistan that many experts were
sceptical of the government’s optimism in 2002 that creating a few exchange companies
would eradicate the ‘kerbed’ market in foreign exchange as well as the practice of
transferring money through hundi/hawala. One expert, Aftab, argued:
If the government, however, succeeds in the open market in forex, then how will it
affect capital inflows, outflows and flight of capital, smuggling and gold brought in
from Dubai that is financed with undocumented private dollars?548

Moreover, law enforcement problems faced by the Pakistani government led further
credence to the impracticability of the reforms which were based on the assumption that the
creation of a few MECs would replace thousands of formal and informal money changers
and create a forex market subject to the same monitoring and documentation procedures as
applicable to the banks. The various factors prevailing in the political economy that feed the
informal transfers raised serious concerns in the event that SBP reforms would not achieve
their stated objectives. Hence, Aftab concluded:
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Will the people engaged in smuggling seek documentation and, also pay all local taxes
on them by operating through MECs? The fact that a number of such customers will
not like to be documented and taxed points to the emergence of yet another parallel
market in the event the government fails to realize its objectives.549

These cautions were prophetic. The fieldwork findings have confirmed that in the years
following the reforms, concerns regarding a parallel underground market were indeed
warranted and the market a reality. The fieldwork conducted during this research has
confirmed that despite SBP reforms, the ‘kerbed’ market and the hawala still prevail.
Moreover, as identified earlier, there are serious regulatory issues in the so-called
‘reformed’ market structure as well as its operations. These issues are further complicated
by the governance and institutional problems Pakistan is facing and present staggering
regulatory challenges to the AML/CFT objectives that the FATF aims to achieve through
implementation of its international standards. The following sections delve into the counterproductivity of the FATF hawala regulation that Pakistan has attempted to comply with by
introducing the 2002 reforms.
Mainly, the 2002 SBP reforms have proven counter-productive on three accounts as
follows:
i)

Cost of Regulation

It has been widely stated that the efficiency of hawala lies in its informality. Hawala
networks are based on the principles of trust and honour and use informal mechanisms of
dispute resolution. The hawala market is generally self-regulated through widely adopted
normative guidance on operators’ (hawaladars) obligations to each other and to their
customers.550 Loss of honour and reputation in the event of mismanagement or cheating
provides deterrence and ensures transparency during the transactions. In this manner, the
informality of the hawala system makes it economically efficient as its operations require
minimal overheads with almost 99 per cent rate of customer protection. Unlike the formal
banking institutions, hawala does not require consumer protection mechanisms such as
bond or capitalization requirements to run a business. Hence, the regulatory strategy of
549
550

Ibid.
Passas, ‘Fighting Terror with Error’, above n 126, 317.

174

licensing or/and registration of hawala businesses (in SR-VI) that entails bond or
capitalization requirements on the hawaladars and subsequent taxes on the entities thus
formed is not economically efficient for the hawaladars as it automatically increases their
overheads. The manner in which the regulation is approached in SR-VI means additional
costs for the hawala operators because it would increase their business expenses whereas in
an unregulated environment, the system works on minimal or no overheads basis. The
SBP’s 2002 moves to implement FATF SR-VI by attempting to formalize the informal
hawala networks through the creation of exchange companies by fixing minimum capital
requirement to set up an MEC failed to incentivize the hawaladars, primarily because it
incurred additional costs for them. Many small scale currency changers and hawala
operators who did not have the requisite liquidity of PKR100 million to start an exchange
company were left out of the market and subsequently, the SBP had to make provision for a
second category of exchange companies with lower capital requirement of PKR25 million.
Despite these relaxations, tens of thousands of hawaladars are still operating in Pakistan
without being licensed or registered. The regulation which was introduced to ‘formalize’
the informal sector has now become even more problematic because the so-called
‘regulated’ and ‘formal’ exchange companies are found to be involved in parallel hawala
transactions.
ii)

Enforcement Issues

Enforcement of regulatory standards and controls has always remained problematic and
often impossible for Pakistani authorities due to the structural problems and a lack of
institutional capacity. According to North et al,551 this is a common situation in LAOs
where despite the availability of the law, rule of law is absent. This inconsistency between
the law and the rule of law can be illustrated in the formal, legal independence of the State
Bank of Pakistan which does not correspond with its actual independence. In Pakistan’s
‘limited access society’, the Central Bank (and its independence) is virtually incapacitated
by the ruling elite class that prevails in the system. Consequently, the SBP is knowingly
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oblivious of the ‘undocumented funds’ which are periodically transferred out of the country
through hawala (for instance, through the ‘export’ of gold jewellery).552
Sufficient information is readily available regarding the smuggling of gold between
Pakistan and India with payments settled in Dubai — the world’s largest gold market.553
This information is irrelevant if different governments are themselves favouring benefits
and exemptions to taxes and tariffs.554 Normally the import of gold is allowed provided that
the importers declare the amounts at the customs and pay the required duty. In Pakistan
however, continuous relaxations in this rule are regularly allowed through the ‘SRO’
culture in which the governments allow duty free import of gold. For example, in the
financial year 2012–2013, importers were allowed duty-free import of an amount of gold
which was proportionate to the value of jewellery they had exported in the preceding eight
months.555 As a result, gold imports surged over 100 per cent.556 Reports suggest that gold
importers showed fake value (on paper only) for the exported jewellery and imported gold
against it. Due to regulatory loopholes, this imported gold was later sold locally and also
smuggled (to India) where tariffs on gold import are higher.557 The gold importers are also a
common front for illicit fund transfers in the garb of gold exports. The common procedure
for the transfer of funds through the gold importers is that gold is purchased on behalf of
the remitter and is exported in the form of jewellery to Dubai where the jewellery is
converted back into gold bars and sold in the local market to reclaim the funds.558 In this
manner, the enforcement of regulatory controls has remained increasingly problematic for
the Pakistani authorities because of the geographical and cultural proximity with the UAE.
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iii)

Collateral Damage

The immediate crack down on the hawala networks in the finance warfare that emerged as
a major instrument of the Bush administration’s anti-terrorism strategy has caused
substantive collateral damage to the success of hawala regulation at the international level.
Contrary to initial reports and allegations, subsequent investigations have found almost
negligible involvement of the hawala or other informal systems in moving terrorist funds.
Nikos Passas has reported that there have been no terrorist finance cases involving AlQaeda and hawala or similar informal networks in the North America. In Europe, there has
been one such case where funds were sent from Sweden to Northern Iraq supporting the
insurgency.559 As a matter of fact, investigations soon revealed that the 9/11 hijackers used
the formal banking systems and operated through credit cards, bank accounts and wire
transfers. Despite the evidence of the non-involvement of hawala in any major terrorist
attack, the western mainly but by no means solely the United States regulatory and law
enforcement authorities have continued a heavy-handed approach towards ethnic remittance
service providers along with their ‘naming and shaming’ in the public and media. In many
instances, IVTS have been stereotyped as the ‘lifeblood of the terrorist operations’ and,
implicitly the hawaladars as the financiers of terrorism.
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remittance provider Al-Barakat has been cited by many authors in support of the heavyhanded approach that western law makers have adopted for IVTS. In 2001, Al-Barakat was
cracked down upon by the US authorities with accusations of financing Osama Bin Laden’s
networks; however, after more than four years of exhaustive investigations there was no
formal indictment on the charges of terrorism financing against this remittance service
provider.561
It is noteworthy that the problems faced by the Somali as well as the other ethnic
communities in the face of post 9/11 regulatory approach to hawala and other IVTS have
evoked feelings of being marginalized and victimized among the migrant ethnic
communities. The political fall-out of the AML/CFT efforts has been the ‘anti-west’ and
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more particularly ‘anti-US’ sentiments.562 Moreover, these sentiments are also reflected
when it comes to the international ‘reconstruction’ efforts in war torn and conflict-ridden
countries. For instance, in Afghanistan and Somalia the international reconstruction efforts
(to introduce western, liberal institutional frameworks) are often viewed by their local
citizens as an attack on the cultural values and indigenous traditions and practices of these
societies, such as hawala. Consequently just like the hawala regulation, reconstruction of
the failed and weak states efforts have also been by and large counter-productive.563
The application of the ‘collateral damage’ in Pakistan can be understood by Parvez
Musharraf’s decision to participate in the United States ‘War on Terror’ which did not have
the popular political and public support, particularly in Pakistan’s tribal areas. As a result,
this decision has faced domestic backlash and resistance. 564 Given that the 2002 SBP
reforms were also part of the steps that the government/SBP took in collaboration with the
international AML/CFT efforts, it could be argued that the hawala market, particularly in
the tribal areas where hawala is traditionally practiced, did not show interest in compliance.
Popular opinion among the tribal citizens was that the SBP 2002 regulation (to curb
hawala) as part of Musharraf government’s policies were implemented in order to ‘please
the US masters,’ rather than a serious effort towards regulating the criminal use of the
informal systems. In other words, the SBP could not muster sufficient support from the
hawaladar community for compliance that would have made the reforms successful. The
hawaladars have preferred to continue operating ‘illegally’ rather than become part of the
‘legal’ and ‘documented’ market primarily because the purported reforms did not offer
sufficient incentives to them to get ‘licensed and registered’ with the SBP.
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7.3

Is FATF Recommendation a Good Rule Badly Implemented?

Hypothetically, one would like to argue that implementation of FATF SR-VI has been
problematic in Pakistan because of the state’s weak institutional and law enforcement
capacity as well as other governance issues. This implies that if Pakistan’s specific
problems did not exist, FATF’s SR-VI is a good rule that could be implemented if
circumstances were other than they are — that is, it is a good rule which could not be
implemented in a bad environment. However, that the regulation has not worked
successfully anywhere else and hawala still prevails as the most popular choice has raised
several questions about the regulation itself. More so, the situation of non-compliance in the
formally regulated banking sector for which FATF AML/CFT reporting standards were
actually designed since mid 1980s further endorses a view that FATF regulations and
controls have remained far from realistic and practicable. Evidence from many international
banks shows that since the imposition of the FATF’s AML statutory regulations, banks
have not been able to observe compliance and consequently several multi-million dollar
fines have been imposed on leading global banks that have allegedly exposed the
international financial system to money laundering, drug trafficking and terrorist financing
risks due to their poor AML controls.565 Among these leading banks, HSBC’s Mexican unit
has been fined USD27.5 million,566 the UK division of South Africa’s Standard Bank
GBP7.6 million567 and the Doha Bank’s branch in the United States USD5 million.568 These
are but a few examples of non-compliance with the costly regulations and standards. The
question remains: If FATF’s regulations and controls are not implementable in the formal
banking sector for which these were originally designed, can these standards be
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implemented on the informal IVTS? We take the example of implementation of SR-VI in
Pakistan’s case.
Earlier, it has been explained that IVTS has a ‘dual’ function in Pakistan — hawala is used
to channel the much needed migrant remittances as well as simultaneously facilitating the
transfer of funds generated in the shadow economy as a result of economic crimes, such as
corruption and tax and tariff evasion. Consequently, Pakistani regulators have faced a
‘moral dilemma’ in regulating hawala. The economic interests of a cash strapped country
that requires more foreign exchange are clearly in conflict with the international AML/CFT
objectives of regulating the informal hawala-type IVTS in order to mitigate risks associated
with money laundering, drug and terrorism financing. As a result, the application of
international standards and best practices has created more hurdles for implementation in a
country where regulation is most required but cannot be implemented. This begs analysis of
issues in FATF hawala standards and best practices, in order to appreciate the shortcomings
of these rules in regulating the hawala-type IVTS.
7.4

Issues in FATF Recommendations and Standards

i)

Wholesale Transfer Procedures

In both letter and spirit, the FATF’s approach to regulating the IVTS is similar to the
manner in which it approaches the regulation of the formal banking institutions. In this way,
FATF’s 40+9 recommendations and best practices attempt to superimpose the agreed
international regulatory standards and reporting requirements applicable to the formal
financial sector upon the informal hawala-type systems.569 Thus, whilst the hawala model
(explained in Chapter 2) includes a sender, a recipient and two hawala operators at the
respective ends, in the post 9/11 framework it now includes the additional legal/regulatory
requirements that have been enforced in the form of registration and/or licensing, customer
identification requirements, record keeping and reporting of suspicious transactions to the
regulatory authorities. Critics have argued that this kind of ‘wholesale transfer’ 570 of the
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formal regulatory procedures that were originally designed for the formal financial sector
by the international regulatory authorities has not been helpful in optimizing the regulatory
objectives for the informal fund transfer systems.
FATF insists that jurisdictions comply with SR-VI which requires either the licensing or
registration, or both, of the remittance and the currency exchange services. The FATF has
further recommended that to maintain consistency with the obligations imposed on other
financial institutions, jurisdictions should introduce transaction reporting in line with their
current reporting requirements for financial institutions. Specifically, the FATF has
recommended that:
Jurisdictions may consider issuing specific guidance as to what may constitute a
suspicious transaction to the MVT service industry. Some currently used indicators of
suspicious financial activity, such as those found in the FATF’s Guidance for Financial
Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing, are likely to be relevant for money/value
transfer service activity. However, particular activities and indicators that are unique to
this sector should be further developed. The second half of FATF Special
Recommendation VII on Wire Transfers should also be taken into account when
developing guidance in this area. For example, operators that receive funds/value
should ensure that the necessary originator information is included. The lack of
complete originator information may be considered as a factor in assessing whether a
transaction is suspicious and, as appropriate, whether it is thus required to be reported
to the Financial Intelligence Unit or other competent authorities. If this information is
not included, the operator should report suspicious activity to the local FIU or other
competent authority if appropriate.571

ii)

Tracking Suspicious ‘Hawala’ Transactions

In ascertaining the practicality of the AML/CFT regulatory objectives for hawala-type
informal systems, there is always a risk in relation to the movement of funds generated in
the global informal sector. In many instances, it has been noted that the misuse of the
hawala system is not confined to money laundering or financing of terrorism; rather the
bulk of the funds that are transferred through the hawala channels are those which are
571
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generated through fiscal offences (such as, by-passing currency controls, tax evasion or
irregular trade). Identifying and separating money laundering and terrorism financing
offences from the various fiscal offences and then tracking suspicious transactions in
accordance with FATF’s guidelines is an impossible proposition.
Moreover regulating hawala with reference to a specific list of clients, according to the
‘originator information,’572 is again not a regulatory option. Hawaladars do not operate in
terms of ‘origination of funds’ for the funds that they facilitate to transfer. For this reason,
tracking a hawala transaction and identifying the relevant parties is a difficult proposition
as the hawaladars only retain records of the information which they and their immediate
partners require to have access to in order to process the transactions in which they
themselves are involved.573 It is noteworthy that in the multi-layered chain through which
an IVTS transaction moves, the records held by any one hawaladar are not likely to provide
a complete picture of the entire transaction trail. From the hawaladar’s point of view, he
needs to know only his own part in the total chain in order to successfully carry out a
transaction. This is contrary to the AML/CFT regulatory framework as it works through a
‘follow the money’ approach where the origin of transaction is a critical detail but the same
cannot be applied precisely in a hawala transaction.
iii)

What’s In a Name!574

A major problem in the FATF hawala regulatory framework is that of legal terminology.
To date, there is neither a single definition nor a common term by which the hawala-type
informal systems can be referred to. A variety of terms and definitions575 are used to refer
to the informal transfer systems in academic literature as well as at the international policymaking forums. Use of various terms for IVTS may not be a concern from an academic,
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political or economic point of view; however, fruitful legal discourse becomes problematic
if the practice aimed to be regulated is lacking in a uniform definition at different policymaking forums. The Abu Dhabi Declaration, which was the first official forum to discuss
the informal financial practices, used the term ‘hawala and other informal remittance
systems’ and referred specifically to ‘informal money or value transfer systems or networks
outside the formal financial sector’.576 This was not an all-encompassing definition and
could not be used for meaningful legal discussions. The Asia Pacific Group on Money
Laundering (APGML) uses the general terms ‘underground banking’ and ‘alternative
remittance services’ and defines the services as, ‘informal mechanisms based on the
networks of trust used to remit monies’.577 This definition is not an improvement on the
Abu Dhabi Declaration and limits the informal transfer systems to money remitting
networks. In June 2003, the FATF issued a Best Practices Paper on combating the abuse of
the alternative remittance systems. Here, it has adopted a broad definition for the informal
transfer systems by adopting the term ‘Money or Value Transfer Service’ (MVT service)
which refers to:
[a] financial service that accepts cash, checks, other monetary instruments or
other stores of value in one location and pays a corresponding sum in cash or
other form to a beneficiary in another location by means of a communication,
message, transfer or through a clearing network to which the MVT service
belongs. Transactions performed by such services can involve one or more
intermediaries and a third party final payment.578
FATF used an inclusive and comprehensive definition and considered as many possibilities
as there can be for the use of the informal systems. The Best Practices Paper also noted that
an MVT service may be provided by persons (natural or legal) formally through the
regulated financial system or informally through entities that operate outside the regulated
system; that in some jurisdictions, informal systems are frequently referred to as alternative
remittance services or underground (or parallel) banking systems; and that often these
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systems have ties to particular geographic regions and are therefore described using a
variety of specific terms which include hawala, hundi, fei-chien, and the black market peso
exchange.
In 2010, the FATF has arguably taken a shift from its earlier position on the MVT services
and used the term ‘informal money remittance services,’ defined as ‘underground banking
channels in which the transactions are settled by offsetting an equivalent sum at the
receiving location’.579 In FATF’s 2010 definition, hawala-type systems have been
categorized as an ‘underground’ activity having similar accounting methods to banking.
FATF’s stance on the informal transfer systems appears rather condescending. It shows a
clear shift from the earlier position which was more inclusive and defined the informal
transfer systems within a broad term ‘Money or Value Transfer Service’. Could it arguably
be said that the change in FATF’s position is due to its failure in regulating hawala? The
discussion gets further confusing when it states:
Detecting these underground systems is by definition very difficult. In countries with
alternative money remittance systems, it is often difficult to prove illegal activities in
these systems as they are often trust-based, secretive and unregistered, with indirect
fund movements.580

FATF’s defeatism becomes clear as the discussion concludes: ‘[I]t is difficult to assess the
degree of compliance even when informal value transfer service providers are legal’.581
iv)

Registration and Licensing Approaches to Regulate Hawala

Within the FATF Special Recommendation VI, there are two approaches to the regulation
of hawala: a minimalist ‘registration’ of the IVTS operators or a more optimal method of
‘licensing’ that ensures that people with dubious backgrounds are not given legal status to
operate. ‘Licensing’ and ‘registration’ of IVTS businesses are considered the first step in
bringing IVTS operations under the supervisory and regulatory framework of the state. The
Interpretative Note to SR VI defines these terms as follows:
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Licensing means a requirement to obtain permission from a designated competent
authority in order to operate a money/value transfer service legally. Registration (...)
means a requirement to register with or declare to a designated competent authority the
existence of a money/value transfer service in order for the business to operate
legally.582

While both the licensing and registration would at the very least allow the competent
regulatory body to be aware of an IVTS operation in its jurisdiction, ‘the difference
between the two is that licensing implies that the regulatory body has sanctioned the
particular operation before it commences business, whereas registration implies that the
operator has informed the regulatory body of its existence’.583 The registration or licensing
approaches are nevertheless problematic in jurisdictions where hawala is essentially
outlawed. Pakistan is such an example, where licensing or registration of IVTS/hawala is
impossible, because that would be calling for the regulation of an unlawful act. As a result,
Pakistan has neither licensed nor registered hawala per se, but has created new, formal
entities (exchange companies) in 2002 that could be both licensed and registered and
regulated accordingly to carry out foreign exchange and remittance businesses. This point
regarding licensing and registration is explained further.
In certain jurisdictions, a transaction is considered ‘legal’ if it is carried out by a registered
entity and an audit trail is available. The registration approach is hence, suitable for those
countries which have well-structured financial systems and are advanced in their
capital/current account convertibility. In these countries MSBs can be registered without
imposing any further regulatory measures that could be detrimental to everyday financial
business; and so, the registration approach allows the regulatory and law enforcement
agencies a straightforward way of contacting IVTS operators for both specific
investigations as well as research purposes. On the other hand, in countries where hawala is
illegal, implementation of FATF’s licensing and registration approaches becomes
impossible. For instance, movement of foreign exchange into and from the country has
always remained a regulatory concern for the Pakistani authorities and therefore Pakistan
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has a history of strict currency controls. In an environment where hawala is an illegal act in
Pakistan, the SBP cannot be restricted to only registration and audit trails when it is setting
the regimes for money transmitters. For the SBP, adopting regulatory measures such as
registration, licensing and audit trails are not sufficient to declare any transaction legal and
regular in Pakistan. As a result, in order to satisfy the objectives of the international
AML/CFT compliance as well as keeping up with its domestic policy concerns regarding
movement of the capital, the SBP has a comprehensive regulatory framework for financial
institutions in order to consider any transaction as legally authorized. This comprises:584
whether the financial institution a) follows the prescribed procedures, b) adheres to liquidity
reserve requirements c) possesses authorization for business activities, d) has procedures for
any arrangement with other entities including the settlement mechanisms, e) has adopted
and follows KYC/CDD mechanisms, f) conducts an annual statutory audit, g) reporting
requirements, h) meets the inspection and supervisory requirements of the central bank, i)
possesses internal controls, and j) undertakes periodic renewal of its licence.
It is clear from these procedures that in Pakistan, following the financial regulatory regime
is complicated and cumbersome even for the formal financial industry. In the case of the
outlawed hawala, SR-VI is simply not implementable. This is not a small problem because
Pakistan is a ‘hotbed’ of hawala. The government has attempted to implement SR-VI by
creating formal entities (exchange companies) that would embrace the various small scale
operators and bring them within the regulatory net; but this has not happened and hawala is
still prevalent. The only available option financial authorities are left with in countries (like
Pakistan) where there are legal impediments in the implementation of SR-VI is strict law
enforcement as is done by labour importing countries, such as Japan and Saudi Arabia.
However, as explained earlier, law enforcement in Pakistan is ineffective and is hampered
by various factors including antiquated laws and weak institutions. As a result, hawala
remains largely unregulated in Pakistan despite the international standards that call for its
regulation as well as various attempts of Pakistani authorities to curb the informal transfers.
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v) Consolidation and Settlement
Another major issue in hawala regulation is that the consolidation and settlements of
transactions are similar to those for international payments that go through the banking
systems. Just as it happens in hawala, banks also do not move physical cash between
branches or correspondent banks when effecting transfers. Wilson has explained the
consolidation of debt in hawala transfers thus:
[I]ntermediaries consolidate small positions into larger subtotals in fewer hands. Such
entities ... are larger scale operators than the small scale hawaladar .... Where are such
entities concentrated? It cannot be ascertained for certain, but for various reasons
Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, has often been singled out as a location where
many hawala transactions are consolidated and cleared.585

Passas states that ‘there is no doubt that there are several layers of hawaladars who may
play a part in the global networks’.586 Roger Ballard has explained the consolidation
mechanism in hawala between various layers of hawaladars in South Asian settlements in
the United Kingdom — a complex network of agents and sub-agents whom he categorizes
as ‘retail’, ‘wholesale’ and ‘global’ hawaladars. According to this explanation, on the
lowest rung, local/retail hawaladars collect deposits in hard currencies from migrant
workers, note the details of the recipient to whom an agreed upon sum of rupees is to be
delivered (perhaps in India or Pakistan) and then transmit (by fax or email) a tranche of
details of payments to those hawaladars who are running considerably bigger operations in
other South Asian settlements in the Britain. This bigger business — the ‘wholesale’
hawaladar — is ‘then able to take advantage of very substantial economies of scale by
bundling whole tranches of instructions together in a single fax, a series of which are then
sent off to specific partners in India or Pakistan’.587 The business credentials of the
‘wholesale’ hawaladars are accepted by local bank branches to enable them to set up
foreign exchange accounts which could handle such a daily volume of business at relatively
low rate of commission.
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Roger Ballard’s explanation can be imitated to understand how few big foreign exchange
companies (wholesale hawaladars) consolidate payments in Pakistan. These companies
have their agents, sub-agents and sub-sub agents across the country. The agents (retail
hawaladars) purchase hard currency in foreign exchange from the tourists, visiting
migrants or their families, and even from private citizens. The big companies arrange for
the physical transfer of the non-dollar currency to Dubai for which they have legal
permission from the SBP. In Dubai, many of these companies have counterpart
organizations and they also have access to the global fund transfer facilities. Funds are
consolidated in voluminous records of transactions, albeit the record of account numbers
and beneficiary of each transaction is available in the bank statements of the wholesale
hawaladars, in compliance with the due diligence procedures and other regulatory controls.
It could be argued that the area where the FATF recommendations and international
standards are most deficient in addressing the informal transfer systems is the settlement
side of hawala transfers. For instance, FATF recommendations are silent on the ‘global’
hawaladars who are stationed in major financial centres (for example, Dubai) and ‘have no
contact whatsoever with the relatively tiny sums remitted by the labour migrants’.588
Instead, as Roger Ballard has explained, ‘such hawaladars characteristically broker deals
on behalf of lower-level hawaladars, both wholesale and retail, and also on behalf of large
commercial clients’.589 A pertinent question that has been asked by many is whether these
‘facilitators’ are legally covered under the FATF standards, as these are neither hawala
operators nor remittance service providers. A SBP Task Force Report590 proposed that if
hawala has to be regulated then there should be an internationally defined mechanism of
settlement akin to hawala-type settlement method which is acceptable to all jurisdictions.
In view of the above analysis it can be seen that FATF’s policies want hawala to operate in
a bank-like manner; and given hawala’s own characteristics and in-built mechanisms, this
has remained impossible. Hence, in terms of the policy, FATF’s regulation has been
unsuccessful (and counter-productive) because to begin with the regulation is aimed at
588

Ibid 26.
Ibid 27.
590
‘Understanding Hawala’, Task Force Report on Home Remittances, June 2006 (unpublished) (Circulated
among Participants at the Workshop on Banking Practices Organized by the State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi,
15 June 2006).
589

188

transforming hawala rather than preventing or reducing the impact of criminal uses of the
IVTS. In the context of Pakistan, it shows that even if the country were not facing the
structural and governance problems that it does, the 2002 reforms were doomed to fail
because the objectives of the reforms was not to stop or reduce illicit transfers through
hawala but to implement the hawala regulatory framework that calls for hawala to be
regulated in the same manner and with similar set of procedures as formal banks do and as
explained, this was not workable.
There should be no confusion as to whether hawala needs to be regulated in Pakistan, and
elsewhere, as much as the formal financial institutions are required to be regulated. Both the
banking institutions as well as the IVTS are vulnerable to abuse as both can be used to
transfer illicit funds. Regulation is essential to mitigate the risks of abuse in both hawala as
well as in the banks. Nevertheless, IVTS and banks cannot be regulated in the same manner
and with the same set of rules, primarily because the formal banking regulations are not
workable for hawala. We have demonstrated that hawala is filling an essential void that is
created due to the non-availability of effective formal financial institutions in many parts of
Pakistan and that it is effectively substituting for the formal institutions (for perfectly
benign purposes) in the transfer of remittances the Pakistani migrant labour force earns in
foreign countries. For this purpose, hawala is an efficient tool of value transfer for the poor
and the unbanked populations who do not have access to the formal financial facilities.
Hawala serves them as an instrument of essential public service in the Pakistani state.
Simultaneously, it is a conduit for tax-evaders, corrupt officials and smugglers who wish to
siphon away their illicit funds. Pakistan therefore needs a hawala regulatory policy that can
prevent ‘the wrong use’ of these informal networks or reduce their impact for criminal uses.
The question remains how can Pakistan achieve this objective?
7.5

Shift in Regulatory Paradigm

In more recent years, an apparent paradigm shift regarding regulation of hawala-type
transactions could be seen in many policy debates. Many experts and scholars have argued
the case for open-ended and flexible solutions to regulate informal transfer systems
depending on individual countries’ economic and cultural circumstances for instance, the
anthropological approach that takes into account the social relations between individual
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families and the broader social communities.591 Interestingly, this paradigm shift is so far
not reflected in the official policy line of the international financial institutions such as the
FATF, although it has remained at the forefront of understanding the multifarious
challenges in regulating hawala-type transfer systems. The international policy making
forums have continued to pursue their ‘formal-centric’ approach that aims to transpose
hawala into formal banking systems. As a result, dogmatic solutions have been
implemented to regulate hawala which are based on sponsoring formal financial institutions
to compete with hawala by introducing processes and products that would eventually
disincentivize hawala, such as better outreach, cheaper remittance transfers, speedier
transactions and other financial products. One such project (discussed in Chapter 5) has
been launched in Pakistan as well.
By now it is very clear that the formal banking sector cannot overcome the informal hawala
systems and so concentrating on regulatory ideas that advocate unrelenting support for
western banking institutions (to increase their outreach and eventually cause the hawala
systems to disappear) may not be an optimal strategy. Indeed, such purported patronage of
the western banking systems vis-à-vis hawala has been detrimental to the regulation of
IVTS because, firstly, such an approach places the western formal banking systems as the
sole legitimate universal standard,592 essentially ignoring the indigenous systems and
practices that prevail in the absence of conventional western banking systems in many
countries.593 On the other hand, this kind of approach is fundamentally ethnocentric — it is
the post Second World War philosophy of diffusion of western capital, technology and
institutional innovations, which is reflected in the contemporary prioritization of the
western forms of governance and modernity.594 The mindset that explores the panacea of
state weaknesses and failures in the context of western liberal values and standards
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arguably places the endogenous cultural and informal practices of these countries at an
inferior level.595
In the manner that the FATF has approached hawala regulation so far, it appears that in the
eyes of this international regulator, the western banks are the sole standard by which
hawala-type practices could be regulated. In reality, an appraisal of FATF’s international
standards and best practices that have been introduced during the past decade to ensure
transparency in financial transactions shows that there is still a need on part of the
international community to understand the informal transfer systems in order to appreciate
that these cannot be regulated with a similar set of rules and standards to those that are
required for the formal banking institutions. Also, in reality the international regulatory
standards and best practices have achieved much less than was desired even in the formal
financial systems. As mentioned earlier, there have been many instances of the western
banks ‘exposing the financial system to risks due to their non-compliance with the due
diligence standards and lack of transparency’. Indeed, following the global financial crisis
that hit the world in 2007, another analogous debate albeit in a different setting, regarding
the health as well as the legitimacy of the conventional western financial system has sprung
up.596
7.5.1

Can Hawala Become an Alternative Financial Instrument?

In the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Islamic banks (as opposed to the western banks)
seemed to have fared differently and relatively better.597 It has been reported that the
Islamic banks have exhibited stronger resilience to the GFC and they now constitute one of
the fastest growing segments of the global financial industry. The Global Islamic Finance
Report (GIFR) provides that in 2008 the size of the global Islamic banking industry was
estimated about USD820 billion. It is now closer to USD1.35 trillion, and expected to
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exceed USD1.6 trillion within this year.598 The Islamic financial industry comprises 430
banks and financial institutions. In addition, around 191 conventional banks have Islamic
banking windows operating in more than 75 countries.599 Pakistan has also adopted Islamic
banking as a parallel banking system in 2002 and, presently it constitutes about 8 per cent
of its local banking industry.600
Presently, there are two parallel banking systems simultaneously operating in the global
financial order despite fundamental differences between them:
i) As opposed to the western banking system where the central concept is profit, Islamic
banking and finance works on the concept of justice, which is achieved mainly through the
sharing of risk.601 In the Islamic banking model, stakeholders/partners are supposed to share
profits and losses and charging interest is prohibited under the precepts of the Islamic
Shariah law.602
ii) Financial intermediation in western banking is largely debt based and allows for risk
transfer. Islamic intermediation, by contrast, is asset based and allocates risk sharing
between the partners.603 Being asset based Islamic banking features a close link with the
real economy.604
In this way, the proximity between financial practices and the real economy in the Islamic
banking model that does not allow investing in or financing speculative instruments such as
toxic assets, derivatives, and other conventional financial institution securities,605
essentially reduces any contribution to excesses and ‘bubbles’606 that may lead to a
meltdown and trigger a financial crisis. Thus, the Islamic banking institutions also enjoy a
‘head start’ in mitigating the risks of money laundering and terrorism financing because
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unlike their western competitors that rely on documentary evidence and usually have
impersonal relationships with the majority of their clients, the Islamic banks have more
stringent ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC) requirements. Ishrat Hussain607 has explained the
reasons for this. The western banks rely on fixed pre-determined return frameworks and due
to this reason are less concerned about the character and credibility of their customers as
they are more interested in the underlying securities and assets. On the contrary, since the
Islamic banking model is based on a quasi profit-loss sharing partnership with the customer,
it is important for the Islamic banks to know their clients, the nature of their businesses,
their sources of income as well as uses of bank financing, in order to determine the
authenticity and legitimacy of their client-partners. Due to this in-built risk mitigating
strategy that comes with the bank’s relationship with its clients, the Islamic banks are better
equipped to detect, prevent and disengage from suspicious customers and transactions as
compared with the western banking institutions.
It could be argued that this model is applicable to the IVTS as well. Hawala is essentially
an instrument of trade financing, exchange of goods and services and remittance transfers
that ensures a link with the real economy. Similar to Islamic banking, hawala also offers an
alternative to the conventional western finance and has its own ingrained KYC/CDD
features. Arguably then, if despite fundamental differences both the Islamic and western
banks can co-exist in the new financial order, then the possibilities of exploring hawala and
the other IVTS as an alternative or parallel financial instrument can be far and many,
particularly for countries like Pakistan where these networks are prevalent.
7.6

Conclusion:

The aim of this chapter was to understand the counter productivity of the 2002 hawala
regulation in Pakistan with the view to analysing policy issues in FATF’s hawala
regulatory regime. It has been argued that in its letter and spirit, the FATF wants to regulate
hawala by ‘transforming’ these informal practices into formal bank-like structures and then
monitor them with similar set of regulations to those that are used to monitor the banks.
Such an approach has proven counter-productive to the objectives of the regulation as,
607
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firstly it has increased the cost of the regulation which became a disincentive for the
hawaladars. Secondly, the enforcement of the regulation has remained problematic in many
countries and finally, the regulatory approach has essentially resulted in political backlash
and incurred collateral damage.
This chapter has argued that there are various issues in following the FATF licensing and
registration regulation in Pakistan where hawala is illegal. It follows that whilst hawala
regulation is essentially required in Pakistan, it cannot be implemented in its present form
because it does not address Pakistan’s domestic circumstances. Moreover, FATF’s
approach attempts to regulate hawala-type systems with the same set of rules as those for
banks, which is an impossible proposition to implement due to the inbuilt mechanisms of
these informal transfer systems. This chapter has concluded that Pakistan’s peculiar
domestic, economic and cultural realities demand a regulatory approach where the benefits
of hawala as an essential public service tool can be utilized while simultaneously reducing
the impact of its criminal use in transferring illicit funds abroad. This requires a change in
the current approach to regulating these systems. We have concluded that the possibilities
to explore hawala as an alternative financial instrument in Pakistan can be considered on
similar lines as Islamic banks are operating parallel to the conventional western banks,
despite fundamental differences.
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Chapter 8
8.1

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

In conclusion, this thesis has attempted to understand why the far-reaching international
AML/CFT regulation to curb informal value transfer systems, such as hawala, that were put
in place in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the ensuing
‘War on Terrorism’, have not borne fruitful results. In studying the example of Pakistan, the
thesis has aimed to elaborate the challenges and issues that engulf the regulation of hawalatype IVTS. While Pakistan is only one of many countries where hawala is prevalent and
while solutions that may work in one jurisdiction are not necessarily transferrable to other
situations, the lessons we can learn from the Pakistan experience do have wider
implications. The purpose of the thesis is to draw lessons from Pakistan in order to
highlight the regulatory issues as well as short-comings in the existing regulatory
prescription that attempts to counter IVTS with the objective of replacing these systems
with formalized structures that can be regulated in the same manner as formal banking
institutions are monitored.
The thesis has argued that in order to keep up with its international obligations under and
commitment to the ‘War on Terrorism’ as well as due to its domestic policy concerns that
warrant hawala regulation, the SBP created licensed and registered money exchange
companies in 2002. The idea was that within a period of two years, a well-documented
corporate foreign exchange sector would be established and hawala would cease to exist.
Unfortunately, the SBP’s attempt at hawala regulation through the creation of a corporate
order has not been successful. Hawala continues to prevail while the regulatory efforts have
resulted in alarming consequences and resulted in an alternative ‘grey market’, comprising
the so-called formally regulated exchange companies that are found to be operating, thus
showing corporate governance failure in Pakistan. It has been concluded that the SBP has
not been able to create sustainable corporate institutions that it could effectively protect and
regulate. On the other hand, SBP’s Pakistan Remittance Initiative, which was meant to
counter hawala in a free market through competition, has turned out to be state patronage of
the commercial banks. The project is mired in scandal and corruption in which billions have
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allegedly been doled out from the public exchequer as a result of alleged collusion between
commercial banks and officials of the SBP.
Notwithstanding the failure of the 2002 reforms, it has been argued that these reforms need
to be viewed in perspective because the reforms were fundamentally ill-conceived and
introduced without taking steps that were required to mitigate the impact of those factors
that directly challenge hawala regulation. Among these problems are mainly corruption and
tax evasion by the Pakistani elite. Funds which are generated through tax evasion and
corruption constitute a large part of Pakistan’s shadow economy and are subsequently
siphoned off through the use of these informal transfer systems. The Pakistani ruling
governments are unwilling to take action to introduce fundamental taxation reforms as most
of the elected politicians do not themselves pay income tax, yet Pakistan continues to
receive financial assistance from the international community .Whilst these factors
emphasize why regulatory reforms in Pakistan are necessary, it has also raised questions
about the role of international donors who have not used their substantial influence to push
the Pakistani elite for essential reforms; instead they continue to finance the country with
the money their citizens pay in taxes. The question remains: if the Pakistani elite are
unwilling to take action to introduce taxation reforms, increase revenues and improve
services for the poor, will the international community use its influence to push for the
essential reforms required? So far, the role of the international donors has remained elusive
in regard to the required essential reforms.
It has also been argued that hawala prevails in today’s globalized world due to the
disparities and irregularities in international trade and finance. Large sections of the world
operate ‘under the radar’ and as a result financing of transnational transit trade by the
hawala networks which are facilitated by migrant workers in major labour importing
countries such as, UAE and Saudi Arabia is just one example of hawala’s integration into
the global financial edifice. We have argued that hawala is being used as a logical business
solution and reaction to repressive and restrictive government policies and so, even though
a view may be taken that with strict regulatory frameworks and effective law enforcement
the source countries can deal with terrorism financing and other financial crimes, one can
argue that hawala will continue to prevail as long as disparities in government polices and
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regulatory loopholes exist making hawala the most cost effective and efficient option for its
customers.
The problem with the current international approach is that it views IVTS through the prism
of the formal financial systems. The international regulatory community tends to ignore that
fact that despite being similar to the western banking, hawala is a distinct fund transfer
system that needs to be viewed on its own merits. Unfortunately, the focus of FATF’s
hawala regulatory efforts has remained on ‘converting’ or ‘transforming’ hawala into banklike structures, without appreciating that attempts to deprive these networks of their distinct
identity by way of regulation have not been successful and regulation has largely failed in
countries where it is most required. One such example is Pakistan where the licensing and
registration regulation through the creation of exchange companies has been counterproductive on mainly three accounts. Firstly, it has increased the cost of the hawala
operations because the creation of exchange companies entailed an initial capital
requirement which was a costly venture against the minimal overheads of hawala.
Secondly, the weak Pakistani state does not have the institutional capacity for enforcement
of the regulation. Lastly, since the regulation did not consider the social fabric and cultural
realities of Pakistan, particularly in the tribal areas where hawala is engrained in the
cultural traditions, the regulatory efforts have been taken by the local population as an
authoritarian attack on the traditional practices rather than a serious attempt at reform.
The apparent failure of the regulation in Pakistan (and elsewhere) has raised many
questions about FATF’s approach to IVTS regulation. FATF wants hawala to comply with
the reporting and compliance standards applicable to banking and other formal structures.
The thesis has questioned whether such an approach is realistic and if so, can a country like
Pakistan comply with these standards, in spirit, when hawala-type transfers are essentially
outlawed in its jurisdiction. As an example of the impracticable implementation of the
regulations, the thesis has argued that over the years FATF transparency and compliance
standards have remained far from successful even for banking institutions for which these
were originally designed. As a result, many leading banks have incurred millions of dollars
of fines for non-compliance with FATF’s AML/CFT standards.
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Based on the discussion in the thesis, financial policy makers need to be clear regarding the
objective of regulating hawala-type systems. In Pakistan’s case the vast bulk of funds
which are transferred through the hawala channels comprise migrant remittances which are
facilitated and channelled to the unbanked and underserved populations who have no easy
access to formal financial facilities. On the other hand, hawala is also facilitating the
transfer of funds generated from fiscal offences such as corruption and tax-evasion as well
as criminal offences. This means that Pakistan essentially requires a hawala regulatory
strategy that takes into account the ‘dual function’ of IVTS in its economy. This ‘dual
function’ of hawala is evidently the critical policy factor from Pakistan’s perspective.
Pakistan would not want hawala to stop because it is essentially filling a critical gap by
providing easy access to finance to the many poor and the underprivileged. At the same
time, the impact of illicit financial flows (proceeds of corruption, tax evasion and
smuggling through transit trade, and across borders to Afghanistan and Dubai) needs to be
prevented.
In view of Pakistan’s peculiar policy concerns discussed in the thesis, it is argued that for
Pakistan, a single track hawala regulatory strategy may not be sufficient, because of its
peculiar geo political situation, administrative and institutional issues. Instead, a multitrack strategy is required that involves coordination between the various government
agencies at different levels as well as international cooperation. This would be a
challenging task, given that the Pakistani state is weak and failing (corruption is prevalent,
laws are over-ridden, and vested interests are deep rooted). We take the view that the
Pakistani state lacks the capacity required to undertake multifarious regulatory
responsibilities that would result from the adoption of a multi-track strategy. The
international community could have played a significant role by pushing the successive
governments to take action for essential reforms, such as improving tax collection or
reducing corruption but, as discussed, the international donors mainly the United States and
the IMF have so far remained elusive to requisite reforms and have, in this manner,
supported the status quo. A most recent example where, despite international involvement,
reforms have not worked is that of the United States’ facilitation in improving PakistanAfghanistan transit trade procedures and control to prevent smuggling but where no real
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success has been achieved. We argue that reforms in the sense of improving systems is
perhaps a very tall order due to Pakistan’s peculiar economic, political and cultural realities
as well as the other geo-political dynamics discussed in the thesis.
In these circumstances, Pakistan should rethink its approach to hawala regulation for the
following reasons:
i) It is by now clear that the western banks cannot overcome or disincentivize hawala. The
SBP has introduced many financial products and incentives through the Pakistani banks.
The latest of these incentives, the ‘Pakistan Remittance Initiative’, has also failed to
eliminate hawala or reduce its impact. Hawala still prevails in Pakistan as the most popular
choice.
ii) Western regulatory models may not work in Pakistan due to its peculiar geo-political,
economic and cultural circumstances. Moreover these regulatory models are essentially
devised for formal institutions as the modern western thinking is not familiar with informal
financial instruments that are based on personalized values. Hence, ‘trust-based’ systems —
carrying out financial transactions in the absence of conventional documentation,
guarantees, insurances and third party interventions — are unusual for the western policy
makers. For them, trust is a value more suited to personal relationships and interactions
rather than to the performance of financial exchange functions, for which the western
modernization has devised specialized banking institutions. On the other hand, the
geographical and cultural realities of Pakistan, where informal institutions and practices are
prevalent, are different. Hence Pakistan should give credence to its ‘peculiar’ circumstances
in devising regulatory policies.
iii) There is nothing inherently wrong with IVTS. Hawala is essentially an instrument of
trade financing and exchange of goods and services much in the same manner that banking
is. In this way, it can be used as an instrument of essential public service and
simultaneously is vulnerable to abuse in similar manner as banks are. The view that the
informality of hawala increases its vulnerability to abuse is misled and requires review.
iv) If Pakistan can operate two parallel banking systems —western and Islamic banking—
simultaneously, then why can’t hawala, which is similar to the Islamic banking in the sense
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that it keeps a close link with the real economy, operate legally as a parallel financial
instrument?
v) Last but not least, the objective of hawala regulation should be to stop or reduce the
criminal use of IVTS and not simply adopt formalism and legalism for the sake of ‘window
dressing’ in order to impress the international community while hawala continues unabated
in an unregulated environment. As suggested by experts,608 hawala regulatory strategy can
be based on flexibility and creative thinking. We argue that Pakistan can devise regulation
in consideration of its ground realities instead of implementation of FATF’s impossible to
adopt regulation.
Based on the above discussion, we are basically arguing a case for a ‘soft approach’ to
hawala-type IVTS in Pakistan instead of completely declaring these systems outlawed. It is
the ‘if you can’t beat them, join them’ approach that the Pakistan government requires in
order to gain optimum benefits of hawala and at the same time regulate these systems to
prevent or reduce their abuse. On the basis of the fieldwork findings of this research, it is
recommended that a regulatory approach based on two key elements may achieve the
objective of effective hawala regulation in Pakistan:
i)

Incentives for Hawaladars: So far, Pakistan’s hawala regulatory approach has

remained focused on providing incentives to the formal banking sector. The various
initiatives that the SBP has taken over the years to regulate the informal sector have focused
on providing benefits or incentives to the commercial banks to channel more and more
funds. This approach has evidently ignored the majority of Pakistan’s population which has
no access to the formal banking channels and is catered for by hawaladars in the informal
sector. Simultaneously, whilst the hawaladars are important stakeholders in the financial
network operations in Pakistan, they remain excluded from the system because in the eyes
of the law they do not exist. Although in 2002 the SBP (through the licensing and
registration regulation) has attempted to bring the hawaladars into the legal and regulatory
net SBP’s otherwise well-intentioned efforts failed because the reforms did not provide
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enough incentives to the hawaladars to become registered with and licensed by the
government.
It is clear that if regulation increases the costs of the hawala operations, it will never work.
The hawaladars require an incentive that provides them legal cover while not increasing
the cost of their operations. The government/SBP needs to consider such an incentive for
the hawaladars to operate legally. This may include policies that entail negligible initial
costs or tax exemptions or alternatively accept hawala as a parallel trade financing
instrument based on its own settlement procedures and other built-in mechanisms as
regulatory standards.
ii) Community Participation: A key element of the Pakistan government hawala
regulatory strategy should focus on involving the hawaladar community. We know that
hawala are community based networks and hence it is reasonable to believe that the
hawaladars not only personally know each other but are also protective of each other’s
interests, particularly if they believe that the objective of the regulation is detrimental to
their collective business interests. In this connection, the Exchange Companies Association
in Karachi and the Saraf Association in Peshawar (and also Quetta) markets can play
important bridging roles between the hawaladar community and the government. Such
approach will generate positive feelings in the community regarding the objective of the
regulation as beneficial to them and to the country’s interests. At the same time, such an
approach will enable the law enforcement agencies to separate and identify the criminal
elements in the market with the help of the community, through a more inclusive ‘follow
the hawaladar’ as opposed to the ‘follow the money’609 approach.
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8.2

Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions of this research, the specific recommendations for
hawala regulation in Pakistan are as follows:
1. Pakistan’s hawala regulatory policy needs to be devised keeping in view its
geographical, economic and cultural realities as well as hawala’s relative operational
efficiency compared with the formal banking institutions.
2. The government/ SBP should consider legalizing hawala.
3. The government/SBP should consider exploring regulatory mechanisms that allow
incentives to the hawaladars, as follows:
i) Negligible initial costs to legalize their businesses.
ii) Tax exemptions.
iii) Accepting hawala as an alternative financial instrument based on its own settlement
procedures and other built-in mechanisms as regulatory standards.
4. Representatives from the hawaladar community should be involved in the regulatory
process. The Exchange Companies and the Saraf Associations can play a role to bridge the
gap between the hawaladars and the government and convince the hawaladars to cooperate
with the law enforcement agencies in identifying the criminal elements in the market. In
this manner, a more inclusive, ‘follow the hawaladar’ regulatory strategy can emerge.
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Appendix A:

List of Interviewees

Group 1: Governance
1. Official of the State Bank of Pakistan (G-SBP01)
2. Official of the State Bank of Pakistan (G-SBP02)
3. Representative of the Forex Association of Pakistan (G-FAP01)
4. Representative of the Forex Association of Pakistan (G-FAP02)
5. Official of the Federal Investigation Agency in Karachi (G-FIA01)
6. Official of the Federal Investigation Agency in Peshawar (G-FIA02)
7. Official of the Federal Ministry of Trade and Commerce (G-MCT01)
8. Senior Official of the Federal Board of Revenue (G-FBR.01)
9. Official of Pakistan Customs Service (G-PCS 01)

Group 2: Hawaladars
1. Hawaladar in Peshawar (G-H01)
2. Hawaladar in Peshawar (G-H02)

Group 3: Other Businesses
1. Exchange Company owner in Karachi (G-OB01)
2. Banker in Peshawar (G-OB03)

Group 4: Customers
1. Migrant Worker from a village in Punjab province (G-C01)
2. Migrant Workers’ Family from Peshawar (G-C02)
3. Importer from Karachi (G-C03)
4. Exporter in Peshawar (G-C04)
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Appendix B
1.

Sample of Interview Questions

Questions for Financial Regulators and Policy makers
 What was foreign exchange market structure before 2002 when State Bank of
Pakistan introduced foreign exchange market reforms?
 How do you see the 2002 foreign exchange market reforms introduced by the SBP
in retrospect? Have these reforms been successful in eliminating the kerb and the
unreported remittance transfers, unify the markets and create sufficient financial
deepening as envisioned by SBP? If no, why? If yes, how so?
 What is the “lure of kerb” in Pakistan’s foreign exchange market?
 When replacing traditional money changers with exchange companies, what were
the assumptions of State Bank of Pakistan regarding the change to occur on an
operational level? How far has this change occurred?
 Were aspects of informal transfer systems that make it a source of public service to
the poor and the deprived considered by the State Bank?
 Why were some policies implemented in 2002 relaxed by the State Bank later on?
Was there a back-lash or revolt from the market?
 What are the loop-holes in the present regulatory structure governing foreign
exchange and remittance transfers in Pakistan and how are they being addressed?
 Are the laws and regulations governing foreign exchange and remittance transfers
sufficient to prosecute miscreants in the formal remittance business?
 Other than weak legal and regulatory structure, what practical challenges do you see
for financial regulators in the Pakistani foreign exchange market?
 What steps are being taken to address regulatory challenges for financial regulation
Pakistan is facing as a result of its international obligations through agreements such
as Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement?
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2.

Questions for Financial Investigators and Prosecutors
 Are the laws and regulations governing foreign exchange and remittance transfers
sufficient to investigate miscreants in the formal remittance business?
 Other than weak legal and regulatory structure, what practical challenges do you see
for financial investigators in the Pakistani foreign exchange market?
 What steps are being taken to address regulatory challenges for financial regulation
Pakistan is facing as a result of its international obligations through agreements such
as Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement?
 What capacity building is required for better financial investigation in Pakistan?

3.

Questions for Bankers and Foreign Exchange Dealers.
 What is the structure of Pakistan’s foreign exchange remittance market? Who are
the key players and what roles and influences can be observed in overall market
operations?
 What, in your view, should be done to eliminate the “kerb” in the foreign exchange
market?
 Has the State Bank’s decision to replace traditional money changers with exchange
companies in 2002 been successful in introducing a corporate culture and
unification of markets in the forex business. Has it created sufficient financial
deepening as envisioned in the reforms package?
 What practical and operational changes have occurred in forex business since 2002?
 Is the present regulatory structure impractical in view of the market operations? If
yes, why was the market in favour of these reforms? Was the market taken on-board
with the decision? Was the market divided in support of these reforms? Was there a
back-lash from the market?
 What are the operational difficulties faced by the “formal” remittance sector?
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 What are the practical and operational differences between formal and informal
remittance transfers in Pakistan? Pl focus on costs, speed, convenience?
 What is the level of competition between the formal and the informal remittance
markets and, why or why not?
 Do social relations, links and trust between various market players work to achieve
profitable transactions?
 Do social norms influence the market dynamics? How?
 Are ethnic, community, family and cultural ties important in market/business
decision-making? How?
 Is it true that customers prefer informal remittance systems because the formal
procedures are cumbersome, always changing and bureaucratic?
 Does poverty and lack of education affect customers’ choice for formal remittance
systems?

4.

Questions for Hawaladars.
 What are the practical and operational differences between formal and informal
remittance transfers in Pakistan? Pl focus on costs, speed, convenience?
 What is the level of competition between the formal and the informal remittance
markets and, why or why not?
 Do social relations, links and trust between various market players work to achieve
profitable transactions?
 Do social norms influence the market dynamics? How?
 Are ethnic, community, family and cultural ties important in market/business
decision-making? How?
 Is it true that customers prefer informal remittance systems because the formal
procedures are cumbersome, always changing and bureaucratic?
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 Does poverty and lack of education affect customers’ choice for formal remittance
systems?
5.

Questions for Hawala Customers

a)

Migrant Workers, their Families.
 Are “formal” financial facilities available in your home town, village or area? If yes,
do you use these, if they are available and you don’t use them, why?
 Are you a frequent sender or receiver of foreign remittances? If yes, what remittance
transfer method do you prefer and why?
 Other than cost efficiency, what are the factors that may affect your choice?
 Do social relations, ethnic or linguistic ties with remittance service providers play a
role in determining your choice? If yes, do you get discounts or bargains in
transactions because of these relationships?
 Do you “trust” formal institutions during financial transactions? If yes, why? If no,
would you like to explain your reasons for distrust?
 Do you think that customers prefer informal remittance transfer systems or cash
payment because the formal procedures are cumbersome, always changing, and
bureaucratic?
 Does poverty and lack of education affect customers’ choice for formal systems and
procedures?

b)

Businessmen, Importers, Exporters
 Are you a frequent buyer or seller of foreign exchange? If yes, do you prefer open
market rates or inter-bank rates? Why?
 Do social relations, ethnic or linguistic ties with foreign exchange dealers play a role
in determining your choice? If yes, do you get discounts or bargains in transactions
because of these relationships?
 Do you “trust” formal institutions during financial transactions? If yes, why? If no,
would you like to explain your reasons for distrust?
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c)

Parents of Students Studying Abroad, Travellers.
 Are you a frequent buyer of foreign exchange or sender of foreign remittances? If
yes, what remittance transfer method do you prefer and why?
 Other than cost efficiency, what are the factors that may affect your choice?
 Do social relations, ethnic or linguistic ties with money changers and remittance
service providers play a role in determining your choice? If yes, do you get
discounts or bargains in transactions because of these relationships?
 Do you “trust” formal institutions during financial transactions? If yes, why? If no,
would you like to explain your reasons for distrust?
 Do you think that customers prefer informal remittance transfer systems or cash
payment because the formal procedures are cumbersome, always changing, and
bureaucratic?
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Appendix C: Summary of Interviews
My Key Words

Interview Key Word

Interviewee

1. Structure

Structure

G-SBP -01

Clients

Reforms' Success

Responses
Banks, forex comp & Hawala
Pak. Remittance Initiative’s success

G-SBP-02
Key Players

Operational Change

Type of Business

Hawala’spublic
service
policies relaxed

Size (customer
/annum)
Volume
(US$/day)

Money Exchange Companies replaced
money changers
Hawala helped poor & unbanked
populations
Successful transition; no market revolt; SBP
has disturbed the status-quo
FERA is a self-contained law; SBP keeps
updating policies

laws & policies

Efficiency
2.Market
Operations
How do MECs
get US$?

Structure

G-FAP-01

Key Players

G-FAP-02

Roles
3.Regulatory
Issues
ShadowEconom
y
Tax Evasion

Influences
Regulatory Issues

Corruption
Laws (FCR)

Efficiency

Hawala rates are better than banks and
kerb
banks, forex companies

Argument
SBP side-lined/reduced Hawala
since 2002;
corporatized market, Involved
banks
Create a self-regulatory corporate
culture; introduced formality
Hawala is filling the void left by the
commercial banks
SBP has to keep all stakeholders
on board
Policies are updated in view of the
market situation
Hawala’s rates are a issue of
supply/demand, filling void left
by banks
ECs have taken hawala in their fold

Econo
mic

Politi
cal

Soc
ial

Legal
L

E
L
L
L
L
E

L

banks, forex companies,some people are
doing hawala
formal vs Illegal; forex companies not
involved in hawala
if any forex company is involved then it is
reported to SBP
liaison required between SBP &FBR;

Hawala is still going on

L

some people are still doing hawala

L

clandestine dealingsin currencies
(is going on)
Monitoring is required

L

documentation of the economy;corruption
control measures are required
improve tax collection

There are issues in hawala
regulation

L

hawala can never be stopped because it is
very efficient

Funds generated in the informal
sector will need a channel

Two complainants are required to register a

Law is the main challenge in

L

E

Institutions (FIA)
Smuggling (ATT)

Laws

G-FIA -01

L
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case under FERA; FERA is an out-dated
Enforcement Issues

G-FIA-02

4. Hawala
Enablers
Trust

law; FERA protects miscreants .The arrested
hawaladar is
bailed in 1 day; immediately back in
business;
becomes a threat to law-enforcement,
PECO lapsed;
FATA; cross border movement; Afghan
nationals

enforcement

No cyber crime law since 2010

L

tribal links with Afghanistan;
Transit Trade

P

S

L

Networks
Family
Connections

Market Players

Memon-Gujrati; Pushtun&Afghan

ethnic, linguistic ties; groups
spread internationally
through migration & resettlement

Market Structure

A &B category forex companies;Peshawar
ChowkYadgar market is largest hawala
facility
in Asia;400 shops,4 registered

A category MEC owners control
themarket

5. Hawala
Efficiency
Rates
Speed

Market operation

E

L

E

L

MEC franchises are all over Pakistan and
international
Big businessmen deplete dollars, create
artificial demand.

lack of
documentatio
n
Regulations/San
ctions

MECs have sister concerns in Dubai.
Foreign exchange is available on
cash and credit; Chamak is the rate of
exchange
Peshawar market $10-12 million daily

Efficiency
Market Volume/day
Afghan Transit Trade

B category MECsdo hawala;
networks in Dubai
Peshawar market caters ATT,
migrants

L

G-MCT-01

Revisedtransit trade agreement since 2010.

E

P

S

L

L
stringent regulations to curb
smuggling and dumping

Afghan trucks will carry cargo
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Smuggling

to Khi. Pakistani trucks to Central Asia.
Tracking devices on trucks; financial
guarantees

Afghan Transit Trade

G-FBR -01

Smuggling

border crossing

G-PCS-01

Total ATT trucks missing during 2009-11
were 28,802; only 560 could be traced.
Loss to govt. PKR 50 billion.

100 containers cross-over daily.

L

ATT is the cause of 75 per cent
smuggling in Pakistan
Recommendations are to bring
down duties; valuate goods,
restrict quantities
Afghan importers to open LCs with
localAfghan banks
People are border crossing without
documents

E

L

E

L

L
L

20-50000 people cross border daily , only5
per cent have documents.
ATT trucks re-routed through FATA

L
L

Market Operation

G-OB-01

30 MECs,15000 hawala operators

hawala still operational

L

Market Volume/day

G-OB-02

non-dollar currency exportedto Dubai; US$
brought in officially
No cash US$ import anymore, transfer
through banks.
kerb turn-over 5-6 million daily

physical transfer of foreign
exchange
Foreign exchange transfer into
Pakistani bank accounts
size of black market not known

L

hawala rates are better. Hawala caters to
the
undocumented economy, both domestic
and international. Examples of the kind
of funds transferredare: migrant
workers’ extra income,
expat businessman’s untaxed income,
foreign exchange acquired by resident
citizens.

economic advantage of hawala

E

People buy US$ and keep inprivate
lockers , travelers bring in
foreign exchange everyday

E

Restrictive policies are responsible for
hawala. For example, ban on gold
import or that the

formal sector is offering same
efficiency

E

Challenges
Efficiency

Regulations

L
L

L
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MECs cannot do trade treaty.
Size

MEC clients one million/annum

formality vs informality

Different Dynamics

MEC report and document transactions.
They are legal entities.
MECs deposit extra US$ in the inter-bank.

formal is strong if there is liquidity

Networks

competition b/w formal &informal depends
on
liquidity in the market.
without trust & networks market cannot
function

trust relations and networks are
important in foreign exchange

better rates than formal, quickest transfer
anywhere internationally, within half hr;
advance
payment settled later, rate margin 0.100.30
agents in major financial centers; cultural
ties
business concentration

More efficient than formal

Clients

Migrants, Importers, businessmen

caters to a variety of clients

E

Comparison Formal

hawala is simple and
uncomplicated, no documents

E

L

Trust

trader loaned 100 million on promise to
return in 10 days.
Hawala caters to uneducated,non-english
speaking customers in foreign countries.
KNC, no cheating, no delay

KYC mechanism inbuilt

E

L

Regulation

tribal elders resolve disputes

dispute resolution mechanism

E

L

law enforcement

harrassment by agencies; money is
confiscated
formal facilities not available in village,
remittances are received either through
the
hawaladar or the postman

law enforcement detrimental to
market
hawala is filling the void

On the spot receipt; home delivery, minimal
documentation
banks require at least one week, procedures

hawala is simple and
uncomplicated
hawala is simple and

Efficiency

G-H-01
G-H-02

Networks

Formal market

G-C-01

G-C-02
Efficiency of hawala

G-C-03

hawala vs banks

G-C-04

L
E

S
E

L

E

L

transnational networks

P

S

L
E

E
E
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hawala trade
financing

are cumbersome , bureaucratic and
always changing.
forex bought to clear import bills; available
on cash and credit
Ratefor foreign exchange oncredit is more;
trust relationships
Foreign exporters demand hawala mode of
payment; government regulations and
traderoutes matter such as payments
for Iran and Afghanistan are done in
Dubai.

uncomplicated
trust relationships play a role in
trade financing
access to credit based on personal
relations
hawala becomes business logic

S

E

P

L
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Appendix D:Detailed Statistical Tabulation of Results

Influences

Enforcement
Issues

Laws & Policies

Efficiency

Operations

Cl_Businessmen

Cl_Importers/Ex
porters

Cl_Migrant
Workers

Cl_Expat
Pakistanis

Other Travellers

Trust &
Networks

Reform Success

Market Change

Afghan Transit
Trade

Shadow
Economy

Corruption

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

G.FAP.02

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

G.SPB.01

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

G.SPB.02

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

Federal
Investigation
Agency
Pakistan Customs
Service
Federal Board of
Revenue
Ministry of
Commerce and
Trade

G.FIA.01

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

G.FIA.02

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

G.PCS.01

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

G.FBR.01

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

G.MCT.01

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Other
Business

Exchange
Companies/banks

G.OB.01

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

G OB.02

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

G-H.01

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

Unspecified

G-H.02

1

1

1
0

1

HawalaDar

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

G-C.01

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

Exchange
companies
Association of
Pakistan
State Bank of
Pakistan
Governance

Clients

Migrant Workers

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Smuggling

Groups

Institutions

Key Role

G.FAP.01

Interviewee
Groups

Border Crossing

Interview
ee ID

Key Players

Regulatory Issues

Structure

Hawala Market

0
0
0
0
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0
0

Family of Migrant
Workers

G-C.02

1

0

Importers

G-C.03

1

1

Exporters

G-C.04

1

1

0
0
0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0
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Appendix D: Detailed Statistical Tabulation of Results (%)
Corruption

Smuggling

Border
Crossing

Institutions

Cl_Business
men
Cl_Importers
/Exporters
Cl_Migrant
Workers
Cl_Expat
Pakistanis
Other
Travellers
Trust &
Networks
Reform
Success
Market
Change
Afghan
Transit Trade
Shadow
Economy

Operations

Other

Efficiency

Governa
nce

Federal
Investiga
tion
Agency
Pakistan
Customs
Service
Federal
Board of
Revenue
Minsitry
of
Commerc
e and
Trade
Exchange

Influences

State
Bank of
Pakistan

Key Role

Exchange
compani
es
Associati
on of
Pakistan

Intervie
wee ID

Key Players

Groups

Regulatory Issues

Structure

Intervie
wee
Groups

Enforcement
Issues
Laws &
Policies

Hawala Market

G.FAP.0
1

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.7
9%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

G.FAP.0
2

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.7
9%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

G.SPB.0
1
G.SPB.0
2

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.7
9%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.7
9%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

G.FIA.01

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

G.FIA.02

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%
0.00
%
0.00
%
0.00
%

0.0
0%
0.0
0%
0.0
0%
0.0
0%

G.PCS.0
1

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.0
0%

G.FBR.0
1

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

G.MCT.0
1

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

G-OB.01

0.79

0.79

0.79

0.79

0.00

0.00

0.79

0.79

0.79

0.79

0.79

0.79

0.79

0.79

0.79

0.7

0.00

0.79

0.79

0.00

0.00

0.7
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Business

Hawala
Dar

Clients

Compani
es

Unspecifi
ed
Migrant
Workers
Family of
Migrant
Workers
Importer
s
Exporters

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

9%

%

%

%

%

G-OB.02

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.7
9%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

G-H.01

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.0
0%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

G-H.02

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

G-C.01

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

G-C.02

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

0.00
%

0.00
%

G-C.03

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

0.79
%

G-C.04

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

0.79
%

HAWALA
MARKET

76.98%

REGULAT
ORY
ISSUES

23.02%

0.00
%

%
0.00
%
0.00
%
0.00
%
0.00
%

9%
0.7
9%
0.7
9%
0.0
0%
0.0
0%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.0
0%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.79
%

0.00
%

0.00
%
0.00
%

0.0
0%
0.0
0%
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Appendix D:Detailed Statistical Tabulation of Results (% contd.)

Key Role

Influences

Enforcement
Issues

Laws &
Policies

Efficiency

Operations

Cl_Businessm
en

Cl_Importers/
Exporters

Cl_Migrant
Workers

Cl_Expat
Pakistanis

Other
Travellers

Trust &
Networks

Reform
Success
Market
Change
Afghan
Transit Trade

Shadow
Economy

Corruption

Smuggling

Border
Crossing

GOVERNA
NCE

4.76
%

3.17
%

3.17
%

2.38
%

1.59
%

4.76
%

3.17
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

3.17
%

3.
17
%

3.17
%

0.00
%

0.
00
%

1.
59
%

0.7
9%

OTHER
BUSINESS

1.59
%

1.59
%

1.59
%

1.59
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

1.59
%

1.59
%

1.59
%

1.59
%

1.59
%

1.59
%

1.59
%

1.59
%

1.59
%

1.
59
%

0.00
%

1.59
%

1.
59
%

0.
00
%

0.0
0%

1.59%

HAWALA
DARS

1.59
%

1.59
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

1.59
%

0.79
%

1.59
%

1.59
%

1.59
%

1.59
%

1.59
%

0.79
%

0.79
%

1.59
%

0.79
%

1.59
%

0.00
%

0.79%

3.17
%

1.59
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

1.59
%

3.17
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

0.00
%

1.59
%

0.00
%

1.59
%

0.00
%

0.
79
%
0.
00
%

0.0
0%

CLIENTS

1.
59
%
1.
59
%

0.0
0%

0.00%

0.
00
%
0.
00
%
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Institutions

Interview
ee Groups

Key Players

Regulatory Issues

Structure

Hawala Market

0.00%
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